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ABSTRACT 
Ukraine’s creation of national heroes reflects the challenges of nation-building after the 
fall of the Soviet Union.  Since its independence in 1991, Ukraine has attempted to “rehabilitate” 
controversial political figures into national heroes in order to create a united national history.  
Nations have always depended on symbols and perhaps one of the most important symbols is 
that of a national hero.  A person who fought and possibly died fighting for a national cause can 
unite and inspire future generations while legitimizing the necessity of the state.  Along with 
inspiring faith and courage, the focus on national heroes manifests norms, goals, and are a 
medium for imposing those beliefs upon a society.  While Ukraine has literary heroes, political 
figures are controversial.  My research has focused on five figures: Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, Ivan 
Mazepa, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Symon Petliura, and Stepan Bandera due to their attempts to 
build an independent state in Ukrainian history. 
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank my wife, parents, and advisory committee for all of their support 
and encouragement during the writing of this thesis.  
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………………...iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS …………………………………………………………………….....iv 
INTRODUCTION….…………………………………………………………………………......1 
BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKYI………………………………..………………………………....18 
IVAN MAZEPA………………………………………………….……………………………...34 
MYKHAILO HRUSHEVSKY……………………………………………………….……….....49 
SYMON PETLIURA AND AN ATTEMPT AT AN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE …………...84 
STEPAN BANDERA AND THE OUN ……………………………………………………….110 
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………..……..140 
BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………..……………………………………..……149 
APPENDIX: MAP OF UKRAINE……………………………………………………………..156 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
In January 2010 outgoing Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko honored Stepan 
Bandera posthumously with the award “Hero of Ukraine.”  The announcement of this award 
unleashed a wave of protest across Eastern Ukraine, as well as denunciations from the European 
Union and from the Russian Federation condemning Yushchenko’s decision.  The protests 
condemning Stepan Bandera’s reception of the award linked Bandera with Nazi occupation and 
even presented him in altered photos wearing an SS uniform.  Western Ukrainian pro-Bandera 
groups rallied to his defense waving banners of him (which also make their appearance at 
Western Ukrainian soccer games), renamed streets after him, erected monuments to him, and 
even issued a commemorative postage stamp of him.  Incoming President Viktor Yanukovych 
promptly declared that in his first acts he would revoke the award
1
 and in January 2011 his office
announced the revocation official.
2
The uproar over establishing Bandera as a hero of Ukraine is symptomatic of the divided 
society still trying to establish a united national conception after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in 1991.  Due to its division between Poland and Russia through much of its history, the 
division between the Habsburg and Russian Empires for almost 150 years, and its subordination 
in the Soviet Union, any possible political figure that could be a national hero remains highly 
controversial.  This controversy over national heroes extends beyond simply Stepan Bandera.  
Ukraine is a nation without heroes.  This essay will examine five case studies of potential and 
1
 “Yanukovych to repeal Bandera hero decree” Kyiv Post March 10, 2010
http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/yanukovych-to-repeal-bandera-hero-decree-
62152.html (accessed December 6, 2013). 
2
 Pres-sluzhba Prezidenta Ukrainy Viktora Yanukovycha, “Rishennyam sudu prezydentskyi ukaz 
‘Pro prisvoyennya S.Banderi zvannya Heroy Ukrainy’ skasovano” under ostanni novyny 
http://www.president.gov.ua/news/19103.html (accessed December 6, 2013).
2 
controversial political national heroes: Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, Ivan Mazepa, Mykhailo 
Hrushevsky, Symon Petliura, and lastly Stepan Bandera through historical memory. This essay 
will utilize Ukrainian and Russian primary sources including Mykhailo Hrushevsky’s histories, 
Symon Petliura’s articles, Stepan Bandera’s writing, and declassified KGB documents as well as 
recent (since 2000) Western scholarship from leading scholars like Timothy Snyder, Paul Robert 
Magocsi, Serhy Yekelchyk, and Orest Subtelny.  Each of these potential heroes attempted to 
build a unified and independent state in the Ukrainian lands yet remain controversial within 
Ukraine due to accusations ranging from ensnaring Ukraine under a larger power, trading away 
Ukrainian lands, anti-Semitism, treachery, and even genocide.  
One may ask why a focus on Ukraine is necessary.  Not only is Ukraine a large 
geographic region of Europe but it is also one of the largest states population-wise that does not 
have a cohesive people.  Ukraine remains a state caught on the border between East and West, 
between Russia and Europe, between cleavages to its past and outlooks on its future.  Imperial 
Russia developed itself based on its distinctiveness from Europe and the West and that outlook 
remained through the Soviet era and left an impact on Ukraine when it gained independence.
3
Shortly after gaining independence, scholars like Mark von Hagen and Andrew Wilson discussed 
how Ukrainians had been challenging the Soviet legacy, attempting to nation build, and establish 
itself as part of Europe.
4
  These Ukrainian attempts to nation build and connect itself to Europe
continue to be a major part of internal politics today. 
3
 Liah Greenfeld.  Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1992), 266-7. 
4
 Mark von Hagen. “Does Ukraine Have a History?” Slavic Review 54 (1995):658-73. 
Andrew Wilson.  The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation. (New Haven: New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002). 
3 
Nation building, much like a national movement, depends on symbols and mythology to 
further their goals and inspire unity.  Symbols can include a new focus on important individuals, 
establishing heroes, a new flag, a new anthem, and downplaying or removing symbols of the 
previous regime.
5
  While it is difficult to measure something as subjective and esoteric as a
“national hero” there are some suitable markers to help guide the way.  If a person is important 
to a society, frequently there will be indicators and icons.  People and politicians generally create 
ways of honoring new figures that are considered important and downplaying former regime 
symbols by renaming streets, buildings, and museums after important figures, building new 
monuments to national heroes, writing histories to those figures, producing television and film 
documentaries and movies, and inclusion in textbooks.  So perhaps one of the most important 
symbols for a nascent nation is that of a national hero.  
The problems establishing these five people as national heroes reflect the problems of 
nation building in Ukraine.  Support for these five political figures is anemic, ranging from a 
high of 55% for Ivan Mazepa in Western Ukraine to a low of 6% for Symon Petliura in Eastern 
Ukraine.  Even with the highest rate, nearly half the population does not support the concept of 
Mazepa as a hero even though he is on the 10 Hryvnia note.
6
  Ernest Renan wrote that “the
essence of the nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have 
forgotten many things” to create “a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of sacrifices 
5
 Taras Kuzio. Ukraine: State and nation building. (London: Routledge, 1998), 217. 
6
 According to a 1997 survey “Mazepa had a 55% positive response in western Ukraine, 
compared to 22% in eastern Ukraine. Petliura had 31% and 6% and Bandera 41% and 7% 
respectively.  Contrasting those figures, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, the last secretary of the 
Communist Party of Ukraine received 18% and 31% respectively.” Andreas Kappeler. “From an 
Ethnonational to a Multiethnic to a Transnational Ukrainian History” in A Laboratory of 
Transnational History: Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography. Eds. Georgiy Kasianov 
and Philipp Ther (Budapest: Central European Press, 2009), 55. 
4 
that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future.”7  While
Ukrainians have many things in common, they have yet to establish cohesively what constitutes 
a Ukrainian national hero.  
One may ask what is the importance of a national hero to nation building?  Scholar 
Joseph Campbell argued that a society needed heroes “because [a hero] has a constellating image 
to pull together tendencies to separation, to pull them together into some intention.”8  Professor
Anthony D Smith argued that “every nationalism requires a touch stone of virtue and heroism, to 
guide and give meaning to the tasks of regeneration.  Heroes provide models of virtuous conduct, 
their deeds of valour inspire faith and courage in their oppressed and decadent descendants."
9
Along with inspiring faith and courage, the focus on national heroes manifests norms, goals, and 
are a medium for imposing and uniting those beliefs upon a society.  With such a divided 
interpretation of these political figures that fought for an independent Ukrainian state, it seems 
difficult if not impossible to establish common national heroes that create large-scale, common 
solidarity completing the nation building process and thus establishing a nation and national 
identity.  
Early Modern Era and the Rise of the Cossacks 
The people residing in the area now known as Ukraine have been known under a few 
different names.  Through much of their history the people have been known as the Rus’.  The 
other major appellations have derived from that.  In the West they were called Ruthenians, and 
7
 Ernest Renan. “What is a Nation?” in Becoming National: A Reader. eds. Eley, Geoff, and 
Ronald Grigor Suny, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 45, 53. 
8
 Joseph Campbell with Bill Moyers. The Power of Myth. (New York: MJF Books, 1988), 163. 
9
 Quoted in Guntis Šmidchens. “National Heroic Narratives in the Baltics as a Source for 
Nonviolent Political Action”  Slavic Review, Vol. 66, No. 3 (Fall, 2007), 487. 
5 
under the Russians they became known as the Malorus or Little Russians.  Through this paper 
the people will be referred to as Rus’, Ruthenians, Malorus or Little Russians depending on the 
context of the era and what state they resided within until the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries when they
started calling themselves Ukrainians.  For the sake of simplicity the territory will be referred to 
as Ukraine (unless certain regions are specifically named) and will correspond roughly with the 
current borders as represented in the Appendix.  Ukrainian city names will be presented as 
simplified translations from Ukrainian omitting translations of soft signs, thus as examples: Kyiv 
rather than Kiev, Kharkiv rather than Kharkov, Odesa rather than Odessa, and Lviv rather than 
L’viv, Lvov, or Lwow.  The name Ukraine stems from old Slavonic meaning on the border or 
frontier but the word remained limited in use for the region.  The border, though, is an apt 
description because through most of its existence it has been a border region for several different 
cultures.  Three different cultures, Poland-Lithuanian, Ottoman, and Russian, have contributed 
the most to its development.  
In the modern world nationality is taken as matter of factly as gender or height, but for 
much of history that is not the case.  There was no concept of nationality until the late 18
th
century and into the 19
th
 century.  What differentiated people from one another before that time
was primarily religion and class, and only partially state loyalty.  The majority of Rus’ identified 
themselves primarily as Orthodox Christians while the noble Rus’ included class along with the 
religious identification.  Neither of these groups saw any common unity except for religious 
affiliation even though they would have spoken the same language.  It is necessary to discuss the 
pre-national developments in Ukraine focusing primarily on the state, religious, and class 
developments since these have had long lasting consequences on future developments in the 
region.  Successful state formation during this early modern era not only aided particular cultural 
6 
development for nationalities, but also aided future nationalist claims that certain groups were a 
“historical” people deserving of a state while other “non-historical” people did not.  
One of the most important and most heavily contested eras of Ukrainian history is the 
Cossack Era because historians debate whether the situation in Ukrainian territory constituted a 
state or not.  Ukrainian historians contend that the Cossack actions established the foundation for 
an independent Ukrainian state.  In contrast both Polish and Russian historians largely view the 
Cossacks as ruffians on a rebellious border region between their respective states that brought on  
the downfall of one (Poland) and initiated the greatness of the other (Russia) when they 
integrated their Slavic brothers into the state.  Two figures, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and Ivan 
Mazepa, stand out in this era because they led the Ukrainian Cossacks and played the largest 
roles in this contested state development during the early modern period.  As well since the 
Cossack Era and these two men play such central roles in Ukrainian culture and nationalist 
thinking, it is necessary to give an introduction to them and their time. 
The Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania held the greatest sway over the area through 
the early modern period of the 14
th
-17
th
 centuries.  After the conquest of Galicia in 1349, Poland
controlled the western part of Ukraine and desired to incorporate more of the territory.  Lithuania 
had control over much of the rest of the Ukrainian territories from the mid 14
th
 century until its
incorporation with Poland during the Treaty of Lublin in 1569.  For almost two centuries, an 
informal personal relationship existed where the Lithuanian nobility recognized the Polish king 
but the nobles maintained their independence.  The Treaty of Lublin formalized and restructured 
the relationship into a united Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania (Rzeczpospolita) with one 
7 
 
Diet (Sejm) that elected its king.
10
  The election of the king strengthened the Sejm so greatly that 
they could not only override his decisions but required unanimous consent to make any change.
11
  
While Ruthenian nobles greatly influenced the Lithuanian state, they supported Polish 
incorporation because they believed that they would benefit from the union.  The Ruthenian 
nobles believed it was a way to safeguard their Orthodox church, and maintain the use of 
Ruthenian as an administrative language, as the Lithuanians allowed.  They also believed that 
they would be incorporated into the Polish szlachta (nobility) like the Lithuanian nobles and 
would have similar benefits of using public lands as private property, of defering military 
service, and the elimination of most taxes.
12
  This union not only expanded the nobility but also 
made Poland the undisputed leader in the region while bringing western ideas into the region. 
The western idea that influenced the region the most during this era was the Counter 
Reformation which was progressing east at the time.  Jesuits attempted to halt the influence of 
Protestantism and entered Poland to combat deviations from Catholicism in 1564.  The more 
militant Catholicism influenced Poland greatly and caused friction between the Catholic Poles 
and Orthodox Ruthenians.
13
  The Jesuit education influenced the szlachta to oppose the 
Orthodox “schismatics” turning the previous general religious toleration in Poland into a virulent 
Catholicism.  The szlachta denied Ruthenian nobles entry into it unless the Ruthenians would 
assume Polish customs, laws, language, and become Catholic.  The szlachta even went so far to 
encourage the Polonization of Ruthenian nobles that laws “stipulated that a nobleman who 
                                                          
10
 Paul Robert Magocsi. A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its People, 2
nd
 ed. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2010), 141. 
11
 The infamous liberum veto, a veto of one noble, could stop all work. 
12
 Magocsi, 141. 
13
 Orest Subtelny. Ukraine: A History 4
th
 ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 94. 
Magocsi, 170. 
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adopted Catholicism would automatically receive the rights of a Polish nobleman.”14  These laws 
created an ultimatum of acquiesce or be denied entry. 
This Ruthenian nobles’ desire to become part of the szlachta created problems for future 
development in the Ukrainian lands.  In Poland the increased Catholic and Polish education 
provided a commonality between noble and peasant, but in the Ukrainian lands that education 
only created a greater division between noble and peasant.  As the nobles became more 
Catholicized and Polonified, being Polish and Catholic became equated with being cultured 
while Orthodoxy became equivalent to being uncivilized, peasant, and backward.  Since nobles 
frequently are a competitive group, envious of others’ status, many were concerned that 
Ruthenian culture was holding them back, thus many nobles quickly embraced Polish 
assimilation.
15
  With the Polish assimilation of the nobles, the Ruthenians lost the traditional elite 
patrons of language, religion, and customs that create high-culture and ultimately establish 
independent states.  With the benefit of joining the szlachta, the nobles became more concerned 
with their own future development to the detriment of Orthodoxy and the peasants. 
Orthodoxy, much like other religions, flourishes best when receiving support from a 
noble class within government.  Under the previous Lithuanian rule, nobles adopted the 
Orthodox faith and reestablished a metropolitan to combat Muscow’s influence.  Unfortunately, 
this support disappeared with Polish incorporation.  Orthodoxy no longer received support from 
the Catholic king or szlachta.  The szlachta decided to undercut Orthodoxy’s legitimacy by 
selling bishoprics to untrained lay authorities who ended up pilfering and pillaging churches 
                                                          
14
 Subtelny, 89. 
15
 Subtelny, 95-6. 
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selling off icons and holy relics.
16
 As the Ruthenian nobles assimilated and the Catholic pressure 
increased, Orthodox leaders believed there were few options available to maintain their religion.  
Some Orthodox Church leaders supported reconciliation with Catholicism so they could 
safeguard their practices.  The attempt at reconciliation culminated in the Union of Brest in 1596 
but fell short of reunifying the faiths when the Pope failed to recognize the decision.  The 
Orthodox faithful in the Ukrainian lands condemned the Union and derisively referred to 
adherents as Uniates.  The Union only complicated the religious situation in the Ukrainian lands 
even more because instead of two conflicting religions there were then three, Catholicism, 
Orthodoxy, and Uniate.   
Other Orthodox Church leaders condemned the Galicians for their heresy in uniting with 
the Catholics, and felt that the only true way to preserve Orthodoxy was to find a supporter or 
sponsor.  Ultimately, the Orthodox Church looked to three different groups as sponsors, two 
within the Ukrainian lands and one from without.  Orthodox merchants and guilds formed 
Brotherhoods in the western Ukrainian lands to protect the faith and worked with nobles who 
remained in the faith to purchase printing presses and form schools to counter Catholicization.
17
  
The other local sponsor and defender of the faith Orthodoxy found in the 17
th
 century were the 
Cossacks but their distance from most of the population centers limited their influence.  
Orthodox leaders were forced to look outside of Ukraine for a strong support.  Traditionally 
Orthodoxy would have looked to Constantinople for aid from the Patriarch, but with the fall of 
Constantinople in 1453, much of the Church leadership fled to Moscow and the Patriarch had 
more concerns maintaining the faithful within the Ottoman Empire than rescuing the faithful 
                                                          
16
 Subtelny, 93. 
17
 Subtelny, 96-7. 
10 
 
abroad.
18
  Like many of the former Constantinople Church leaders, Ukrainian Church leaders 
began to look to Moscow for help and many went so far that they fled from the Ukrainian lands 
to Muscovy to maintain their religion.
19
  
These religious refugees first from Constantinople and later from the Ukrainian lands 
happened to flee to Moscow as it was becoming an important power in Russia and began to 
portray itself as the defender of Orthodoxy.  In order to explain Moscow’s good fortune, the 
grand princes began to promote Moscow as the “Third Rome” a permanent holy and universal 
empire.
20
  Along a similar line of reasoning, the metropolitans justified the flight abandoning the 
Ukrainian lands to the Mongols in 1326 by constructing the claim that Moscow was the last 
remaining dynastic Kyivian Rus state and thus entitled to be the seat of the Metropolitan.  The 
sovereigns in Moscow encouraged this claim to explain Muscovy’s rise to prominence and 
ultimately maintained that they were the “ruler of all Rus” effectively establishing claims to all 
Rus lands.
21
  This ideology was to have a great effect on the Ukrainian lands as contact with 
Moscow increased. 
Religious development was not the only way that the nobles started to separate 
themselves from the Ruthenian peasants.  As nobility frequently was contingent on their amount 
of wealth, the nobles began to also focus upon their further economic enhancement.  Without 
merchants and large trading towns as developed in Western Europe, nobles saw agriculture as a 
step towards greater monetary gains and expanded status.  The 15
th
 and 16
th
 centuries saw an 
                                                          
18
 Magocsi, 162. 
19
 It was not the first time that Ukrainian Church leaders fled to Moscow.  During the Mongol 
invasion of the 13
th
 century, the Metropolitan of Kyiv fled north leaving Ukrainian lands without 
religious leadership. 
20
 Subtelny, 76. 
21
 Subtelny, 77. Magocsi 158, 160. 
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influx of New World precious metals that inflated European agriculture prices.  Food prices 
increased by 400-500% and in some locales even as high as 1000%.
22
  Nobles attempted to 
capitalize on these prices by sending greater and greater quantities of grain to the West, however, 
the economic structure was inefficient since peasants owned small, divided individual farms.  
Nobles began to reorganize the farms into plantations and estates by appropriating peasant lands 
and increasing peasant work obligations.  Through this process, grain trade shipments increased 
from roughly 13,000 tons in 1491-2 to a high of 272,000 in 1618.
23
   
The nobles’ economic restructuring did not occur all at once.  Starting in the 1490s the 
Polish Sejm started restricting peasants’ ability to leave noble estates legally.  Peasants could 
appeal their noble’s decisions and were allowed to leave if they had the proper authority and 
found a replacement for their labor.  While difficult to do, it was a check on noble authority.  In 
1518 the szlachta-dominated royal court decided that they could no longer hear complaints from 
subjects not living on personal lands of the royal crown which greatly disadvantaged the 
peasants.  Since nobles controlled local courts and had the legal right to judge their peasants 
since 1457, and without the right to appeal to a higher authority, the peasants faced greater land 
confiscations and increased obligations.
24
  The Lithuanian nobles started to adopt similar 
practices as the Sejm even before the incorporation.  In a 1557 agricultural reform, peasants lost 
all property rights to the land.  Peasants could continue working the land but only nobles could 
own it.  Without owning the fruits of their labors, most peasants could not pay to leave or afford 
the replacement for their labor.  Serfdom came to full fruition in 1573 when laws prohibited 
                                                          
22
 Subtelny, 88. 
23
 Magocsi, 156. 
24
 Magocsi, 151. Subtelny, 90. 
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peasants from leaving estates for any reason.
25
  So not only did peasants lose rights to own the 
land, they also became the nobles’ chattel on the land. 
The increased Western agricultural prices also encouraged nobles to expand farmlands 
and resettle the previously abandoned steppe in what is now western and central Ukraine.  Some 
places were so vacant that there were as few as 7 or 8 people per square mile, versus 36 in 
Poland.
26
  Nobles obtained vast royal land grants with promises of future settlement and spread 
the practice of serfdom into the Ukrainian lands.  In order to encourage settlement on the steppes, 
nobles frequently offered reduced periods of serfdom, slobody, to lure serfs from other noble 
holdings.  The terms of slobody differed greatly between nobles ranging from a period of 10 to 
30 years of free work on the land before being expected to work for the noble.
27
  After the term 
of slobody ended dues and taxes would commence as normal (though frequently at dues lower 
than in western Poland or Galicia).  While nobles were luring serfs from other nobles, the Polish 
government continued to enact laws limiting the rights of the peasants and strengthening the 
practice of serfdom to ensure continued agricultural growth.  In 1588 the Sejm declared that any 
peasant who resided on a manor for ten years became “immovable” property of that manor.28  
That nobles continued to lure peasants from other nobles’ manors questions the effectiveness of 
the laws. 
As the nobles’ estates grew, they needed people to oversee the leaseholding of their vast 
lands.  Nobles believed that the Jews were experts at leasing and money management, so 
frequently they relied on Jewish leaseholders brought from the west.  By the early 1600s there 
                                                          
25
 Magocsi, 151. 
26
 Magocsi, 151. Subtelny, 83. The Mongol invasions of the 14
th
 century caused the 
abandonment of the lands.  
27
 Subtelny, 88. 
28
 Magocsi, 151. 
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were already about 120,000 Jews in the Ukrainian territory.
29
  Over the course of the 16
th
 and 
17
th
 centuries, Jews came to manage a large proportion of the economy in the Ukrainian lands, 
and by 1616 more than half of the crown lands in Ukrainian territory had Jewish leaseholders.
30
  
Along with being leaseholders, they frequently operated the mills and distilleries that processed 
grain for the nobles.  Since the nobles often had monopolies on mills and distilleries, they would 
regularly lease them out for limited times to their managers at a certain price.  The leaseholders 
would then charge whatever price they wanted for the products and any fees in “excess” of the 
nobles’ demands went to the leaseholders’ as profits.31  The added “excess” demands would 
increase peasant labors for the noble from two to three days a week to six or seven.  Some 
leaseholders even went so far as to establish alcohol consumption quotas forcing peasants to 
imbibe the overproduction and continue payments.
32
  Due to the fact that Jews were often 
middlemen for the nobles and seen as profiting from the peasants’ labor, peasants came to see 
the Jewish population as local symbols of noble exploitation and oppression.
33
   
Some peasants began to leave the nobles’ lands for the frontier to escape the taxation, 
exploitation, and oppression they faced, and live a freer life.  Initially these peasant frontiersmen 
went to the border regions only to hunt, fish, and trade only for a limited time but eventually 
decided to settle and farm on the frontiers to escape the nobles entirely.  It was a dangerous life 
on the frontier though, which required these frontiersmen to organize defensive groups they 
called Cossacks to protect themselves and others from Ottoman slave traders.   The Cossacks 
were originally defensive in nature, frequently starting as farmers working in the fields with 
                                                          
29
 Subtelny, 108. 
30
 Subtelny, 124. 
31
 Subtelny, 124. 
32
 Subtelny, 214. 
33
 Magocsi 153. 
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rifles slung over their shoulders, but eventually they would evolve into skilled fighters and fierce 
raiders of Ottoman caravans acquiring the riches of Tatar traders.
34
    The Cossacks first 
appeared around the 1480s and did not increase drastically until the imposition of serfdom in the 
region in the mid 16
th
 century.
35
  After a peasant’s period of slobody ended, frequently the serf 
would not feel bound by the original agreement or the children would not believe serfdom 
applied to them and would run away.  Serfs escaped from their masters in Poland, Lithuania, 
central Ukraine, and Russia.  They would flee beyond the rapids on the Dnipro River to join and 
expand the groups significantly, ultimately equating Cossackdom with being free men.  To 
strengthen the Cossack position on the Dnipro even more against possible Ottoman raids, Dmitro 
Vyshnevetskyi requested supplies from the Polish king and began to build a permanent fortress 
(Sich).
36
  This place beyond the rapids (za porozhia) would become known as the Zaporozhian 
Sich and became equated with freedom.  The groups ultimately grew to a size capable of 
providing military services for nobles and the king.  The mythos of the Cossacks would become 
a future cornerstone of Ukrainian identity, much like the cowboy is for America.   
The Cossacks came under the authority of the Commonwealth when Lithuania united 
with Poland in 1569.  The Cossacks swore allegiance to the king and recognized the authority of 
Poland but only on a contractual basis contingent on whether the king respected the Cossacks’ 
semi-democratic rights to organize themselves.  Both nobles and the king used Cossacks to gain 
wealth and prestige fighting against the Ottomans, Muscovy, and other foreign powers.  The 
Cossack groups would frequently try to play nobles and the king off each other to increase their 
                                                          
34
 The word Cossack possibly derives from the Turkish word “qazaq” meaning plunderer, or 
raider warrior.  As it is believed that the first Cossacks were renegade Turkish warriors.  
Magocsi, 191.  
35
 Subtelny, 108. 
36
 Michael Hrushevsky.  A History of Ukraine. Ed. OJ Fredriksen.  (Archon Books 1970), 157. 
15 
 
position in the Commonwealth and occasionally even ally with foreign powers against Poland.
37
  
Nobles often saw the Cossacks as a double-edged sword, they were convenient to use for their 
own aggrandizement but grew concerned about their continuous demands for being ennobled, 
while the Polish kings frequently saw the Cossacks solely as a military asset due to the nobles’ 
reluctance to increase taxes to pay for a Polish army.
38
  As the Ruthenian nobles and prior elites 
became more Polonized and as the Cossacks became enriched from military campaigns, the 
Cossacks became essentially a new elite in the Ukrainian lands.   
For decades the Cossacks begrudgingly followed orders from the king of Poland-
Lithuania but the mixture of a semi-democratic organization within a stratified state and nobles 
attempting to maintain control over peasants continued to create problems.  While the Cossacks 
were useful, they also presented a potential challenge to noble control.  One of the first steps the 
king instituted to control the Cossacks was creating a differentiation between “registered” and 
“unregistered” Cossacks and limiting their numbers.  The king recognized registered Cossacks as 
free landowners in Polish military service who were payable for their services where as the 
unregistered were frequently escaped serfs and not extended the same privileges.
39
  The king 
attempted to keep Cossack numbers low, usually around 6,000-8,000 men, but the number 
frequently increased during times when Poland waged wars and needed the additional soldiers. 
During the “Time of Troubles” in Muscovy for example, Poland not only attempted to control 
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Muscovite succession but also with the help of the increased roll of 20,000 registered Cossacks 
conquered Moscow in 1608.
40
   
This environment of stratification and social resentment fostered rebellions.  Starting 
from 1591 on, there were several minor Cossack rebellions over the religious, economic, and 
political rights of their group.  These rebellions frequently began because of perceived violations 
of Cossack privileges.  Prior to 1648 most were small insurrections that collapsed soon after 
beginning or were quickly crushed by superior Polish forces.  Cossack Hetman Petro 
Sahaidachnyi attempted to reconcile the Cossacks with the Poles starting in 1616 until they could 
become a match for Polish forces.
41
  To show his support for Poland, he aided the king in his 
missions against the Ottomans and Muscovy.  Sahaidachnyi was so willing to reconcile with 
Poland that once the campaign against Muscovy ended and the king demanded a reduction of 
Cossacks from 20,000 to 3,000, he complied and kept the Cossacks from rebelling from even his 
own authority.
42
  He gained enough prestige through these missions that he believed he could 
demand restoration of the Orthodox Church and destruction of the Uniates.  During his time as 
Hetman, he decided to make the Cossacks the protectors of the Orthodox faith to gain popular 
support.  Cossacks then sponsored restoration of monasteries, bought printing presses, and aided 
in the construction of academies.  The Cossacks joined the Kyiv Brotherhood to strengthen the 
Orthodox faith further and helped encourage a cultural revival.  Sahaidachnyi’s tactics were 
successful since the Cossacks accrued popular appeal from joining the Brotherhood along with 
political and military prestige that transcended long after his death.     
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The Cossacks attempted to take advantage of that popular appeal upon the ascension of 
Władysław IV as king.  The Cossacks rebelled from Poland demanding equal treatment of 
Orthodox bishops and demanding recognition of Cossacks as a noble estate for the first time.
43
  
In 1632 Orthodoxy finally was granted equal status in Poland-Lithuania.  Metropolitan Petro 
Mohyla capitalized on this equal status creating an Orthodox College based on Jesuit models, 
resuming printing presses, expanding Brotherhoods, and building new churches.
44
  While the 
king was willing to recognize the Cossacks as nobles (since he wanted to use their services in 
another war against the Ottomans), the szlachta was not convinced.  The szlachta applied their 
liberum veto and denied the Cossacks recognition.  This lack of recognition created further 
problems in the Commonwealth, especially after Poland declared all unregistered Cossacks 
outlaws in 1638.
45
  Differences between registered and unregistered Cossacks became more 
pronounced since registered Cossacks saw themselves as equals to the nobility and wanted 
inclusion with the rights pursuant to that estate; unregistered Cossacks saw their class as equal to 
the registered and wanted inclusion.   
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BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKYI 
It was in this time of simmering animosity between the Polish nobles and the Cossacks 
that one rebellion would ultimately change the entire relationship between Poland-Lithuania and 
Ukraine forever.  The Cossack uprising began in 1648 under the leadership of Hetman Bohdan 
Khmelnytskyi.  Khmelnytskyi was perhaps the most unlikely character to begin a rebellion.  He 
was a registered Cossack who was educated at a Jesuit school in Polish and Latin.  He had 
previously distinguished himself fighting for the Commonwealth, and was even captured during 
a campaign against the Ottoman Turks fighting for Poland.  He was even one of only four 
Cossacks in a delegation to the king advocating for an expansion of registered Cossacks’ 
privileges in 1638.  He was a minor noble trusted by the king who was nearly 50 years old at the 
time, and leading a rather subdued life.
46
  His status in the Commonwealth easily suggests that he 
could have been content in the social structure but he began an uprising against the 
Commonwealth due to a Polish noble’s infringement of his rights.  His relatively subdued nature 
changed when like something out of a vigilante story happened; in 1647 a rival distiller raided 
his estate, captured his love interest,
47
 stole and destroyed property, and flogged Khmelnytskyi’s 
son to death.
48
  Khmelnytskyi went to the local courts to seek justice for his loss, but was 
unsuccessful due to the rival’s status.  He then went to Warsaw to seek redress from the Sejm and 
even petitioned the king.  The king admitted that he could not help him due to the szlachta’s 
domination of the legal and administrative system.
49
  Khmelnytskyi returned home disenchanted 
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only to be arrested by the rival.  His friends helped him escape and he fled like prior discontented 
Cossacks to Zaporozhia. 
In Zaporozhia Khmelnytskyi influenced Cossacks to make him Hetman drawing on 
popular Polish discontent and gathered support for a rebellion.  He understood the failures of 
previous Cossack rebellions and sent envoys to the Ottomans asking for their support.  Polish 
leaders gained information of the Ottoman-Cossack alliance and prepared military forces to 
oppose them.  The Polish force included registered Cossack units that quickly defected to 
Khmelnytskyi’s side and turned the tide in the opening conflicts.  Many peasants heard of 
Khmelnytskyi’s victories over the Polish forces, began to revolt against Polish governors and 
landlords, attacked local szlachta, and attempted to join the Hetman’s victorious forces.   
Frequently the peasants staged minor rebellions but this rebellion reflected the full nature of 
peasant resentment with the nobles.  The peasants’ resentment showed itself through malicious 
acts “wherever they found szlachta, royal officials or Jews, [they] killed them all, sparing neither 
women nor children.  They pillaged the estates of Jews and nobles, burned Catholic churches and 
killed their priests.”50  Polish nobles fled when they could so most of the brunt of the peasant 
attacks focused on the Jewish population.  Accurate numbers are unknown, but plausible 
estimates for the number of Jewish victims range from around 10,000 to 20,000 with some 
unlikely estimates into the hundred thousand range.
51
 
After Khmelnytskyi’s initial successes against the Polish armies and the death of the 
Polish king in 1648, he sent envoys to Warsaw with modest demands.  He requested an increase 
in registered Cossacks to 12,000, remuneration for the Cossack’s previous services to the state, 
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redress for his rival’s wrongs, fair treatment for the Orthodox Church, and Polish aid in 
suppressing the peasant uprisings through the land.
52
  The Sejm responded enthusiastically to the 
modest demands but wished to elect a new king before accepting.  While the Sejm deliberated, 
Polish forces reorganized under the leadership of Jeremi Wisniowiecki, the largest szlachta 
landowner in the Ukrainian lands.  Wisniowiecki, a Polonified descendent of Zaporozhian 
founder Dmitro Vyshnevetskyi,
53
 was caught on his estates stretching from Kyiv to Poltava 
during the peasant uprisings and forced to flee.  During the flight, he gathered 230,000 of his 
subjects, other nobles, and Jewish leaseholders to fight their way west in order to escape into 
calmer Polish lands.
54
  From a base in Poland, Wisniowiecki grew tired of the Sejm’s delay in 
crushing Khmelnytskyi’s uprising and assembled a force of 15,000 to fight Khmelnytskyi and 
the peasant uprisings himself sparking the civil war anew.  He responded to the peasant violence 
with terror tactics of his own, capturing, torturing, and killing Cossacks, peasant men, women 
and children through Galicia and Volhynia.
55
  Wisniowiecki’s successes helped reenergize Polish 
forces but drove a greater wedge between the peasants and the nobles.   
Khmelnytskyi camped near Bila Tserkva where he awaited response to his demands and 
trained his increasing peasant forces in preparation of further military campaigns against the 
Poles.  The peasant support reflected the popularity of the uprising.  By the end of the summer of 
1648, his army rose to roughly 80,000-100,000 men with only around 40,000 Cossacks out of 
that number.  After hearing of Wisniowiecki’s attacks in Volhynia, Khemelnytskyi left Bila 
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Tserkva to engage the Polish forces and defeated them with the help of his Ottoman allies.  With 
this Polish defeat, Warsaw was defenseless but Khmelnytskyi was conciliatory rather than 
attacking, he sent envoys to the new king with greater demands to restore Cossack privileges, 
that Cossacks were dependent only to the king, a general amnesty for all participants in the 
rebellion, and abolition of the Uniate Church.
56
  The new king (who Khmelnytskyi wanted on the 
throne) gave his word to do his best on the requests and requested Khmelnytskyi to end the 
rebellion and restore peace among the peasants. 
With the king’s word, Khmelnytskyi returned to Kyiv in January 1649 to popular 
acclaim.  The Orthodox metropolitan of Kyiv and the Patriarch of Jerusalem, who happened to 
be travelling through Kyiv, hailed Khmelnytskyi as a “modern day Moses who had liberated the 
Rus’ from Polish slavery.”57  The Patriarch Paisius even went so far in his laudation of 
Khmelnytskyi that he called him King of an independent state of Ukraine.
58
  These praises and 
encouragements seemed to have influenced him because the tone of his next missive to Polish 
commissioners changed entirely.  Rather than his previous modest demands from the Polish 
king, his next response reportedly included statements of: 
I shall free the entire people of the Rus’ from the Poles.  Up to now I have fought because 
of the wrongs done to me personally; now I shall fight for our Orthodox faith… I shall 
drive the dukes and princes ahead of me… Not a single prince or nobleman shall I permit 
to set foot in Ukraine, and if anyone desires to eat our bread, he must be loyal and 
obedient to the Zaporozhian Host.  I am a small and insignificant man, but by the will of 
God I have become the independent ruler of the Rus’.59 
                                                          
56
 Magocsi, 217. 
57
 Subtelny, 129. 
58
 Hrushevsky, 283. 
59
 Hrushevkshy, 284. 
22 
 
Along with that response, Khmelnytskyi began to call himself “Autocrat of the Rus’ by the 
Grace of God” and vowed liberation of all Rus’ in the Commonwealth.60  It was at this point in 
the Khmelnytskyi uprisings that the Ukrainian lands were effectively under Ruthenian control 
and governance.  Future Polish commissioners found the Ukrainian lands preparing for war and 
could not even meet with Khmelnytskyi to discuss accommodating the Cossacks within the 
Commonwealth.  As Khmelnytskyi’s goals changed, it was becoming more evident that the civil 
war was inevitably going to restart. 
As the Ukrainian lands were becoming autonomous, Khmelnytskyi persisted in pursuing 
foreign support in the fight in preparation for continued hostilities.  He drew on the successes of 
1648 and began to believe so strongly in the Tatar support that he addressed their leader as “my 
brother” and “my soul” while maintaining the alliance would be eternal.61  In the summer of 
1649, Khmelnytskyi with his Tatar allies fought Wisniowiecki again and the Poles succeeded in 
cracking the “eternal” alliance.  While Khmelnytskyi won the battle, the Poles effectively 
negotiated with his ally and encouraged them to end the fighting by forcing Khmelnytskyi to 
reopen negotiations.  The negotiations resulted in the Truce of Zboriv, which took a more 
moderate tone than Khmelnytskyi’s earlier demands.  The agreement raised registered Cossacks 
to 40,000, declared Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Bratslav palatinates Cossack territory thus removing 
Polish military and Jesuits from the territories and effectively recognize Cossack autonomy, the 
Orthodox metropolitan would receive a seat in the Sejm, and there would be an amnesty for 
nobles participating in the rebellion.
62
  Khmelnytskyi and other leading Cossacks agreed to 
Zboriv since they would be able to reclaim their lands.  The agreement may have been fair for 
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the nobles, but the peasants could not claim any success from the rebellion.  Peasants would not 
receive amnesty and to add further insult Khmelnytskyi even encouraged them to return to their 
prior exploitative landlords.
63
  Yet again, the plight of the peasants was ignored.  Zboriv not only 
highlighted the division between registered Cossacks and peasants, but also encouraged 
historians to interpret Khmelnytskyi’s rebellion as a noble rebellion for autonomy rather than an 
attempt to change the socioeconomic order of the state. 
The Truce of Zboriv brought peace to the area for a brief time as Khmelnytskyi attempted 
to govern his newly autonomous territories and continued to look for potential allies against 
Poland.  Khmelnytskyi redesigned local governments based on the Cossack regimental military 
structure, which also increased his political control.  He effectively made local colonels 
(starshyna) governors and administrators of districts as they usually had greater authority than 
the non-military administrators Khmelnytskyi created.
64
  The starshyna started becoming the 
most important component to his organization and his powerbase as the growing number of 
Cossacks made it difficult to continue the semi-democratic processes.  While he created and tried 
to govern an internal military state, he continued to seek out allies.  He avoided the traditional 
expected alliance partners of the Habsburgs or Muscovy but instead attempted to create a grand 
coalition of Orthodox, Islamic, and Protestant states to oppose Poland.  He reached out to 
Moldavia, Transylvania, the Ottoman Empire, and even went so far as to ask Cromwell’s 
England for aid to “force the Commonwealth to restructure the government into a federation of 
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three equal states.”65  This showed that Khmelnytskyi did not desire complete independence for 
the Ukrainian lands from Poland but wanted greater autonomy for the new Cossack nobility. 
The tenuous autonomous situation in the Ukrainian lands could not survive the szlachta’s 
resentment at losing their properties. Civil war reignited in 1651 with Polish forces crushing 
Cossack forces in Volhynia and quickly capturing Kyiv.  The Treaty of Bila Tserkva was not as 
generous as Zboriv reducing the registered Cossacks to 20,000, reinstituting Polish government 
in Bratslav and Chernihiv, and allowed nobles to return to their estates.
66
  Khmelnytskyi and the 
Cossacks acceded to the treaty and attempted to enforce it even though a liberum veto in the 
Sejm denied its enactment (as the szlachta refused to accept the Cossacks as noble equals).  As 
the Cossack state continued to develop and treaties were made and amended, many peasants 
grew disenchanted with the evolving system and its neglect for their plight.  They felt the 
Cossacks were merely replacing the prior Polish szlachta landlords (where they were being 
replaced) and were concerned more with their own class than the exploitation of the peasants 
which helped start the rebellion.  Disenchantment among the peasantry grew even greater when 
stories of executions as punishment for rebellion spread and that Cossacks fought peasants rising 
up against returning landlords (and enforcing the non-enacted Treaty of Bila Tserkva).  Peasants 
began to move to Muscovite domains lured with tax-exempt settlements (slobody).
67
  Many 
peasants settled slobody lands near the Kharkiv and Voronezh trying to attain the freedom they 
thought the rebellion would bring them.   
Fighting continued through 1652 and 1653 with the Cossacks regaining victories and the 
terms of Zboriv.  While the Cossacks and the Polish forces were able to win battlefield victories, 
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it was becoming obvious though that the civil war was reaching a stalemate with neither side 
able to deliver a knockout blow to end the conflict.  Foreign alliances also proved fickle with 
“allies” vacillating their support between Poland and the Cossack state.  The “eternal” Tatar 
allies fled a battlefield in mid battle and when Khmelnytskyi demanded they return to the field, 
rather than listening to him, they abducted him.
68
  Without their general, the Cossacks 
subsequently lost the battle.  Fortunately Khmelnytskyi was able to escape but only after the 
battle was already over.  Still believing that he needed foreign support Khmelnytskyi continued 
to petition the Ottoman Empire for aid and the possibility of becoming a vassal state.  There had 
been negotiations with Muscovy for some time with the tsar reaching no decisive action.  
However, when Muscovy heard of the possibility of the Cossacks becoming a vassal state, they 
feared the Ottomans would use the Cossacks against them, and finally considered allying with 
the Cossack cause.   
In January 1654, Khmelnytskyi along with his Cossack solders met with Muscovite 
envoys in the town of Pereiaslav to discuss the possibility of an alliance.  Unlike the ease of 
negotiating with the Polish nobles who would have had languages in common, Khmelnytskyi 
needed translators to convert the Muscovite language into comprehensible Latin.
69
  Likewise the 
influence of Polish culture showed when the Cossacks entered the negotiation with preconceived 
Polish legal notions that they believed to be ubiquitous.  When Muscovy decided that they would 
ally with the Cossack state against Poland, the negotiation almost failed when the envoys told the 
Cossacks that the tsar would not swear an oath to uphold their rights unlike what the Polish king 
would do.  The envoys explained that the tsar was an absolute monarch and would not degrade 
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himself swearing an oath to his subjects and limiting his powers so.
70
  Khmelnytskyi and the 
Cossacks stormed out of the church and threatened to stop the entire proceedings but the envoys 
held their ground.  Ultimately, necessity won out in the proceedings, in order to gain Moscow’s 
aid, Khmelnytskyi and the Cossacks of 117 separate towns eventually did swear allegiance to 
Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich Romanov even without his oath.
71
  Khmelnytskyi knew that only a 
monarch willing to aid and protect the Cossacks could bring legitimacy to their autonomous state 
and end the stalemate with Poland that was draining both sides. 
The Treaty of Pereiaslav 1654 was not just a single treaty but actually contained three 
separate parts: the initial oath of loyalty, Khmelnytskyi’s March petition for the tsar’s 
recognition of Cossack rights, and the tsar’s response granting rights.  The treaty guaranteed 
Cossack estates, maintained elections of Hetmans without Muscovite involvement (so long as 
they swore allegiance to the tsar), limited the registered Cossacks to 60,000, provided wages to 
the Cossacks out of taxes due to the tsar, and most importantly guaranteed Muscovite materiel 
aid.
72
  In return for the guarantees, the treaty reoriented foreign policy into a more Moscow 
centered direction by denying the right to negotiate with Poland or the Ottoman Empire.  The 
fact that the tsar granted rights rather than taking an oath would become problematic in the future 
since future tsars would not feel as inclined to guarantee the granted rights.  The Cossacks 
believed the treaty established a quasi-constitutional agreement between a ruler and their estate 
similar to what they had in Poland while Russia viewed the treaty through the lens of an absolute 
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monarch making concessions to expand territory.
73
  In response to the successful negotiations 
and the increased territorial prestige of the tsar, Tsar Aleksei changed his title to “Tsar of All 
Great and Little Rus” fulfilling the dynastic dreams of claiming all Rus’ lands.74 
Since the time of the Treaty of Pereiaslav, the treaty and its interpretation have played a 
central role for Russian and Ukrainian history.  Even today the debate rages on as Professor 
Zenon Kohut discussed the controversy, and politics of the Pereiaslav Treaty in his 2011 work.  
Much of the difficulty in fully interpreting the treaty stems from the fact that the original copies 
of the treaty were lost and that all interpretations are based off incomplete and multiple-times 
translated copies.
75
  The Treaty of Pereiaslav interpretations hinge on a number factors.  One of 
the largest factors is what was the status of the Ukrainian lands during essentially a civil war 
with Poland?  Did Khmelnytskyi and the Cossacks essentially and effectively create an 
independent polity or was it merely a rebellion of lower nobles for expanded rights?  This factor 
is important because it pertains to how the both sides entered the negotiations at Pereiaslav, as 
equally independent states or as rebellious nobles seeking merely to transfer their allegiance to a 
different state.  Russian legal historian Vasilii Sergeevich (d. 1910) argued one of the first 
interpretations that the treaty amounted to a personal union between the two; that although they 
shared the same sovereign they remained two separate governments.  Another Russian legal 
historian, Nikolai Diakonov (d.1919), countered Sergeevich with another interpretation that the 
agreement swearing allegiance was full incorporation into the Moscovite state.
76
  A third 
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argument that both Russian historian Venedikt Miakotin and Ukrainian historian Mykhailo 
Hrushevsky espoused was that the agreement was a form of vassalage, the tsar agreed to protect 
Ukraine and not interfere with them so long as they maintained tribute.
77
  Ukrainian historian 
Viacheslav Lypynsky proposed a fourth argument that Pereiaslav was simply a military alliance 
between two independent states and that this policy was nothing new since Cossack leaders 
frequently played Russia against Poland and vice versa.
78
  Was Khmelnytskyi using Muscovy as 
a bargaining chip to end the war with Poland and convince them to recognize the Cossacks as 
equals or was he changing the political alliance? For much of the rebellion, he seemed content to 
remain within Polish authority and trusted the Sejm as long as the Cossacks would receive the 
rights of nobles and even after the treaty, he continued to play states against each other. 
The fifth major interpretation of the Treaty of Pereiaslav arose from the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union during the 300
th
 anniversary of the agreement.  Ultimately, this interpretation 
asks: what was Khmelnytskyi’s motive during the rebellion?  The party argued that 
Khmelnytskyi’s goal from the beginning of the rebellion was reunion with the Russian people.  
Khmelnytskyi, in the argument, became a proto-class revolutionary
79
 fighting against the 
szlachta and accepted into the Soviet pantheon of heroes who realized that “the salvation of the 
Ukrainian people lies only in unity with the great Russian people”.80  The party also maintained 
that the union was a natural conclusion of a mutual desire to be a reunited Rus’ to escape “alien 
enslavers freeing themselves from foreign subjugation and ensuring national development.”81  
The Soviets after accepting him into the pantheon of heroes even went so far as to rename the 
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western Ukrainian city Ploskyriv Khmelnytskyi to glorify him in 1954.
82
  This was not the first 
time the Soviet Union used Khmelnytskyi to legitimize itself.  During World War II, Stalin even 
revived the Order of Khmelnytskyi to reward Soviet Ukrainian patriots (an order also continued 
in independent Ukraine).  The Soviet revival of interpreting the Treaty of Pereiaslav and 
establishing Khmelnytskyi as a hero was a way of legitimizing the Soviet Union’s control over 
the Ukrainian lands.   
After the Treaty of Pereiaslav, Muscovy joined the Cossack struggle with Poland. 
Moscovy invaded and conquered Commonwealth territories (what is current Belarus) previously 
conquered from Muscovy during the “Time of Troubles.”  Through 1654-1656, Muscovy was 
making great inroads into Polish territory and welcomed as liberators by the peasants even as far 
as Vilnius and Kaunas.
83
  Khmelnytskyi wanted to add the Belarusian Ruthenians to the 
Cossack-Muscovite federation in order to weaken the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth further.  
Even though there were military successes, the Cossack-Muscovy alliance started to show strains 
quickly when Tsar Aleksei sent military governors to Ukrainian cities for “protection.”  The 
largest strain occurred when Moscow reached a secret peace agreement with Poland without 
notifying the Cossacks.  Khmelnytskyi realized yet again that his allies were fickle, but rather 
than abandon alliances, he instead encouraged an alliance with Protestant Sweden requesting that 
they invade in the north.
84
  Theoretically, the alliance with Sweden should have strained relations 
with Moscow when Moscow became involved in a war with Sweden and demanded that the 
Cossacks break off relations, but due to the secret peace agreement between Moscow with 
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Poland and their attempt to subvert his territory, Khmelnytskyi considered the Treaty of 
Pereiaslav essentially void.
85
  In 1657 Khmelnytskyi placed his hopes in one last campaign 
united with his Swedish and Transylvanian allies to completely break Poland and extricate the 
Cossacks from Moscow.  The campaign failed miserably and while raging in a military tent over 
a Cossack regiments’ mutiny Khmelnytskyi fell over and ultimately died from a stroke. 
 
Interpretations and Problems with Khmelnytskyi 
If much has been written on Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and the aftermath of his revolution, it 
is because he left a remarkable concept in the later national mind.  The rebellion itself may have 
simply been a rebellion of lower nobles seeking aggrandizement with religious overtones 
(similar in certain respects to 1618-1620 Bohemia), but he reinvigorated the concept of a modern 
Rus’ state and came the closest in achieving it.  Prior to Khmelnytskyi the last independent Rus’ 
state existed in the 13
th
 century, his actions became a symbol to Ukrainian nationalists that it was 
possible to attain an independent Ukrainians polity.   His actions also gave nationalists a greater 
argument that Ukrainians were not a “stateless people” they had a state but were victims of 
empires exploiting and dividing their territory.  Thus, Khmelnytskyi became a symbol for the 
Ukrainian struggle to recover their state.  Generally, most of the interpretations of Khmelnytskyi 
are positive for Ukrainians but they do have some problems with him stemming from the 
negotiation of Pereiaslav in mind and the aftermath of the treaty.  Ukrainian historians are 
frequently more conflicted attempting to balance his deeds liberating the Ukrainian lands and the 
subsequent ensnarement with Moscow.  Historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky also reflected the 
attempt to balance Khmelnytskyi’s actions in two of his volumes of Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy (Vol. 
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9 part 1 and 2) and his work Pro batka kozatskoho Bohdana Khmelntytskoho.  While 
Khmelnytskyi became a hero for the flowering of Ukrainian culture, independence, and became 
a basis for Hrushevsky’s nationalist movement in the early 20th century, he could not avoid 
criticizing Khmelnytskyi for his reliance on foreign entanglements without being prepared for 
consequences when he should have relied upon the Ukrainian people.
86
  Hrushevsky ultimately 
portrayed Khmelnytskyi not as a “gifted state-builder” but an erratic and unpredictable leader 
who “schemed and intrigued too freely” and was fortunate to die when he did “for the burden of 
his mistakes fell to his successors.”87 Of all the Ukrainian writers to discuss Khmelnytskyi, the 
Ukrainian poet and painter, Taras Shevchenko, is perhaps the most scathing.  He saw Bohdan 
Khmelnytskyi as a major cause of the sufferings of his homeland.  In one poem, “Katerina,” he 
depicts Ukraine as a young maiden who gave her virtue to a Russian soldier, and once 
deflowered and with child was jeered and abandoned.  Suffering from the shame, she committed 
suicide and left an orphaned child to take care of himself.
88
  This poem was a somewhat 
xenophobic warning not only for young Ukrainian women to avoid foreigners and stay with 
locals but also representing what the Cossack state should have done.  Countering the noble 
claim that Khmelnytskyi was a hero, Shevchenko drew on the ideals of Cossack freedoms and 
argued that it was due to Khmelnytskyi’s actions Russia dominated and subjugated Ukraine.  
Shevchenko called him an “unknowing son” “who should look at what has happened to his 
disfigured mother” with the people “toiling in Jews’ and Germans’ hands” while the “Moskaly89 
                                                          
86
 Hrushevsky, 290.  Mykhailo Hrushevskyi. Pro batka kozatskoho Bohdana Khmelntytskoho. 
Jersey City, NJ: Svobody, 1919), 75.  Mykhailo Hrushevskyi. Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy Tom IX-2 
Roky 1654-1657. (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 1997), 1479-1508. 
87
 Hrushevsky, 290.  Basarab, 131-3. 
88
 Taras Shevchenko. Selected Works.  (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), 51-71. 
89
 A derogatory term for Russians. 
32 
 
plunder everything” and ultimately saying that he wished “Bohdan would have been strangled in 
his crib” to prevent what happened.90  He lumped Russians with Germans, Poles, and Jews as 
foreign oppressors of his homeland and began to foment a separate exclusive identity for 
Ukrainians.
91
  Shevchenko’s writings vehemently attacked the tsars as imperialist monsters and 
cannibals whose focus on autocracy punished commoners.  He contrasted Russian autocracy 
with the Cossack aspect of freedom as a way to demark cultural boundaries between Russians 
and Ukrainians.     
Russian historians, unlike Ukrainian historians’ writings on Khmelnytskyi, are usually 
the most forward in praising Khmelnytskyi as he brought the “Ukrainians back into the Russian 
fold.”  Khmelnytskyi became a symbol for eternal Russian-Little Russian unity, especially as 
later historians would contrast his loyalty to the tsar with Cossack Hetman Ivan Mazepa’s 
treachery.  The Romanovs fostered this symbolism of eternal Russian-Little Russian unity in the 
late 19
th
 century and was evident when they erected one of the most impressive statues to 
Khmelnytskyi in Kyiv near St. Sophia’s Cathedral.  The statue represents Khmelnytskyi bestride 
a horse as a Moses for the Little Russian people leading them out of Polish servitude and into 
fraternal union with the Russians.  Even within the statue the symbolism is evident.  
Khmelnytskyi’s mace, the symbol of Hetman authority and power, points to the northeast and the 
direction of Moscow as a way of showing where his power came from. 
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Only two groups of historians, Jewish and Polish historians, do not focus exclusively on 
Pereiaslav for their interpretation.  Due to the peasant rebellions that sparked up in 1648 from 
Khmelnytskyi’s revolt and the number of Jewish dead, several Jewish historians have named him 
“Chmel the wicked.”  Many argue that he sent messengers to encourage the peasant rebellions so 
the onus of the great loss of life falls on him.  The interpretation of him is so scathing that he is 
held on a level similar to the perpetrators of the Holocaust.  Khmelnytskyi has become a symbol 
for all Ukrainian-Jewish strife, and the first “pogromshchik” especially as later pogroms in the 
Ukrainian lands revived concepts of eternal Ukrainian anti-Semitism.  Polish leaders in the 17
th
 
century despised Khmelnytskyi so greatly that once they regained control of the regions 
participating in 1648 uprising they began a brutal reprisal against the people that supported him 
and even took vengeance on Bohdan Khmelnytskyi’s exhumed remains disfiguring them and 
casting them to the winds.
92
  Even modern Polish historians’ opinions of him are not favorable.  
Many consider him a traitor who initiated the degradation and responsible for the ultimate 
destruction of the Commonwealth.  The nearly hundred years following his rebellion has been 
named the “Ruin” and the “Deluge” due to the weakened state Poland-Lithuania was in after the 
constant warfare and invasion.  If Poland-Lithuania could have come to some mutual agreement 
with the Cossacks, it is possible that it could have remained a contending power in Central-
Eastern Europe and possibly could have continued checking Muscovy’s expansion.  The Polish 
szlachta system though was not built to respond to changes; instead it was more focused on 
maintaining the economic preeminence for a select group as shown in the use of the liberum 
veto. 
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IVAN MAZEPA 
The Cossack State Khmelnytskyi founded in the Ukrainian lands only grew more chaotic 
and divided after Khmelnytskyi’s death.  A state of Cossack civil war between Khmelnytskyi’s 
son, Yuri, and his former advisor, Ivan Vyhovsky, divided the lands between a pro-Moscow and 
pro-Poland orientation.  The Treaty of Andrusovo formalized the stalemated division of 
Ukrainian lands between Moscow and Poland in 1667.  The treaty created two separate 
Hetmanates one pro-Polish, and one pro-Moscow who were usually in conflict with each other 
and frequently with their respective sponsors.  Relative peace returned to the Ukrainian lands 
only after Moscow and Poland formalized the “Eternal Peace” in 1686 nearly 30 years after 
Khmelnytskyi’s death.  Each side swore to respect the other’s control over one half of the 
territory and Poland gave up claims to Kyiv and the Zaporozhian Cossacks in exchange for a 
campaign against the Ottomans.
93
 
Ivan Mazepa was able to exploit the political instability in the Ukrainian lands to become 
Hetman of the pro-Russian Cossacks during this period of great divisiveness and was perhaps the 
most influential Hetman after Khmelnytskyi.  Ivan Mazepa was a shining example of how 
certain Cossacks learned how to expand their powers through snaking and zigzagging alliances.  
Even starting in his early life, he learned how to navigate disparate positions.  He was born in 
1639 in Bila Tserkva to a Cossack father who would support Khmelnytskyi’s rebellion and 
ultimately educated in the Jesuit College in Warsaw during the height of the rebellion.  He 
quickly garnered the king’s attention and eventually became a diplomat for the Polish king to the 
Cossacks.
94
  After his career for the Polish king ended in scandal, he fled to the Ukrainian lands 
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only to swiftly rise to prominence in Hetman Petro Doroshenko’s staff.  While on a diplomatic 
mission for Doroshenko to Crimea, Zaporozhian Cossacks captured him, and subsequently 
shipped him off to Moscow for further imprisonment but rather than facing imprisonment and 
execution, Mazepa was able to charm his way into the favor of Muscovite leaders by revealing 
Doroshenko’s plans and returned to the Ukrainian lands in the service of Ivan Samoilovych.  
When Moscow blamed Samoilovych for the military blunders during a campaign against the 
Ottomans and exiled him to Siberia in 1687, Ivan Mazepa, a former ambassador for Petro 
Doroshenko and counselor for Ivan Samoilovych, exploited his close ties with Moscow to 
become Hetman.  While the Treaty of Pereiaslav still provided the election of Hetmans, their 
service began to depend more and more on the Muscovite monarch’s favor and selection.  
Moscow leaders supported him after the removal of Samoilovych due to his charm and the 
influence of 10,000 rubles.  Prince Golitsyn made sure that Mazepa was the only candidate for 
Hetman after the monetary donation.
95
     
Through most of his Hetmanate Mazepa maintained close ties with Moscow gaining 
privileges and balancing the loyalty of the Cossacks.  Mazepa’s zigzagging alliances helped him 
gain his position but it also left him without a local power base.  Eastern and Zaporozhian 
Cossacks distrusted him and believed him to be an upstart Polish noble.
96
  His close ties with 
Moscow could have become a potential problem because when visiting his patron, Regent 
Sophia, her young half-brother Peter deposed her in a palace revolution.  Mazepa yet again 
showed his impressive ability to navigate political intrigue by turning the liability of being 
Sophia’s advisor into an asset for the young new tsar.  He was also able to navigate the political 
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intrigue after his previous sponsor Prince Golitsyn fell out of favor with Peter, rather than fall out 
of favor also, the Hetman actually received Golitsyn’s estates as a gift along with his previous 
bribe of 10,000 rubles.
97
  Peter developed a strong affection for Mazepa due to his intelligence, 
his advice about the Poles, and his loyalty during Peter’s expansion against the Ottomans.98  
Peter showed his favor for Mazepa and his importance in the imperial court with a coveted 
acceptance into the Order of St. Andrew (Mazepa was among the first few to receive the 
award).
99
  This Muscovite favor was extremely useful when Zaporozhian Cossacks allied with 
the Ottomans and revolted against Mazepa declaring their intentions of liberating all the 
Ukrainian lands from Moscow and the increasingly elitist starshyna.  The Zaporozhians became 
progressively more disgruntled at the elitism of the starshyna, their growing contempt for lower 
orders of Cossacks, their semblance to the szlachta, and the Hetman’s increasing reliance on 
them.
100
  After Khmelnytskyi expanded the Cossack Order so greatly during his rebellion, the 
system was too large to remain semi-democratic and the starshyna became essential to the 
Hetman’s government.  Much like previous Hetmans, Mazepa attempted to consolidate his 
power in the Cossack order by giving land and special privileges to the starshyna in order to gain 
their support.  Peter supported Mazepa in subduing the Zaporozhian revolts and used it as a 
stepping-stone to a campaign against the Ottomans.   
Mazepa used the support from Moscow effectively during his Hetmanate to become a 
patron to many projects.  Mazepa obtained nearly 20,000 estates to become one of the richest 
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men in Europe at the time.
101
  But he did not use the resources only to aggrandize himself 
though.  He gave over 1000 land grants to the starshyna to maintain their support and expand 
their individual estates.  Mazepa was also a dedicated patron of education due to his own higher 
education.  He supported the Kyiv Academy donating new buildings and furthering enrollment to 
2000.  Other schools received printing presses so that “youths might be able to indulge in any 
aptitude they had for learning.”102  Mazepa also became a major patron for the Orthodox Church 
during his Hetmanate helping build and repair many churches.   
Moscow’s favor for Mazepa only grew with the success against the Ottomans.  
Muscovite nobles even began to praise Mazepa saying “there has never been a Hetman so 
helpful and beneficial to the tsar” and “the tsar would sooner disbelieve an angel than 
Mazepa”.103  Through the first thirteen years of his Hetmanate, Mazepa maintained and nurtured 
the close relations with Peter.  In 1700 the situation began to shift.  Sweden was becoming a 
stronger power in the region and defeated Moscow at the Battle of Narva with only 8,000 versus 
the Muscovite 40,000.
104
  That success diminished Moscow’s influence in the region, and the 
Swedish king, Charles XII, utilized his increasing influence by invading Poland and taking 
control of Polish leadership.  The Cossack Hetmanate under Poland rebelled in 1702 engulfing 
the area with political turmoil.   Mazepa saw this rebellion as a way to reunite the Ukrainian 
lands under Poland-Lithuania with his and Peter consented.   This allowed Mazepa to take 
advantage of the rebellion in Polish territory to augment Cossack territory.  To finalize his 
influence over the former Polish lands, Mazepa influenced Peter to exile the rebel Cossack leader 
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to Siberia.
105
  As the conflict continued to expand, Peter ordered Mazepa to defend the western 
Ukrainian lands so they would not support Charles XII.  Mazepa entered the region in 1704 and 
united most of the regions controlled by Khmelnytskyi fifty years earlier.  The local Cossacks 
welcomed Mazepa and his support in driving out Polish forces.  Peter saw this as a temporary 
situation though, and thought that his loyal Hetman would return the newly won territories to his 
Polish ally in 1707, but rather than return the territory Mazepa offered various excuses in order 
to delay.
106
 
In the early 18
th
 century, there was growing widespread popular discontent through the 
Ukrainian lands for the Muscovites.  Moscow military governors and their garrisons began 
abusing their power and punishing peasants for minor offenses.  The governors increased taxes 
to provide for the war efforts.  Mazepa also received reports from multiple locations of 
Muscovite garrisons arbitrarily mistreating people, requisitioning food, stealing property, raping 
Cossack wives and daughters, and even received reports about the possibility of the tsar 
replacing him with another favorite foreign general.
107
  The Muscovites furthered enflamed 
Ukrainian discontent through increased demands for military service from the Cossacks and 
pressing villagers into military service while neglecting defense of the Ukrainian lands.
108
  
Moscow’s war against Sweden called up more than 40,000 Cossacks without equipping them 
with modern weapons or training and marched them north to fight Sweden.  Essentially the 
Cossacks were used as shock troops and cannon fodder and suffered casualty rates as high as 
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70%.
109
  Along with the high casualty rates, Mazepa requested Moscow aid after receiving 
reports that the Swedish armies under Charles XII were advancing on Ukrainian lands and was 
rebuffed.  Peter reportedly responded “I cannot even spare ten men; defend yourself as best you 
can”110 much to Mazepa’s dismay.  This rebuff became the final straw and Mazepa believed the 
Treaty of Pereiaslav was invalidated since Moscow was no longer abided its part in the treaty for 
the defense of Ukraine while it continued to infringe on the rights and privileges of the 
Cossacks.
111
  Some historians have argued that Mazepa entered into negotiations with Charles 
XII around 1704 or 1705 but the only confirmed negotiations occurred after the tsar’s snub.  
Mazepa negotiated with Charles XII in 1708 for a possible alliance and wanted the guarantee of 
autonomy under Swedish protection if they would be victorious. 
In 1708 Ivan Mazepa and about 4000 Cossacks journeyed north to meet with Charles.  
Before the journey, Mazepa informed his men of his intentions and allowed 2000 Cossacks who 
disagreed to depart.   Mazepa ultimately joined with Charles XII’s army guaranteeing aid, 
provisions, and shelter within the Ukrainian lands for Charles’ weary men.  Initially Peter did not 
believe the reports brought to him since throughout most of Mazepa’s Hetmanate he had 
received false accusations from Cossacks seeking to aggrandize themselves with his downfall, so 
he ordered the informants tortured to “verify” their testimony.112  By the time the informants 
recanted their accusation and were executed, Peter learned that Mazepa had moved his troops 
into the Swedish camp and found the accusations were true.  To say that Peter was shocked that 
his nearly 70-year-old advisor betrayed him is an understatement.  Peter was determined to 
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punish “the deed of the new Judas, Mazepa, who after twenty-one years of loyalty to me and 
with one foot already in the grave, has turned traitor and betrayer of his own people.”113  Within 
days of learning of Mazepa’s treachery, he sent his army to the Hetman’s capital, Baturin, and 
massacred the entire population of 13,000-15,000 men, women, and children.
114
  A wave of 
terror swept the Ukrainian lands as the Muscovite troops imprisoned and executed anyone 
remotely suspected of supporting Mazepa, who were called Mazeptsi or Mazepists.  Peter 
installed a special court of justice that accused 900 Cossacks loyal to Mazepa of treason, 
tortured, and executed them.
115
  Most of the peasants and the starshyna did not join the rebellion 
unlike in Khmelnytskyi’s rebellion because they feared for their lives.  Peter not only declared 
Mazepa a traitor but also hung an effigy of him and had the Orthodox Church excommunicate 
him and declare him an anathema (even after all the patronage Mazepa gave the Church).
116
  
Peter then demanded that the Cossacks elect the docile Ivan Skoropadsky as their new Hetman.  
The Church declared the annual anathema for over 210 years until a descendent of Skoropadsky 
finally had the Ukrainian Orthodox Church lift the decree in 1918.
117
 
Through the winter of 1708 and spring of 1709, Hetman Ivan Mazepa with his Swedish 
allies faced only some minor battles against Peter, as the two sides maneuvered into strategic 
positions for the final confrontation and attempted to rally the popular support.  One surprising 
group decided to support Mazepa and Charles, the Zaporozhian Cossacks, because they saw 
Mazepa as a lesser evil than Moscow.  Muscovite forces punished the Zaporozhian defiance by 
attacking and destroying several of their fortresses torturing and executing any Cossacks they 
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captured.  Even though Charles’ forces were fatigued and ill from combat through the winter and 
early spring, he decided to march on Moscow going through the Ukrainian lands.  On July 8, 
1709, Charles with his Cossack allies fought Peter and his Cossacks who remained loyal at 
Poltava.  Similar to the Battle of Narva, the Muscovite forces substantially outnumbered the 
Swedish forces 40,000 to 18,000 but unlike at Narva the battle was a defeat for Charles and 
Mazepa.  Mazepa’s skill of picking political winners and being able to play intrigue had run out.  
The success was even greater for Peter who led his forces in person and captured most of the 
leading Swedish generals and officers striking a harsh blow for the Swedish forces.  Charles and 
Mazepa escaped though to Ottoman controlled territory to attempt to reorganize their forces.  
Mazepa attempted to regain his former position under Peter though by scheming to deliver 
Charles into his hands in exchange for a pardon.
118
  While Peter responded favorably to 
Mazepa’s offer, the victorious monarch never received a response.  Only two months after the 
disastrous Battle of Poltava, Mazepa died after passing his Hetmanate to his subordinate Pylyp 
Orlyk.
119
 
Pylyp Orlyk continued Mazepa’s fight and was also the first to justify Mazepa’s actions 
against Moscow during his exile in the Ottoman territories for over thirty years starting in 1710.  
Orlyk argued that Mazepa rebelled from Peter to “defend the laws and liberties of the Cossacks 
and entered negotiations with Charles XII following in the footsteps of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi to 
liberate his fatherland from servitude.”120  The 4000 Zaporozhians who fled with Mazepa 
supported Orlyk’s Hetmanate especially after Orlyk drafted a Cossack constitution which called 
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for limited powers for the Hetman, limited economic exploitation of the peasants, preserved 
Zaporozhia’s status, and declared that the Ukrainian lands separate from Moscow’s should he 
gain power.
121
  Orlyk was recognized as leader of Zaporozhia and the western Ukrainian lands 
and launched several successful campaigns against Muscovite forces but could not attain a 
general popular support against Moscow.
122
  After his final campaign ended in defeat in 1714, 
Orlyk and several of his followers travelled from European capital to capital seeking an alliance 
for the liberation of his lands only to be denied audience and was finally incarcerated in the 
Ottoman Empire.
123
  
The Battle of Poltava strengthened Muscovite prestige in Eastern Europe and resulted in 
a closer inclusion of the Ukrainian lands under Moscow.  It was only after 1721 that Muscovy 
became known as the Russian Empire with the incorporation of Ukrainian lands.  Peter I’s 
feelings of betrayal by a man he once called friend led him to impose a greater centralizing 
control over the Cossacks and establish the policy of Muscovite monarchs selecting loyal people 
for the position of Hetman.  Hetmans could no longer grant or seize estates, or raise or dismiss 
Cossack officers without the tsar’s approval.124  In the beginning any Cossack that did not 
support the tsar or that followed Mazepa when he fled were called “Mazepists” or traitors.  Peter 
only granted amnesty a decade afterwards and only to some Cossacks in order to enhance the 
number of troops for further campaigns against the Ottoman Empire.  Along with selecting a 
loyal Hetman, Peter forced the Hetman to move his capital closer to Hlukiv so that the tsar and 
his minister could keep a watchful eye over him.  With the closer watch over the Hetman, Peter 
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began to cause dissention in the Cossack ranks by threatening to support peasants over the 
starshyna and divisions between the Hetman and starshyna.  The “conflicts” and problems 
among the Malorus became so great that Peter created the Little Russian Collegium in 1722 
comprising of six Russian officers in a parallel government function. With the death of 
Skoropadskyi, the Collegium was the sole authority because Peter would not recognize a Hetman 
and arrested the candidate the Cossacks put forward.
125
  He believed the Ukrainian lands were 
now finally effectively administered and forbade any petitions to install a new Hetman saying 
“from the period of the first Hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, to Skoropadskyi all the Hetmans 
have proven themselves traitors.”126  The injury of the betrayal of Mazepa struck deep. 
 
Interpretations and Problems with Mazepa 
While Mazepa did many things to further Ukrainian learning, culture, and the position of 
the Cossacks, his betrayal of Peter seems to forever tarnish him both in Russia and in Ukraine.  
As the Russian state continued to centralize, ironically many of the intellectuals the state came to 
rely on were from the Ukrainian lands and educated in the academies Ivan Mazepa promoted.  
Mazepa’s Kyiv Mohyla Academy trained many of the leading ministers including Peter I’s chief 
ideologue, Teofan Prokopovych, and Catherine II’s chancellor Aleksander Bezborodko.127  The 
tsars ultimately recruited hundreds of graduates and teachers from the Academy to fill 
government, educational, and church posts due to the high standards of education.
128
  Some 
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historians have argued that perhaps as high as 50% of the first Russian nationalists were actually 
Ukrainian and educated in Mazepa’s schools.129   
Catherine II, like Peter, also distrusted the Cossacks and believed any independent 
leadership would follow Mazepa’s treacherous footsteps.  She began the most intensive 
centralization process of the Ukrainian lands since Peter I’s reign with Ukrainian educated 
nobles.  She eliminated the position of Hetman entirely in 1764, destroyed the fortress in 
Zaporozhia ending the Zaporozhian Cossacks and any last vestiges of their independent power in 
1775,
130
 and consolidated the previous ten Cossack regimental districts into three Russian 
provinces (Kiev, Chernigov, and Novgorod-Siversk) in 1783.  She then absorbed the Cossack 
starshyna into the Russian nobility by 1785 through her “Charter of Nobility” making them 
equal.
131
  With the growing opportunities for the nobility in St. Petersburg as chancellors and 
ministers, most of the Cossack elites welcomed the mobility and advantages of inclusion while 
typically only traditionalists bemoaned the loss of the past structures.
132
   
While Catherine II’s “Charter of Nobility” declared Cossack nobles as equal with 
Russian nobles, it did not define who deserved to be a noble.  Initially the Russian governors-
general accepted all starshyna as nobles but grew suspicious when the large number of over 
30,000 signed up in 1790.  The governor-general struck over 20,000 from the rolls of nobility 
sparking massive petitions to the monarchs.  As Russian monarchs attempted to gentrify the 
Cossacks into Russified nobility by giving them special privileges to land and increasing their 
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serf holdings during the late 18
th
 and early 19
th
 centuries, they required proof to accept them into 
the nobility.  As 
descendants of the Cossack officers were admitted to the ranks of the Russian imperial 
nobility[,] mobilized Ukrainian gentry turned into volens nolens archeographers and 
historians, collecting and producing family genealogies, documents, and chronicles to 
prove their descent from noble families of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This 
mass archeography resulted in the nineteenth century in several histories of Ukraine.
133  
 
These nobles poured through Polish-Lithuanian charters, treaties between Moscow and Hetmans, 
family journals, and local traditions to prove their status.  The histories that the nobles produced 
glorified Hetmans loyal to Russia and continued to vilify the traitor Mazepa in order to gain 
acceptance.  However, searching for their own justification of status, the nobility unwittingly 
provided and published sources fanning the dying embers glorifying the Cossack past and their 
rights that would become tools for future rebels. 
However, Mazepa’s influence on education for state and class building did not matter 
since from the Battle of Poltava into the twentieth century, Mazepa and a Mazepist was another 
term for a traitor in the Russian Empire and ultimately became a term of scorn for early 
Ukrainian nationalists.  The Russian Orthodox Church annually declared him an Easter 
Anathema for over two centuries.
134
  The Russian censors prohibited any objective study of him, 
and would only allow a work if it portrayed Mazepa as one of the greatest criminals against the 
state.  Russian authors like Alexander Pushkin referred to Mazepa as a traitor and used him 
largely as a foil to aggrandize Peter in his poem Poltava.
135
  Even Ukrainophile Russian historian 
Nikolai Kostomarov imbibed the influence of a tarnished Mazepa and it influenced the first 
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serious historical study of Mazepa in the late 19
th
 century.  In Kostomarov’s work Mazepa i 
Mazepintsy (Mazepa and Mazepists) he accused Mazepa of nearly any crime possible describing 
him as “not a representative of the national idea, but an egoist in the full sense of the word.  He 
lied to, cheated, and was ready to do evil to everyone while looking only to benefit himself.”136  
On top of those descriptions, Kostomarov accused him of being “a Polish agent who wanted to 
return the Ukrainian lands to Polish power and re-enslave them.”137  Even once the Russian 
Empire fell, Soviet authorities prohibited any studies about Mazepa and equated his name with 
“Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism” which became yet another form of traitor to the state.  
Discussion of Mazepa in anything other than a traitorous method only started to occur during 
Glasnost.  This kind of thinking over such a long period leaves an ingrained belief that is difficult 
to alter.
138
   
The Romantic Movement starting in the 19
th
 century largely redeemed Mazepa’s image.  
Authors like Lord Byron, composers like Liszt, and novelists like Victor Hugo romanticized the 
notion of him as a tragic, failed hero.  The Decembrist Movement in 1825 as well invoked his 
image as a source of inspiration to rebel against the tsars.  One of the leading members, 
Kondratii Ryleev, went so far as to write a poem entitled “Mazepa” which shows the 
influence.
139
   Ukrainian poet and painter, Taras Shevchenko, also attempted to revive and 
revitalize his image through his art and his poetry.  Tsar Peter and his successors hunted down 
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and destroyed most of the images of Mazepa and the ones that survived showed him as an 
unkempt ruffian because of the anathema.  Shevchenko created a more heroic portrait of the 
Hetman.  Shevchenko also wrote poems commemorating his vision wanting to liberate Ukraine 
and “regretted that the Zaporozhians did not support him unanimously in the battle with the dog, 
Peter”.140  Shevchenko also countered Pushkin’s praise for the tsars by blaming them for the state 
Ukraine was in “it was the First [Peter I] who crucified our Ukraine, and the Second [Catherine 
II] finished off the widowed orphan”.141  Ukrainian nationalists used him to inspire movements.  
Mazepa became a symbol of Ukrainian nationalism largely not because of what he did but 
because of what he represented, a restoration of lost liberties, a rebellion against Russia and the 
“last” independent leader of a Ukrainian state.  Some authors, like Hrihori Poletika in his History 
of the Rus, appealed for a return of Cossack liberties drawing on journals of Mazepa’s successor 
Pylyp Orlyk and other Cossack elites after the Russian consolidation of the Hetmanate lands.  
One nobleman, Vasyl Kapnist, went so far as to secretly petition Berlin in the 1790s to support a 
Cossack rebellion as a response to his criticisms of Russian centralization and violations of 
Cossack rights.
142
  The personal aspects of Mazepa’s history became superfluous but the great 
idea of David taking on Goliath is what drew nationalist appeal to him.  Although Mazepa’s 
stone missed in his attempt to take out the Goliath of Peter, Ukrainian nationalists believed they 
would ultimately succeed in felling the giant of Russia and be independent.   
Nationalist historians like Hrushevsky and Doroshenko continued Shevchenko’s attempt 
to redeem Mazepa’s name and actions and others are continuing to do so but there is still much 
ground to cover.  The 1997 survey referenced at the beginning of this work shows part of the 
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story, but those kinds of feelings persist even today after two decades of attempting to nation-
build.  In a 2009 study 30% of Ukrainians view Ivan Mazepa as a national hero where as 28% 
view him as a traitor.
143
  Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko was one of the leading 
politicians trying to repair Mazepa’s image during the 300th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava 
saying that “Ivan Mazepa was not a traitor since he did not betray the Ukrainian people… He 
had only one goal: to preserve the independence of the Ukrainian state.”144  These words though 
did not convince the people of Poltava to support a monument to the Cossack leader; instead they 
erected a monument to Peter the Great. 
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MYKHAILO HRUSHEVSKY 
The Ukrainian efforts at state building hit a large roadblock after Mazepa’s failure, the 
consolidation of the Ukrainian lands into the Russian Empire, and the Cossack starshyna’s 
assimilation into Russian nobility.  The effects of having no leadership or noble sponsorship 
were so large that 200 years would pass from Mazepa’s failure before there was another attempt 
at building a state in the Ukrainian lands.  In fact without leadership or sponsorship, Ukrainian 
culture nearly died out had not three developments happened when they did in the 19
th
 century, 
the Romantic Movement which inspired Ukrainophilism, Polish nationalism, and the promotion 
of Ruthenians in the Habsburg Empire.  Starting in the 1790s and early turn of the 19
th
 century, 
the Romantic Movement started to spread into the Russian Empire from Germany.  Drawing 
influence from the ideas of the German author Johann Gottfried Herder, the movement 
encouraged greater concentration on folk stories and songs inspiring writers to make works in the 
local tongue.  Herder argued that “the speech is the dearest thing to a people.  Therein resides its 
whole intellectual wealth, tradition, history, religion and principle of life- its very heart and soul.  
To deprive a people of its speech is to deprive it of its one eternal good.”145  In the largely 
illiterate society, oral folk tales could easily have blinked out of existence with the premature 
death of a prior generation.  The life expectancy was an exceptionally low 40, so waiting a 
couple generations easily would have destroyed the memories of the Cossacks and knowledge of 
the Little Russian dialect.
146
  To prevent it from happening, scholars began to collect folk stories 
and create dictionaries of the Little Russian dialect.  It was out of this Ukrainophile atmosphere 
that authors like the Russified Little Russian writer Nikolai Gogol wrote collections of Little 
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Russian short stories, and historical epics like Taras Bulba glorifying the days of Cossacks 
fighting Poland in the 17
th
 century.   
While the scholars did not have political goals in mind with their studies, nobles and the 
Russian government are another story.  The Ukrainian lands were not only instrumental in 
developing Russian and eventually Ukrainian nationalism but were a hotbed of Polish 
nationalism.  In November 1830 Polish nobles followed the example of the revolutions in France 
and Belgium, rebelled in western Ukraine and Poland, and attempted to overthrow Russian 
rule.
147
  In the aftermath of the Polish rebellion, Tsar Nicholas wanted to reduce Polish influence 
and saw education as a way to counter Polish nationalism.  This is why Russian ministers 
founded the university in Kyiv in 1834 “to disseminate Russian education and Russian 
nationality” and to aid the preservation of Little Russian (Ukrainian) folk stories and language to 
counterweigh the Poles.
148
 
One of the most important cultural developments to come out of Kyiv in the 1840s was 
the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius.  Kyiv University history professor Nikolai 
Kostomarov founded the secret society to further literary undertakings in the Ukrainian lands but 
while it started as a literary group, it soon evolved into political discussions.  The group began to 
formulate political goals like education for all, an abolition of serfdom, and called for a 
democratic federation of Slavic nations.  Soon the society attracted the attention of two figures 
who would become the most prominent members of the group, the writer-translator Panteleimon 
Kulish and the writer-poet-artist Taras Shevchenko.  Kulish published two editions of Ukrainian 
primers.  Although the primers did not enjoy widespread use, they became the basis of modern 
                                                          
147
 Hugh Seton-Watson. The Russian Empire: 1801-1917. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 283. 
148
 Subtelny, 210-11. 
51 
 
Ukrainian orthography.
149
  Shevchenko not only interpreted Ukrainian history in a way that 
countered the nobles’ conceptions but also promoted the Ukrainian language as a language 
emotive and nuanced enough that it could be used by more than just serfs and scholars.
150
  
Shevchenko’s importance in Ukrainian literature could be compared to Shakespeare’s 
importance in English.   
A political intelligentsia is not what the Russian monarchy wanted though.  After the 
arrest and punishment of the Brotherhood, the imperial ministers’ suspicions of separatist 
movements abounded from the 1850s on and they became more reactionary towards non-
Russians.  They punished the Poles in 1864 by confiscating Catholic properties, closed nearly all 
monasteries, and centralized Church administration under the Ministry of the Interior.
151
  All 
educational and religious books in Ukrainian were banned in 1863, brotherhoods were limited, 
and anyone suspected of being a Ukrainian populist was arrested.  There were brief respites in 
the 1870s and early 1900s of these policies toward Ukrainians and Poles but largely the stringent 
policies continued until the end of the Russian Empire.   
Soon after the Russian Empire began its promotion of Little Russian language and folk 
tales to counter Polish nationalism in the 1830s, the Habsburg Empire likewise began to promote 
Ruthenian political development as a Polish counterweight in 1848.  This Ruthenian promotion, 
though, did not last long as Polish leadership eventually established a Polish monopoly over 
Galician government, education, and even replaced German with Polish as the language of 
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administration.
152
  As the Poles began persecuting the Ruthenians in Galicia in the 1860s and 
1870s, the Russian Empire began its total denial of the Little Russians’ language and culture.  
Facing this persecution in Russia, many Little Russian scholars like Kyiv professor Mykhailo 
Drahomanov and former member of the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius Panteleimon 
Kulish came west to publish and encourage Ruthenians in Galicia where the laws were less 
stringent than in Russia.  In Galicia, they gave the strongest case for the use of Ruthenian 
vernacular in the form of the writings of Taras Shevchenko.
153
  They sponsored the creation of 
the Enlightenment Society in 1868 and the Shevchenko Society in 1873.  These societies 
promoted adult Ruthenian education and reached out to a broad population of peasants that was 
largely “anational” due to the limited education and that rather than identifying as Polish or 
Ruthenian merely called themselves “from here” even into the 20th century.154  The strongest 
divider of the peasantry was religion.
155
  The societies promoted political and social work along 
with literature and culture.  The prestige of the Little Russian scholars greatly influenced 
Galician feelings that the Ruthenians were part of a larger group.  The Supreme Ruthenian 
Council reflected this unity when they stated in their petition to the Habsburg emperor “we 
Galician Ruthenians belong to the great Ruthenian people who speak one language and number 
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15 million, of which 2 1/3 million live in the Galician land.”156  At this same time, the 
intelligentsia also began referring to Ruthenians and Little Russians as Ukrainians to further 
differentiate the people from Russians. 
It was out of this confrontational intellectual and political environment that Mykhailo 
Hrushevsky grew to prominence.  Galician populist parties were finally successful in expanding 
educational efforts through cooperation with Poles and won a very important victory in 1894 
with the creation of a department of Ukrainian history at Lviv University.  The appointed 
professor, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, was an unknown 28-year-old Russian citizen who studied in 
Kyiv under a Polish professor.  When he arrived in Lviv, Hrushevsky was shocked that the 
Galician Poles were so antagonistic towards the Ukrainian cause and became the strongest voice 
for Ukrainian cultural and intellectual life.
157
 He lectured in Ukrainian to show it was a credible 
language for scholarship and succeeded in drawing scholars from all parts of Ukraine.
158
 Along 
with his scholarly activities, he reorganized the Shevchenko Society into an unofficial academy 
of arts and sciences that had published 300 volumes in history, ethnography, and folklore by 
1914.
159
  The Shevchenko Society provided a training ground for future Ukrainian scholars.  
Ultimately, this little known professor would have an immense effect on not only the 
interpretation of Ukrainian history but also the future political developments. 
Mykhailo Hrushevsky created perhaps one of the most important reinterpretations of 
Ukrainian history with his ten-volume magnum opus History of the Ukraine-Rus’.  Beginning in 
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1898 with his first volume, his history argued against the standard Polish and Russian “historical 
nations” interpretation, which centered primarily on the elites and their involvement in state 
traditions as comprising the nation.  Instead, he focused on the common Ukrainian people as 
comprising the nation and by including the continuity of the common people and their culture, 
Hrushevsky undercut the basis of political state legitimization based on noble assimilation.
160
 
Hrushevsky’s use of the long-history of the people back to the Kyivian Rus’ refuted Moscow’s 
imperial claims as an inheritor and a continuation of the Kyivian Rus’ since he argued the people 
were socially and culturally different.
161
  As well, his long-history allowed for an argument 
against “historic” Polish control over Galicia.  Through the inclusion of the common people, 
Hrushevsky expanded the basis of legitimization for a future Ukrainian state to include the 
ancient Kyivian states rather than just the brief Cossack state.
162
  While not all historians agreed 
with his argument, he brought the Ukrainian people into history and established a compelling 
populist argument for the necessity of Ukrainian statehood while also presenting the history in a 
fairly nuanced and balanced fashion.  
It was not only in his historical works that Hrushevsky brought the Ukrainian people 
forward; he also brought them forward with his political activities.  Hrushevsky maintained 
contact through the Shevchenko Society with underground intelligentsia and political leaders in 
Kyiv and in the eastern Ukrainian lands.  It was through these underground contacts, that he 
knew that the intelligentsia in both the Russian and Habsburg Empires were in favor of 
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uniting.
163
  Hrushevsky was one of the leading figures that founded the Ukrainian National 
Democratic Party in Galicia in 1899 that advocated further political activity “to achieve the 
ultimate unification of the whole Ukrainian nation into one single national organism.”164  The 
National Democratic Party gained popularity quickly, overtook the Radical Party along with 
others, and even won the most famous Western Ukrainian poet Ivan Franko to the cause while 
continuing to declare their support for the Habsburg Empire.  Other parties like the Social 
Democrats and the Radicals altered their platforms in order to mimic the National Democrats, 
which reflected the mood of Ukrainian unity and ultimately national independence. 
The Galician Ukrainian parties and newspaper publications inspired Ukrainians in the 
Russian Empire to attempt political organization.  Following the Revolution of 1905 and the 
October Manifesto, Ukrainian publishers began to organize and publish while political parties 
came into the open.  The Russian government during the first parliament even went so far as to 
declare that Ukrainian was not a dialect of Russian but in fact a separate language and reversed 
their decision allowing cultural activities in Ukrainian.
165
  The ministers believed that the actions 
of the Ukrainian intelligentsia did not threaten Russian unity but that the increased education 
could make Ukrainians into Russian nationals.  Literacy at this time was a dismally low 13% for 
Ukrainians with only a slight improvement to 36% for Russians.
166
 Encouraged by the 
liberalization in 1905, Hrushevsky returned to Kyiv and organized a branch of the Enlightenment 
Society to establish closer ties between the groups of Ukrainians and centralize Ukrainian 
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cultural development.
167
  The Enlightenment Society published numerous books, opened 
libraries and bookshops, and encouraged scholarship in the eastern Ukrainian regions.  
Hrushevsky feared that two separate Ukrainian literatures and cultures would develop unless 
activities were centralized.
168
  He then began to divide his time between Kyiv and Lviv while he 
continued to write his long-history and write profusely on Ukrainian social and political themes.   
This period of Russian liberalization towards the Ukrainians was short-lived.  Following 
the dismissal of two different parliamentary sessions in 1906 and 1907 for being too radical, 
Nicholas II reasserted his authority over the parliament.  For the third parliament, Tsar Nicholas 
changed the election rules to minimize peasant votes, which resulted in fewer Ukrainian deputies 
and a more conservative parliament.  This conservative atmosphere was less conciliatory towards 
the Ukrainians.  Ukrainian deputies’ request in 1908 to teach elementary schools in Ukrainian 
met a rejection.
169
  There was a fear in parliament and the monarchy that educating the peasants 
would only radicalize them.  Russian ministers then began to close all branches of the 
Enlightenment Society (closing the last one in 1910) because they feared that the “Mazepists” 
were fostering a sense of separatism or working as agents of the Austrians or Poles.
170
  
While Ukrainian nationalism may have been growing among the populace in the Russian 
Empire as well as in Galicia, there was little sign of it during the outbreak of World War I.  
Shortly after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in June 1914, Ukrainian political 
parties in Galicia formed into the Supreme Ukrainian Council, which declared its loyalty to the 
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Habsburgs, and professed a unified front against Russia.
171
  They drafted 2,500 men to serve in 
the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen to fight alongside Habsburg armies against the Russians. In total, a 
quarter-of-a-million Ukrainians would serve in the Habsburg armies and frequently fight the 
three and a half million Ukrainians that served in the Tsarist armies.
172
  While the armies fought, 
most of the Ukrainian intelligentsia continued to declare their loyalty for their respective 
monarchs.   
Tsar Nicholas II saw World War I as an opportunity to “reunite” all of the Rus’ lands.  In 
August 1914 Russian armies defeated Habsburg armies and conquered Galicia.  Galician Polish 
administrators retreated with the armies and accused the Ukrainian populace of treason or 
collusion with the Russians.  These accusations brought a backlash that killed several thousand 
Ukrainians and deported even more to internment camps deep in Austria.
173
  The Ukrainians did 
not fare any better with the new Russian military administration.  The new governor attempted 
“to end all seditious Ukrainian activities directed against the Russian Empire in Lviv” by closing 
down all newspapers, disbanding all cultural organizations, instituting Russian to replace 
Ukrainian as the administrative and educational language, and attempting to close the Greek 
Catholic Churches.
174
  Russian administrators arrested many Galician Ukrainian leaders like the 
Greek Catholic Metropolitan, Andrei Sheptyskyi, and deported them deep into Russia and parts 
of Siberia.  Administrators even arrested Professor Mykhailo Hrushevsky upon his return to Kyiv 
late in 1914 and deported him to Moscow.
175
  To signify the importance of the acquisition of 
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Galicia, Tsar Nicholas II visited Lviv in early 1915 and declared that the “‘Russian’ population 
would never be returned to ‘foreign’ rule.”176  These decisions were an attempt to incorporate the 
last outlying “Russian” lands into the motherland but in the end only solidified Galician 
Ukrainians against the Russians.  
In total, the Russian control would be short-lived as the Habsburg armies defeated the 
Russian armies and returned to Galicia in the spring of 1915.  The Russian armies attempted an 
impossible task of deporting the entire Ukrainian population of Galicia to Russia while retreating 
but only succeeded in bringing 25,000 with them.
177
  Following the army successes, Habsburg 
authorities again punished Ukrainians suspected of collaborating with the Russians.  The 
Habsburg authorities sent many Ukrainians to internment camps and placed them on trial for 
treason.  In 1916 Russian forces successfully reacquired sections Galicia and had learned from 
their mistakes during their previous administration of Galicia.  Unlike the previous time, the 
Russian administrators were more lenient to Ukrainians, especially when Ukrainian historian 
Dmytro Doroshenko became governor-general in 1917.
178
  
Galicia was a heavily contested region on the Eastern Front between the Habsburgs and 
Russia.  The region became even more contested when Germany and Austria created an 
independent Poland from Russian territory in 1916.   Polish leadership requested the inclusion of 
Galicia to restore their historic kingdom.  The Habsburgs did not consent to that request but 
promised that the region would receive greater autonomy.  Ukrainian politicians in Vienna 
became incensed at the promise because it would mean greater Polish domination over the 
province.  The Ukrainian politicians renewed their demands for a partition of Galicia into Polish 
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and Ukrainian halves and greater Ukrainian autonomy.  Franz Joseph made promises that once 
the war was over the Galician situation would “be settled favorably.”179  Shortly after making 
these promises in 1916, Franz Joseph died, and his successor, Karl I, made similar promises.  
The promises though did not assuage Ukrainian grievances. 
While the Habsburgs continued to make promises of autonomy to the Ukrainians in 1917, 
the situation in Russia gave an actual chance for autonomy.  In March 1917 a general strike 
spread through St. Petersburg (named Petrograd at the time) over food shortages.  The strikes 
happened to correspond with 30,000 Ukrainians celebrating of the anniversary of Taras 
Shevchenko’s birth.180  The Ukrainian population in Petrograd was familiar with the troops’ 
repressive actions but in 1917 they were even more severe.
181
  Tsarist troops were given orders 
to fire on the protesters but instead joined the strike along with most of the population of the city.  
The Ukrainian community was one of the most active groups during the protests.  Ukrainian 
soldiers and workers encouraged the Volhynian Regiment to join the protests rather than the 
police and were involved in forming workers’ councils.182  Seeing that he no longer had any 
popular support, Tsar Nicholas II abdicated and went into hiding along with several ministers.  
The political vacuum allowed a provisional democratic government to form.
183
  The newly 
formed Russian republic promised “freedom of speech, association, and press” and abolished “all 
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restrictions based on class, religion, and nationality.”184  This liberalized atmosphere encouraged 
Ukrainian political activities to resume. 
Within days of the monarchy’s collapse, three different groups competed for popular 
support in Kyiv.   Representatives of the Russian bureaucracy organized an Executive 
Committee and acted as an extension of the Russian Provisional Government.  Representing a 
more leftist ideology, workers and soldiers organized a Kyiv Soviet.
185
  As these groups 
competed, moderate liberal Ukrainian politicians Dmytro Doroshenko, Evhen Chykalenko, and 
Serhii Efremov joined with social democrats Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura to 
form the Central Rada.  Other parties began to join the Central Rada and membership grew to 
600 delegates. With the increasing membership, it became the largest group and effectively 
displaced the Executive Committee as a form of governance during the political vacuum.  
Nominally, the Rada was an acting regional administrative unit of the Provisional Government 
until the government could organize a formal one, but largely the Provisional Government was 
too involved in its own affairs to influence the Rada.
186
  The delegates seized on the Provisional 
Government’s disregard and attempted to nationalize Ukraine.  From the time the Central Rada 
became the leading group until the eventual Bolshevik conquest, the revolution in Ukraine 
gained more national overtones.  The Central Rada delegates elected Mykhailo Hrushevsky 
president upon his return from exile because of his efforts championing Ukrainian rights and his 
broad nationalist appeal.
187
   
                                                          
184
 Seton-Watson, 726. 
185
 Soviet meaning a council in this sense and not necessarily reflecting support of Bolshevism or 
a Soviet Union. 
186
 Magocsi, 501-2. 
187
 Doroshenko, 597. 
61 
 
Under Hrushevsky’s leadership, the Central Rada attempted to become a legitimate 
representative body for all Ukrainians while “awakening” the nationalist sentiment of the 
common people.  In April 1917 the Rada expanded to 900 delegates representing all regions of 
Ukraine and passed resolutions declaring that only an autonomous Ukraine could fully represent 
the people.
188
  The Ukrainians in the Habsburg Empire supported the Rada’s efforts and declared 
that “they would not give up the struggle repudiating any connection between the Kingdom of 
Galicia with Poland until the great Ukrainian nation was in enjoyment of its full rights on its 
entire national territory.”189  The Rada’s resolutions of autonomy met with silence from the 
Provisional Government though.  They interpreted the silence as tacit approval, so the Rada also 
passed resolutions promoting the use of Ukrainian in primary schools, courts, political 
institutions, churches, newspapers, as well as creating Ukrainian military units.
190
     
In July 1917, deserters and mutineers from the Russian army converged on Kyiv, 
organized themselves into two all-Ukrainian regiments, the Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and 
Polubotok Regiments, and swore their allegiance to the Central Rada.
191
  Along with the soldiers, 
nationalism seemed to be reaching the upper military echelons as well.  Russified General Pavlo 
Skoropadsky “rediscovered” his Ukrainian heritage and offered to swear allegiance with his 
personal 40,000 well-trained, equipped and disciplined soldiers to the Central Rada.  Socialistic 
idealism influenced much of the Rada’s ideology so Prime Minister192 Volodymyr Vynnychenko 
rejected the offer because the standing army would be “unnecessary” since the success of the 
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socialist revolution would “wither away its necessity” and because Skoropadsky was a rich 
bourgeois landowner who could not be trusted.
193
  Less than a year would pass before this policy 
towards landowners would backfire on the Rada.  
The nationalizing effort seemed to garner support as groups of soldiers, teachers, 
workers, and peasants numbered in the hundreds of thousands and demonstrated in Kyiv voicing 
their support for the Central Rada.
194
  These protests may or may not have been direct support for 
the nationalizing effort of the Central Rada but a belief that a closer government would be more 
responsive than the Russian government to end the war and help attain more land.  The great 
majority of Ukrainians were indifferent to the national movement as they were more concerned 
with ending the war and land distribution.
195
  This support though encouraged the politicians to 
believe that they were not just representatives of the intelligentsia but were a legitimate 
parliamentary body representing Ukraine.
196
   
The question of support would remain a source of weakness internally and externally 
during the Rada’s entire existence.  General elections could have removed this internal weakness 
but they were scheduled too late to be of use.
197
  While the demonstrations may or may not have 
reflected the general public opinion, there were some groups greatly mistrustful of the Central 
Rada’s development.  Socialists in Russia and within Ukraine were generally mistrustful because 
they believed the Rada would distract the working classes from the class struggle and focus them 
on the less important national struggle (even though largely the Rada was primarily a leftist 
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organization).
198
  Russian and Jewish populations living in Ukraine still supported Russian 
culture and government and were concerned what the Central Rada would mean for the future of 
Russia.  These Russian and Jewish groups were largely urban, while the nationalist Ukrainian 
population was primarily rural with only small urban political-intelligentsia segments.  
Nationalist Ukrainians continued to debate how to attract the Russian and Jewish groups and 
focused primarily on nationalizing the urban population.  Along with the urban focus, petty 
political squabbles distracted and distanced them from the rural land issues that would have 
given greater political support and legitimization.
199
  The peasants would become so disgruntled 
with the Central Rada’s inactivity over land issues that by the fall of 1917 they started mass 
seizures of noble and crown lands.
200
  This urban-rural divide would be a further challenge to the 
Central Rada’s support and, ultimately, its existence. 
If internal support was a source of weakness, external support was an even greater source 
of weakness.  The Central Rada requested the Provisional Government to recognize their internal 
autonomy to no avail.  The Provisional Russian Government argued that the ability to grant 
autonomy in a federal structure superseded their temporary authorities and did not wish to be 
held accountable for such a change before a permanent government was in place.
201
  Along with 
that argument, there was a general belief that the Rada was taking steps towards Ukrainian 
separatism and dismemberment of Russia.  Volodymyr Vynnychenko later conceded in his work 
Vidrodzhennia Natsii (Rebirth of a Nation) in 1920 that it was “the root of separatism. We all 
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desired to separate from oppression.”202  Due to the lack of response, in June 1917 the Central 
Rada declared in its First Universal “Ukraine is free. Without separating themselves entirely 
from Russia, without severing connections with the Russian state, let the Ukrainian people… 
have the right to order their own lives.”203  This declaration of a legitimate local government was 
a first step toward an independent Ukrainian state. 
The Central Rada was attempting a tightrope-walk balancing considerations of autonomy 
with loyalty to a federated Russian republic.  Conservative Russians in the Provisional 
Government saw the Universal as an attempt to dissolve the Great Russian unity and believed the 
Central Rada was a “hotbed of treason”204 that was guilty of “stabbing the Russian revolution in 
the back.”205  Shortly after the declaration of the Universal, the Central Rada created an 
executive branch called the General Secretariat with Volodymyr Vynnychenko at its head.  
These actions did nothing to relieve the Russian fears of Ukrainian secession, but instead only 
furthered them.  The feelings were so pervasive that the Provisional Government sent Minister of 
War and future Prime Minister Aleksander Kerensky with a delegation to Kyiv to negotiate with 
Hrushevsky and Vynnychenko to maintain Ukrainian loyalty to Russia.
206
  Hrushevsky and 
Vynnychenko gave assurances that their actions were not attempts to separate from Russia but 
only to establish federal authority.  Kerensky and the Russian delegation believed the assertions 
that “nothing decisive” was happening in Ukraine.207  To further the cooperative spirit, the 
Central Rada joined with the Russian delegation and issued its Second Universal.  The Russians 
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recognized the Rada’s authority (but not its autonomy) and the Ukrainians gave concessions to 
maintain unity with Russia.
208
  The Universals and the establishment of the General Secretariat 
tied the Provisional Government’s hands, as it forced them to recognize the Central Rada’s 
control over five predominantly Ukrainian provinces in order to receive continued support during 
World War I.  This debate over autonomy versus centralism would continue to dominate the 
relationship and negotiations of the Central Rada with the Russian Provisional Government.     
The debate over Ukrainian autonomy was not the only issue weighing on the Provisional 
Government from June through October 1917.  As the Central Rada pressed for greater local 
authority, the Provisional Government was facing a greater threat to its very existence.  In April 
1917 a little known socialist political organizer Vladimir Ulyanov (better known as Lenin) 
returned from exile in Switzerland and immediately called on the Bolsheviks to overthrow the 
Provisional Government.  While the general popular opinion trended to supporting socialist 
groups, that did not necessarily translate into support for the Bolsheviks.  Frequently the 
Bolsheviks targeted their message to the urban industrial proletariat and this message did not 
translate well to peasants.
209
  Lenin’s Bolshevik party was not the largest socialist group at this 
time, numbering less than 24,000, but they were a centralized, well disciplined, and organized 
group compared to other socialist parties.
210
  The Bolshevik activities came to a head in July 
when a Russian military disaster on the Eastern Front provided them with popular support for 
their slogan of “peace, land and bread.”211  Workers joined with the Bolshevik attempt to 
overthrow the government but the Provisional Government was able to respond and drive Lenin 
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back into exile.  This time, though, Lenin merely escaped to Finland and continued advocating 
overthrow of the Provisional Government.   
While Lenin was in exile, the Bolshevik party continued to gain adherents.  Lenin’s grand 
strategy was to place as many Bolsheviks in positions of power in workers’ and soldiers’ 
councils (each with its own militia) around Russia as his Red Guard.
212
  This strategy was 
successful since by October the party had grown to 350,000 members and the Bolsheviks had 
majorities in several councils in Moscow and Petrograd.
213
  While the strategy was successful in 
the more urbanized Russia, in the more rural Ukraine the Bolsheviks met with only limited 
success.  By August 1917 there were only around 22,000 members divided in four groups, which 
largely competed with one another, rather than cooperating.
214
  The divided front left the 
Bolsheviks unable to compete with the Central Rada so they cooperated with the local Ukrainian 
government (as much as they ideologically could) and sent representatives as members of the 
Rada.
215
   
Repelling Lenin and the Bolsheviks in July 1917 was only a temporary reprieve for the 
Provisional Government.   The Provisional Government could not stop Lenin from advocating 
further overthrow from Finland nor could they stem possible further Bolshevik attempts.  Two 
months later in early September, another challenge came when a rightist coup possibly attempted 
to overthrow the Provisional Government.  Many in the military grew disgruntled with the 
Provisional Government and the increasing influence of the councils.  Supreme Commander-in-
Chief General Lavr Kornilov believed the Provisional Government was impotent to do anything 
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to the councils and decided to take the law into his own hands and marched on Petrograd
216
 
either to curb the workers’ councils or to initiate a military dictatorship.217  When the Provisional 
Government discovered this, they ordered Kornilov to relinquish control of his troops but he 
disregarded the order and continued his army’s march on the capital.  The rebellion only ended 
due to the general’s lack of preparation and the unity of the railroad workers’ soviets stopping 
the trains carrying the troops rather than a coordinated effort by the Provisional Government.  
The local soviets disarmed and arrested Kornilov with the other mutineers and only increased the 
threat to the state since the soviets still remained and were now armed with Kornilov’s 
weapons.
218
  The Bolsheviks used Kornilov’s coup as a further indictment against Kerensky’s 
inept and ineffective Provisional Government and gained traction with their propaganda.
219
  
Whatever Kornilov’s motives were, the result was yet another weakening of the Provisional 
Government’s position and a strengthening of the soviets which were to become pivotal for the 
Bolsheviks.   
As the Bolsheviks continued to gain power in the Russian Republic, the Provisional 
Government grew concerned over any threats to its power.  It viewed the Ukrainian efforts and 
Bolshevism as linked threats.  The Provisional Government started to withdraw from previous 
agreements with the Central Rada and attempted to centralize Russian control of the General 
Secretariat.
220
  The Rada refused to participate in the State Conference because they were 
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allowed only five delegates and felt underrepresented.
221
  Kerensky’s government grew 
concerned that the Ukrainians were becoming “Judases” and instructed a Russian special 
prosecutor to investigate both the Central Rada and the General Secretariat while also 
withdrawing financial support for them.
222
  Kerensky demanded that the General Secretariat 
come to Petrograd to explain the necessity of their Congress in October 1917 while he 
considered using the military to disperse the Rada.
223
  As the Ukrainians were facing a more 
belligerent Provisional Government and just as the delegates arrived in Petrograd, the Bolsheviks 
launched another attack to overthrow the government and finally succeeded.  The militarized 
Bolsheviks took over public buildings, railroad stations, and newspapers.  After ultimately taking 
over the entire government, the Bolsheviks legitimized their power by passing resolutions 
supporting their actions through the soviets (organizations that they dominated).
224
  The 
Ukrainian delegates saw the turmoil in the capital and quickly returned to Kyiv.  The Provisional 
Government’s prior antagonism towards the Central Rada did not encourage Ukrainians to 
support the Provisional Government’s fight against the Bolsheviks. 
The two issues of land redistribution and ending the war were the largest factors that 
weakened support for the Provisional Government.  Lenin and his Bolsheviks exploited these 
issues to great effect to garner support so he knew that they were the most important issues to 
deal with first.  With Lenin’s first two proclamations the day after his victory, he addressed both 
those issues.  His first proclamation called for all countries at war to begin peace negotiations 
and while his second proclamation declared all land to be state property it made allowances for 
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peasants to cultivate it as their own.
225
  The Bolsheviks opposed private ownership of land but 
wanted the peasantry to feel that the Bolsheviks supported them. 
The Bolsheviks held similar views as other socialist groups in Russia concerning national 
minorities. They straddled claims supporting self-determination yet not wanting them to 
separate.  Both Lenin and the Bolshevik Minister of Nationalities, Joseph Stalin, wrote before 
World War I about Marxism and the issue of self-determination.  Stalin wrote that “Social-
Democracy in all countries proclaims the right of nations to self-determination. […] The right of 
self-determination means that a nation may arrange its life in the way it wishes. […] It has the 
right to complete secession.  Nations are sovereign and all nations have equal rights.”226  Lenin 
reflected a similar ideology stating that “‘self-determination of nations’ in the Marxists’ 
Programme cannot have any other meaning than political self-determination, state independence, 
and the formation of a national state.”227  While both seemed in agreement with self-
determination, their writings in the end castigated national self-autonomy and determination as 
bourgeois ploys to “poison the atmosphere, spread mutual distrust” and “fragment proletarian 
organizations into national exclusiveness.”228  Ultimately, the Bolshevik ideology was that 
national feelings could wait due to the greater importance of class struggle.  This ideology 
tempered Bolshevik relations with the Ukrainian nationalists and the Central Rada.  
As Civil War between the Bolsheviks and the forces of the Provisional Government was 
beginning in the Russian lands, the conflagration threatened to spread to Ukraine.  Russian 
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garrisons in Kyiv, which supported the Provisional Government, attempted to defend the Russian 
Republic, denounced the Central Rada of being in alliance with the Bolsheviks and organized an 
attack on it.
229
  To respond to the threat, the Central Rada briefly allied with the Bolsheviks due 
to the Rada’s military weakness to “defend the revolution” and expel the Russian garrisons.230  
This alliance was short-lived though as the Bolsheviks soon after denounced the Central Rada as 
a “bourgeois agent of international capitalism” and demanded its submission.231  The Central 
Rada attempted to keep a neutral approach not declaring its support for either side in order to 
maintain its autonomy.  While the Rada did not recognize the Bolshevik government as 
legitimate in Ukraine, it did acknowledge its de facto existence in Russia proper to stave off a 
conflict with the Bolsheviks and to effect at least a neutral stance from Russian military units 
fighting the Bolsheviks.
232
 
The Central Rada took steps to clarify its neutral position when it declared its Third 
Universal on November 20, 1917.  The Rada stated that “the Central Government of the north 
has collapsed and anarchy, lawlessness, and ruin are spreading through the state.  Our land is 
also in danger.  Without a single, strong, national authority Ukraine may also fall into the abyss 
of civil war, slaughter and ruin.”233  The Third Universal attempted to expand the Central Rada’s 
influence in the region as the only remaining established order and created the Ukrainian 
National Republic (Ukrainska Narodna Respublika) or UNR to legitimize that government.   
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Even though they were declaring Ukraine a republic, this Universal did not take the final step 
and declare independence.  The Central Rada explicitly stated that the Ukrainians were not 
“separating from the Russian Republic” but were “maintaining its unity […] standing firmly on 
their territory so that [their] strength may aid all of Russia, so that the whole Russian Republic 
may become a federation of equal and free peoples.”234  With the establishment of the Ukrainian 
Republic, the Central Rada also attempted to take advantage of the chaos and expand its territory 
from the previously recognized five to nine dominantly Ukrainian provinces. The declaration 
again attempted to maintain Ukrainian aspirations of national autonomy within a federalized 
Russian republican state.   
The Rada continued its delicate equilibrium between autonomy and placating the 
Bolsheviks.  Even in the declaration of the Ukrainian Republic, the balancing act is apparent.  In 
Ukrainian the word narodna can either mean national or people’s.   This double meaning was a 
way of reconciling socialist groups and nationalists internally and a way of appeasing the 
Bolsheviks externally since each group interpreted narodna through their own ideology.  The 
Third Universal as well incorporated some of Lenin’s initial proclamations attempting to settle 
land issues and echoed the call for peace.  Through the fall, many peasants had already started to 
seize church and royal lands, and large estates, the leaders in the Rada were aware that they were 
too weak politically and in numbers of police to reverse the illegal seizures.  Rather than trying 
to regain influence through rational and legal land reform that could have further legitimized 
their government, the Central Rada compromised by “asserting these [seized] lands are the 
property of the entire working people, and that they be recognized as such without compensation 
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to former proprietors.”235  This declaration followed Lenin’s example earlier that month.  The 
Rada also called upon all belligerents to begin peace negotiations and asserted it would defend 
Ukrainian rights from infringement during the negotiations.   
While the stated goals of the Bolsheviks and the Central Rada seemed compatible with 
one another, the two groups quickly antagonized each other, which led to an expansion of the 
Civil War into Ukrainian lands.  The Bolsheviks remained amicable while they still believed 
they could possibly take power in Ukraine through peaceful and “democratic” means.  Starting in 
early December 1917, Minister of War, Symon Petliura, correctly interpreted the threat to the 
Ukrainian Republic.  He called for a cessation of foreign (Russian) troops moving through 
Ukrainian lands.  To enforce it, Petliura ordered Ukrainian troops not to obey orders from the 
Bolsheviks and to disarm any Russian soldier passing through Ukrainian territory.
236
  The 
Bolsheviks issued an ultimatum to the Central Rada to return the weapons within 48 hours or 
there would be a state of war.
237
 Simultaneously with the ultimatum, the Ukrainian Bolsheviks 
attempted to organize soviets in Kyiv in order to seize greater power in the government.  The 
soviets overwhelmingly supported the Rada over the Bolsheviks (53% to 10% respectively).
238
  
Following these unsuccessful attempts, the Rada was able to force the Ukrainian Bolsheviks out 
of Kyiv.  After the Ukrainian Bolsheviks fled, they established a rival government, the Ukrainian 
Socialist Soviet Republic
239
, in Kharkiv on December 17 and appealed to the Russian Bolsheviks 
for support.  Lenin used the excuse of civil war in Ukraine to send the Russian Red Guard to 
invade Ukraine on December 25 and support the Ukrainian Bolsheviks.  To lend credibility to 
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the Ukrainian Bolsheviks’ cause, Lenin placed Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko in charge of the Red 
Guard because of his Ukrainian sounding name.
240
 
As the Russian Civil War spread into Ukraine, both the Bolsheviks and the Central Rada 
attempted to extricate themselves from World War I.  The Bolsheviks were able to negotiate a 
cease-fire on December 22 while the peace conference met in Brest-Litovsk.  The Central Rada 
leaders became concerned when they learned the Bolshevik government would be negotiating on 
their behalf so they sent delegates to protect Ukrainian interests on January 1, 1918.  The Central 
Rada abandoned the idea of a federal structure since the Bolsheviks declared of war and started 
their invasion.  German and Austrian diplomats grew concerned that the Ukrainian delegates 
would complicate a desired quick peace settlement, but relented to the Ukrainian delegates on 
the condition the Russian delegates allowed and recognized them.  The head of the Russian 
delegates, Leon Trotsky
241, did not object to the Ukrainian presence and maintained Lenin’s 
argument that they had the right to secede.
242
  The Russian recognition along with de facto 
recognition and entreaties from France and Great Britain to remain involved in the war were the 
beginnings of acknowledgment of an independent Ukrainian state.
243
  On January 6, 1918, the 
Germans began formal negotiations with the Ukrainians. 
It was soon apparent that the German delegation would not be able to get the quick peace 
treaty they wanted from the ideologically driven Trotsky and Russian Soviet delegates. Trotsky 
would frequently begin to harangue the Germans as though he was prosecuting western 
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capitalism and attempted to spread revolution to the Habsburg and German armies.
244
  There 
were reports of discontent in the West due to the war and the Bolsheviks believed that that would 
be the beginning of a worldwide proletariat revolution.  Trotsky hoped that he could stall the 
negotiations long enough for either a proletariat uprising or that the Bolsheviks could achieve a 
victorious peace.
245
  The negotiations began with the Russian delegates pressing for national self-
determination and no annexations and the delegates were completely unfamiliar and unprepared 
for the realpolitik style of the German negotiators.  The German delegates finally grew tired of 
Trotsky’s lectures and stall tactics by January 18 and German General Hoffmann produced a 
map showing that the German armies would not withdraw from the territories of Poland, 
Lithuania, or Belarus and refused further negotiation on the creation of these “buffer states.”246  
Trotsky requested and received time to bring this proposal to the capital for instructions.  One of 
the reasons why the Germans opened negotiations with Ukraine was due to the difficulty dealing 
with Trotsky.   
The Germans met with the Ukrainian National Republic delegates for nearly a month, 
and were having greater success at attaining a peace treaty.  The Ukrainian delegates argued for 
expanded territory including the Ukrainian regions of Galicia and Volynia under Habsburg 
control.  While unsuccessful at receiving the territories into the UNR, secret protocols assured 
the delegates that the Ukrainian regions would become a special crownland in the Habsburg 
Empire.
247
  Unlike Trotsky though, the UNR delegates were not as ideologically driven due to 
their circumstances.  The delegates were aware that Bolshevik armies were closing in on Kyiv 
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and they needed a deal to end the war and gain the support of the Central Powers.  The Ukrainian 
military’s previous show of support in July 1917 seemed to be for naught as most of the 300,000 
soldiers melted away back to their farms or were effectively disenchanted with the Central Rada 
due to continuous Bolshevik propaganda.  By January 1918, Minister of War, Symon Petliura, 
could only effectively muster 15,000 soldiers for his Free Cossack brigades and was also relying 
on Galician volunteers under the command of Yevhen Konovalets.
248
  The Red Guard had 
already gained control of many eastern and southern provinces through a rail war including 
Kharkiv, Poltava, Katerynoslav, and Odesa in the month long fight and it was uncertain whether 
the Central Rada could hold out much longer near Kyiv.   
The negotiations at Brest-Litovsk and the Bolshevik invasion were instrumental for the 
Central Rada to take the final step towards Ukrainian independence.  Hrushevsky and the Central 
Rada leadership knew that the treaty could only happen with sovereign states.  As well, they 
knew that the Bolsheviks would not agree to Ukrainian autonomy or shared governmental 
powers in a Russian federation since the Bolsheviks had recently dispersed the popularly elected 
Assembly for expressing anti-Bolshevik sentiments.
249
  So on January 25, 1918
250
, the Central 
Rada released its Fourth Universal which declared Ukraine “a free, subject to no one, sovereign 
state of the Ukrainian People” in order to finalize the treaty.251  As the Central Rada debated and 
finally decided on the course of independence, the Ukrainian military defenses around Kyiv were 
failing as the Red Guard continued its rail war attack along the Kursk-Kyiv rail line.  The 
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military attempted a hasty and desperate defense to fend off the Red Guard at the town of Kruty 
but the inexperienced student army failed and left Kyiv open for assault on January 30.
252
 
The Central Rada in Kyiv attempted to pass as much legislation as possible before the 
Bolsheviks reached the capital.  Commissions began to enact the land policies passed with the 
Third Universal and eliminated private land ownership.  The Rada passed laws for an eight-hour 
workday, public control of industries, and curtailed capital punishment.
253
 Along with these laws, 
the Central Rada established symbols of a Ukrainian state: a new currency (the Hryvnia), a coat 
of arms for the republic (the trident of the Kyivian Rus’ King Volodymyr), Ukrainian 
citizenship, and created laws guarding national minorities.
254
  All of the legislative activities 
were an attempt to reach out to the peasants and workers in order to fortify the concept of a 
Ukrainian state in the popular consciousness.  The attempts though seemed too late as politicians 
and workers sympathetic to the Bolsheviks staged rebellions in several Ukrainian cities and 
challenged the Rada’s authority internally.  Members of the Social Revolutionary Party 
conspired to overthrow the Rada, establish a soviet form of government, and make peace with 
the Bolsheviks.
255
  Meanwhile in the rest of Kyiv, workers seized the arsenal, began to fight 
soldiers supporting the Ukrainian government in the streets, and reported to the Red Guard that 
the city had fallen.
256
  The army responded quickly but within a week the Red Guard was within 
range to bombard Kyiv. 
The Bolshevik twelve-day bombardment of Kyiv threw the entire city into chaos.  Fires 
broke out from the bombs and striking water plant workers only exacerbated the problems with a 
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lack of water.
257
  Where the city did not have fires, it was in darkness from striking power plant 
workers.  The Bolshevik bombardment also ended up ruining Hrushevsky’s apartment building 
and destroying his personal library (as well as many documents he accumulated for the ninth 
volume of Istoria Ukrainy-Rus’ and for a work about Bohdan Khmelnytskyi separating myth 
from fact).
258
  Many Central Rada and cabinet members fled to avoid the chaos in the city, and 
those that stayed found themselves in such danger that they needed pistols to defend 
themselves.
259
  The entire UNR government finally fled on February 7 to Zhitomir.   
Only when the success of the UNR delegates at Brest-Litovsk seemed imminent did 
Trotsky demand recognition of the Ukrainian Soviet delegates as the legitimate Ukrainian 
government.  The Central Powers ignored Trotsky’s demand, recognized Ukraine as a separate 
sovereign nation, and signed a peace treaty in order to support their dwindling food supplies with 
Ukrainian grain on February 9, 1918.
260
  The Central Powers were not aware of the UNR’s dire 
circumstances.  Within ten hours of the recognition and signing the peace treaty, word of Kyiv 
falling to the Bolshevik army reached Brest-Litovsk.  When the Bolsheviks captured Kyiv, they 
captured and executed between 2,000-5,000 “class enemies” and alienated many of the people 
they were “liberating.”261  The Brest-Litovsk agreement would have forced the Russian 
government to recognize Ukraine as a fully independent state and to discontinue their war with 
them.  Trotsky and the Russian delegates continued to debate the German delegates until finally 
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Trotsky announced “Russia, while refusing to sign an annexationist peace, for her part declares 
the state of war with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria at an end.”262  After this 
statement, Trotsky and the Russian delegates left believing that without fighting there was no 
war.   
While German civilian diplomats were willing to accept the unorthodox peace agreement, 
the German military interpreted it differently and announced the Russian withdrawal from 
negotiations as an end to the armistice.  On February 18, the German army accepted the Central 
Rada’s appeal for help and resumed hostilities with the Bolsheviks.263  The Germans quickly 
adapted to the Bolshevik rail war tactics and overwhelmed them with an army of 450,000 
soldiers.
264
  The German forces took control of all rail lines in Ukraine.  The resumed war forced 
the Bolsheviks to come back to Brest-Litovsk, agree to the German demands, and recognize an 
independent Ukraine.  By the end of April 1918, Bolshevik forces were retreating and the 
Central Powers’ armies had liberated all of the Ukrainian lands that the Central Rada claimed to 
represent and even added Crimea to their territory. 
In March 1918 with the German armies’ aid, the Central Rada reentered Kyiv to govern 
again.  The German liberation of Ukraine was not without problems.  It was not an altruistic 
exercise; they expected Ukraine to provide the agreed upon grain and wanted it promptly.  The 
Rada’s socialistic tendencies tended to worry the German Central Command so the Germans 
countermanded many of the Rada’s decisions.265  The Germans demanded farmers to sow all 
arable land and attempted to force the land committees to supply large estates with labor. The 
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Ukrainian people grew upset because of the German export expectations.
266
  The Central Rada 
could have attempted to strengthen their tenuous link to the peasants but failed but instead both 
large landowners and peasant farmers became hostile to the Rada.  President Mykhailo 
Hrushevsky attempted to portray himself above the political fray but by this time though, he 
could not maintain a unified government.  German leadership began to describe Hrushevsky as 
“a frightened old man all of a tremble; his old bones are supposed to give the Rada a noble patina 
worthy of so august an assembly. [He] Holds on for all he is worth to the German Command.”267  
When the Central Rada still could not present an effective form of government to provide 
German food supplies, the Germans replaced the government on April 29, 1918 with one they 
believed could be more effective under Pavlo Skoropadsky. 
Hrushevsky’s role in the Ukrainian National Republic became very limited after the 
Germans removed his government from Kyiv.  He was a figurehead for a brief time but began to 
quarrel with the leaders of the UNR Directory, Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura, 
who subsequently completely displaced him from the government in 1919.  Since he no longer 
had a role in government, Hrushevsky left Ukraine to continue his historical studies in exile in 
Vienna.  Hrushevsky only returned to Ukraine in 1924 after the Soviets consolidated their 
control.  The early stages of Soviet control in Ukraine were more conciliatory to national issues 
allowing scholars to promote the history and print in Ukrainian as a stepping-stone to further 
socialization.  This policy of allowing nationalities to develop in their own language was known 
as korenizatsiya (taking root).  According to Soviet ideology, korenizatsiya was necessary to 
instruct various nationalities how to become good socialists and allow rastsvet (a flowering) to 
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occur.  Essentially the ideology was an attempt at fostering nationalist sentiment and then 
reshaping that national sentiment into Soviet patriotism.  Even allowing the name Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist Republic was a begrudging recognition of the national issue.  During this period 
of relative openness, Hrushevsky established and led the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences 
effectively recreating his previous role when the tsarist government was in place. 
The Soviet policies towards nationalities did not remain conciliatory for very long.  
Hrushevsky was one of many Ukrainians caught in Stalin’s first purges.  In the late 1920s and 
early 1930s, the Soviet policy of korenizatsiya ended with denunciations of it claiming that it 
fostered “cultural counter-revolution,” “national enmity,” and “isolated Ukrainian workers from 
the positive influence of Russian culture.”268  By the end of the 1930s, Soviet leaders turned 
away from the prior korenizatsiya language policies and demanded that Ukrainian students be 
fluent in Russian.
269
  With the policy change, secret police began to search for underground 
Ukrainian nationalists.  The secret police believed they had discovered an underground 
organization called the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine in July 1929 and arrested 5,000 
“members.”270  The next spring Soviet authorities conducted show trials to deal with the 
underground nationalists.  During the show trials, the secret police “discovered” Hrushevsky’s 
role as a leading nationalist conspirator and arrested him.  Unlike many of the other nationalists 
who were shot or deported to Siberia, Hrushevsky escaped with a somewhat more lenient 
sentence of being deported to Moscow in 1931 and ultimately to the Caucasus where he died in 
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1934 under somewhat mysterious circumstances.
271
  Those around Hrushevsky were also 
arrested as collaborators.  In contrast, Hrushevsky’s right hand man in the Academy, Fedir 
Savchenko, was arrested and disappeared without a trace.  Savchenko’s name was virtually 
erased from history, his ultimate fate unknown, and most of his works were confiscated to be 
destroyed.
272
  The Soviet government attempted to give Hrushevsky the same fate as Savchenko. 
When he was exiled in 1931, anyone purchasing a work by Hrushevsky could be arrested and 
ultimately by 1937 no work by Hrushevsky was even published in the Soviet Union.
273
    Even 
though Hrushevsky’s works survived destruction in the Soviet Union, leaders censored 
Hrushevsky’s history as “bourgeois nationalism” or “Ukrainian fascism” and it remained taboo 
even to discuss his works until Perestroika while most of the West gave it short shrift due to it 
being a history from a small power nation.
274
   
 
Interpretation and Problems with Hrushevsky 
There are two ways that Hrushevsky was important to a Ukrainian state, one as 
revolutionary and politician, and the other as a historian.  Hrushevsky was a better revolutionary 
figurehead and organizer than a politician.  His organizational abilities helped educate a segment 
of society of nationalists and helped Ukrainians view the Galicians under Habsburg rule as part 
of the larger group under Russian rule.  However these organizational abilities did not work 
when Hrushevsky led the Central Rada.  The Rada remained politically divided over its course of 
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action whether to declare independence or remain an autonomous region of Russia until the 
Bolsheviks were invading.  This political indecision ultimately placed Ukraine in a crisis that had 
no alternative except to accept German and Austrian intervention or fall to the Bolsheviks.  The 
criticism Hrushevsky leveled at Khmelnytskyi over foreign entanglements in Volume 9 of his 
history may have in fact been self-criticism over the entangling relationship Hrushevsky himself 
made with Germany during that crisis and that ultimately forced him from power.  The Germans 
would only become more unpopular in Ukraine due to their demands under Hrushevsky’s 
usurper and successor.  This anti-German attitude tainted Hrushevsky since he invited their 
support and was one of the reasons why Vynnychenko and Petliura did not restore Hrushevsky to 
power when they overthrew Skoropadsky. 
Hrushevsky’s greatest importance, however, remained his historical influence.  His 
History of the Ukrainy-Rus’ provided one of the most important arguments against both the 
Polish and the Russian traditional interpretations.  He delinked the aristocratic view that the 
nobility comprised the nation and established Ukrainian nationalism firmly in populism where 
the common people comprised the nation.
275
  Thus even though the Ukrainian lands lost their 
nobility to Poland and Russia the people still had a history, language, culture, and right to a 
state.
276
  These ideas were dangerous and a reason why the Soviets attempted to ban and destroy 
his works.  It was only late during Perestroika in 1989 that both Western and Ukrainian scholars 
began to reinvestigate his works and he became a “rehabilitated” figure.  His histories provided a 
readymade nationalist interpretation of Ukrainian history as the Soviet Union started to break 
apart and provided a new teleology; instead of the eventual victory of communism and withering 
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away of the state, it provided for the success of a nation-state after its centuries of struggle.  With 
Hrushevsky’s rehabilitation, one can see the collective act of forgetting French scholar Ernest 
Renan discussed for a nation.  Hrushevsky became figure for the new Ukrainian state to emulate.  
To show the “continuity” with the Ukrainian National Republic, the new Ukrainian state adopted 
the same flag, the trident, national anthem, and currency.  As an ultimate show of continuity and 
legitimacy for the new government, the last president of the UNR in exile resigned his symbols 
of authority to the Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk in 1992. 
84 
 
 
SYMON PETLIURA AND AN ATTEMPT AT AN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE 
With the removal of Hrushevsky as President of Ukraine on April 29, 1918, a bloodless 
coup established General Pavlo Skoropadsky as leader of Ukraine.  The Germans conspired with 
General Pavlo Skoropadsky to overthrow the Central Rada and establish a new government that 
would be more conservative and reliable.  For a month before the coup, German military leaders 
grew concerned with the Rada’s socialistic tendencies and saw it as an ineffective regime.277  In 
the middle of April 1918, the Germans met with General Skoropadsky, who was one of the most 
outspoken critics of the Rada’s radicalism, and agreed to remain neutral in a coup so long as a 
Skoropadsky regime fulfilled the secret clauses of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.  On April 29, 
industrialists, large landowners, bankers, and former tsarist ministers met as the League of 
Landowners to protest the Central Rada’s attacks on private property, and the 6,000 gathered 
members proclaimed Skoropadsky Hetman in order to stop the socialist experimentation.
278
  
After the proclamation of the assembly, Skoropadsky told the audience to gather in St. Sophia’s 
Square to have the Kyiv Metropolitan anoint his position (an act not done in 154 years).
279
  With 
the acclamation and anointment, Skoropadsky revived the semi-monarchical nature of the 
Hetmanate in Ukraine.  
The Central Rada was still in session as Skoropadsky was becoming Hetman and 
possibly could have maintained its position had it acted in time.  Hrushevsky received reports 
that there was a potential coup but he also received German intelligence that informed him the 
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Central Rada “had no reason to be concerned.”280  The German involvement in the coup has 
remained debated and problematic since it happened.  While the Germans claimed they had no 
participation in the coup, they were quick to capitalize on the coup by recognizing the new 
Skoropadsky government.  Former tsarist Russian soldiers supported Skoropadsky’s ascension 
and seized key ministries under his orders while the Rada’s troops offered minimal resistance.281  
The Central Rada was caught unaware while Skorpadsky’s soldiers disarmed those soldiers that 
supported the Rada and dissolved the Central Rada.  In his first decrees, Skoropadsky nullified 
all of the Central Rada’s policies and established himself as the sole dictatorial authority in a 
provisional government and commander-in-chief of the army and navy until elections would 
create a parliament.
282
  The elections would never occur and the Ukrainian National Republic 
became the Ukrainian State (or frequently referred to as the Hetmanate or the Second Hetmanate 
to claim a continuance with the Cossack Hetmanate). 
Skoropadsky did attempt to reach out to many Ukrainian nationalists from the Central 
Rada though and offered them cabinet positions in order to foster Ukrainian unity.  Almost 
unanimously all members of the Central Rada rejected Skoropadsky’s offer and refused to 
participate with his government.  Only one leading nationalist and socialist from the Central 
Rada accepted a position in Skoropadsky’s cabinet as Foreign Minister, Dmytro Doroshenko,283 
and only after he broke with his party to do so.  Doroshenko attempted to convince other 
nationalists to participate in order to further the Ukrainian national cause but was unsuccessful.  
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The nationalist and socialist boycott of his government would prove to be a problem through his 
entire reign.  Without their support, he was forced to rely more heavily on the Germans and 
derived what he could get of his internal political support from landowners, capitalists, and 
former bureaucrats of the tsarist regime.  He responded to that internal support by establishing a 
special propertied class for them, and called them “Cossacks.”284 
Many of the Ukrainian nationalists attacked Skoropadsky for his reliance on “foreigners” 
to keep him in power.  He hired many former tsarist bureaucrats due to their expertise and based 
recruitment on skills rather than language qualifications.
285
  These bureaucrats proved to be 
effective administrators due to their experience but because of his dependence on Russian 
bureaucrats, nationalists decried Skoropadsky as not being nationalist enough while many of the 
socialists attacked him for being reactionary and for essentially restoring the monarchy.  Former 
members of the Central Rada called him a Russified sell-out of his people, and cited his ancestor 
Ivan Skoropadsky’s refusal to ally with Ivan Mazepa as a reason why he could not be trusted.286  
He even responded to the charge when he requested that the Kyiv Metropolitan lift the anathema 
against Ivan Mazepa to make him a more acceptable hero to the Ukrainian public.  However, 
during the Hetmanate of Pavlo Skoropadsky though, there were some of the most effective 
nationalizing attempts.  He enacted a law codifying Ukrainian citizenship based on loyalty to the 
state, established Ukrainian universities, ordered the creation of Ukrainian history, culture, and 
literature departments in all previously established universities, founded over 150 schools, 
created funds to educate professors and teachers and to print Ukrainian textbooks.
287
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Skoropadsky organized Ukrainian cultural edifices including: the Ukrainian State Theater, the 
State Archives, a National Gallery and Museum, and attempted to organize the Ukrainian 
Academy of Sciences (and even offered former Rada President Hrushevsky a leading role in it) 
but was forced out of office before it was actualized.
288
   
As Skoropadsky attempted to Ukrainianize the state and his cabinet, he could not appease 
either side.  His attempts did not satisfy the nationalists (who failed in their own similar attempts 
under the Central Rada, but yet saw the measures as not going far enough), and enraged many of 
the anti-Bolshevik Russians who found the concept of Ukrainian citizenship and loyalty 
repugnant.
289
  Some of the anti-Bolshevik Russians, who fled south to Ukraine to continue their 
fight, thought the Ukrainianization was a “farce” or just “paying lip service” to the “Mazepintsi” 
while others were so enraged they left for the Don and Kuban regions to support other anti-
Bolshevik “White Russian” forces under General Kornilov and then Anton Denikin.290  
Nationalists on the other hand remained in Ukraine but planned and worked to displace 
Skoropadsky’s regime with a popular republic.  In July 1918, Skoropadsky gave orders to watch 
and if necessary arrest the leaders of the UNR.  The orders placed Hrushevsky under house 
arrest.  The Hetman’s Minister of the Interior accused former Prime Minister, Volodymyr 
Vynnychenko, of conspiracy to overthrow the Hetman and arrested him on July 12 (they released 
him shortly after on lack of evidence but by September Vynnychenko was active in protests 
against the Hetman).
291
  Former Minister of War Symon Petliura had become leader of the All-
Ukrainian Union of Zemstvos, organized it as a center of opposition to Skoropadsky, protested 
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the increased grain requisitions, the increased censorship and limited civil liberties, and called 
for a return to local self-government.
292
  The government accused him of being an instigator of 
anti-German actions and arrested him on July 27.  Petliura attained release only because of 
Doroshenko’s advocacy and upon the condition that he “refrain from conspiratorial activity.”293 
Nationalists were not the only groups attacking Skoropadsky’s regime.  Peasants and 
laborers blamed Skoropadsky for the excessive German crop demands, the brutal German 
reprisals when the demands were not met, and for not solving the land issues.  Landowners used 
the occupying German forces to punish peasants who stole or damaged lands in the prior year.  
Since the German forces at first prohibited the Ukrainian State from establishing a large internal 
military (there were German fears that those troops would be used against the Germans), the 
German troops became the law of the land.
294
  To impede any organized resistance of 
intellectuals, workers, or peasants, the German army instituted new censorships, prohibited 
public gatherings, and attempted to halt the increasing number of agricultural and railroad 
strikes.
295
  The German efforts to control Ukraine only created greater animosity to the occupiers 
and that animosity was reflected in the increasing terroristic activities.  Peasants began to attack 
Germans posted to protect rail stations, and bridges.
296
  In early June Kyiv munitions stores 
exploded killing two hundred and injuring many more; a similar munitions explosion followed in 
late July in Odesa.  Eight days after the explosion in Kyiv, fire swept through the city leaving 
several thousand homeless.
297
  When the culprits of these terrorist acts were caught, frequently 
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the soldiers would shoot them on the spot, occasionally in the event that the culprits were 
arrested instead, they faced German military tribunals.
298
  Terrorist activities culminated with the 
assassination of German Field Marshal von Eichhorn on July 30. 
While the Ukrainian domestic situation remained unstable and problematic, the Hetman’s 
Foreign Minister, Doroshenko, secured many diplomatic victories.  Doroshenko was able to 
retain German support after the assassination of Eichhorn and effectively persuaded German 
leaders to consent to the creation of an independent Ukrainian army to help maintain order.
299
  
He also was able to maintain friendly relations with Austria-Hungary even though there were 
some minor frictions over the independent crown land for Galicia and the belief that Wilhelm 
von Habsburg wanted to be king of Ukraine.  Doroshenko finally attained an armistice with the 
Soviet Union on June 12, 1918, and received recognition that Ukraine was an independent state 
(three months after the Soviets signed and agreed to do so at the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk).
300
  The 
negotiations with the Bolsheviks broke down by October though and an uneasy situation 
remained.  One of the greatest successes was Doroshenko’s reopening diplomatic relations with 
Western Europe.  After the Ukrainian National Republic signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the 
Entente broke off relations because they saw the UNR as supporting the continuation of the war.  
As defeat of the Central Powers became more apparent and imminent, Doroshenko was 
convinced that Entente recognition and support was necessary for a continued independent 
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Ukraine.
301
  As World War I was winding down, Doroshenko travelled to Switzerland to meet 
French representatives, seeking Entente support and occupation forces until a strong Ukrainian 
military could form.
302
  French and English representatives would not make a commitment until 
the pro-German elements left the cabinet and Ukraine ended its alliance with Germany. 
The Hetmanate attempted to balance the Entente’s demands while maintaining Ukrainian 
security from the potential Bolshevik threat.  Many members of Skoropadsky’s cabinet did not 
agree with Doroshenko’s nationalistic cause for an independent Ukraine.  Most of the cabinet 
were still heavily pro-Russian and saw Ukraine only as a base of operations for the continued 
war against the Bolsheviks.
303
  This internal strife led to a cabinet crisis in mid-October 1918.  In 
an attempt to appease the Entente and receive their support, Skoropadsky made a clean sweep of 
his entire cabinet in late October and reached out to Ukrainian nationalists like Vynnychenko to 
no avail.  Eventually Skoropadsky believed that the only way to attain Entente support was 
through working with the “White Russians” and promoted a policy change in mid-November 
where the Ukrainian State would return to a non-Bolshevik Russian Federation.
304
  He issued an 
edict calling on all citizens and Cossacks of Ukraine to support a Russian Federation. 
The edict did not have the effect that Skoropadsky hoped; the Entente continued to delay 
support while Ukrainian nationalist leaders galvanized a resistance movement to Skoropadsky’s 
regime using the edict as “proof” of his Russian sympathies. The movement began slowly in 
October 1918 with Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura uniting with three others (who 
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were virtually political non-entities) to form the Directory.
305
  The leaders knew that it was 
essential to win over the Ukrainian army so Petliura petitioned the army’s aid in Bila Tserkva.  
Petliura won influence with the Galician Sich Sharpshooters and the newly formed regiment, the 
Zaporizhian Riflemen, who were displeased with Skoropadsky’s policy calling for a return to 
Russia.  The Directory excluded Hrushevsky from the organization because there was 
widespread anti-German sentiment and they felt that Hrushevsky damaged his reputation 
accepting German aid against the Bolsheviks and felt that including him would hurt the 
movement.
306
  After the edict, thousands of peasants went to Bila Tserkva wanting to join the 
Directory’s struggle against Skoropadsky.     
The Directory did not succeed in overthrowing the Hetman until the Germans forces were 
withdrawing after signing the armistice on the Western Front.  The Directory’s armies marched 
on Kyiv to overthrow Skoropadsky in late November and called on the German forces not to 
fight to support his failed regime.  For nearly a month, there was a standoff between the Germans 
and the Directory’s forces near Kyiv.  The Directory used this time to consolidate their influence 
on other areas south of Kyiv until Skoropadsky’s power was limited to just the area around Kyiv.  
By mid-December, the German soldiers were already war weary and wished to return home so 
the Directory offered them safe passage home and took Kyiv relatively peacefully.  Skoropadsky 
fled with the retreating German armies and renounced the position of Hetman, but he remained 
an outspoken supporter of Ukrainian independence until his death during an Allied bombing raid 
in Germany in 1945. 
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As central Ukraine was changing regimes, a new Ukrainian government also was forming 
in the west.  The Ukrainians in the Habsburg Empire were still kaisertreu (loyal to the emperor) 
to the end of the empire but could see that the Habsburg rule in Galicia was soon going to end.  
On October 16, 1918, Emperor Karl issued a manifesto transforming the Habsburg Empire into a 
federation.  Polish leaders in Galicia were already moving steadily towards independence and 
unification with Congress Poland (which the Central Powers established in 1916) which caused 
some concern for Ukrainians.
307
  Galician Poles were considering themselves already citizens of 
a Polish state comprised of the “historical borders” prior to the 1772 partitions.  In order to 
preempt the Polish independence, Galician Ukrainian leaders declared the formation of a 
Western Ukrainian Republic on October 19 and seized key government buildings in Lviv by 
November 1.  This seizure of government buildings was an attempt to portray a peaceful 
relinquishment of power to the Ukrainians.  The Ukrainians were among the last nationalities to 
see an independence movement from the Habsburgs, and only did so reluctantly as the Poles 
were declaring Galicia part of their state.  While their involvement in World War I was ending, 
they quickly entered a new war with Poland in November 1918.
308
 
The people of Lviv awoke November 1, 1918 to the sight of Ukrainian flags hanging 
from government buildings and announcements that Lviv was the capital of a new Ukrainian 
state encompassing Eastern Galicia and Bukovina.
309
  Other towns throughout Eastern Galicia 
had similar occurrences with most of the Ukrainian population greeting the news 
enthusiastically.  The overwhelmingly Polish population of Lviv though did not receive the news 
as favorably.  Largely the Polish population, once the shock had dissipated, turned to active 
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resistance against the new government and bitter house-to-house fighting broke out between the 
Poles and the Ukrainians.
310
  The more organized Polish forces captured key railroad centers that 
could have supported the Ukrainian forces in Lviv.  In the south, Romanians seized most of the 
Bukovina territory while the Hungarians retained control over its Ukrainian population the 
Western Republic attempted to claim.  By November 5, the Galician Ukrainians began to appeal 
to Skoropadsky for military aid primarily against the Poles.  Skoropadsky was afraid to offend 
the Polish leaders but allowed the Galician Sich Sharpshooters to cross the border covertly to 
support the Galicians while disavowing any knowledge of their actions.
311
  Most of the Galician 
Sharpshooters remained in central Ukraine though in order to support the Directory’s overthrow 
of Skropadsky.  Without the Sharpshooters’ support, the Western Ukrainian Republic lost control 
of Lviv on November 22 and were forced to flee to Stanyslaviv (modern Ivano-Frankivsk). 
In Stanyslaviv the Western Ukrainian Republic made its greatest efforts to form a 
functioning government.  Even though the Western Ukrainian leaders faced military difficulties 
and defeats, they pressed forward to form a capable civil administration and even held elections 
for a legislative body.
312
  The republic guaranteed full voting rights to all citizens and granted 
minority rights.  Like the UNR in the east, the Western Republic faced issues concerning 
peasants’ rights to land.  Unlike the UNR though, the Western Republic was able to maintain 
stability and its authority while appropriating land for the peasantry.
313
  Also unlike the UNR, the 
Western Republic quickly realized the effectiveness and necessity of a fully trained regular army 
for its defense and was able to muster 100,000 troops.  
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The Directory of the UNR stood in stark contrast to the organizational ability of the 
Western Republic.  From the beginning of the revolt against Skoropadsky, there were political 
and personal animosities between Vynnychenko and Petliura that divided the orientation of the 
future government and confused loyalties.  After Vynnychenko and Petliura entered Kyiv on 
December 14, Vynnychenko became President of the Directory while Petliura became Otaman (a 
Cossack term for general) of the military.  The more idealistic Vynnychenko believed that 
uniting with the Bolsheviks was essential to overthrow Skoropadsky and further a socialist 
revolution, whereas the more pragmatic Petliura maintained that Ukraine needed Western 
support to retain independence.
314
  Vynnychenko’s idealism versus Petliura’s pragmatism also 
influenced their stances on the use of Skoropadsky’s regular armies (perhaps the best and most 
important legacy of the former Hetman’s rule).  Vynnychenko believed that rhetoric and people’s 
councils would influence popular support, establish peace, and make regular armies 
unnecessary.
315
  Petliura knew that more than just rhetoric would be needed for Ukrainian 
independence.  The Galician Sich Sharpshooters were unsure initially which leader to support 
but eventually threw their support behind Petliura. 
The first two months of the Directory’s existence showed the greatest promise of success.  
The Directory had most of the Ukrainian armies under their direction (about 127,000 soldiers by 
the end of December) and influenced a large portion of the Ukrainian lands.
316
  On December 1, 
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the Directory showed this great promise and declared its support for the Western Republic 
announcing its ultimate intention of unifying all Ukrainians under one state.  They reestablished 
several of the laws that the Central Rada passed to protect laborers and peasants and attempted to 
settle the peasant land issues finally (which already caused problems for the two prior 
governments’ relations to the peasants).317  By January 22, 1919, the leaders of the Directory 
were able to meet with the Galician leaders and declare a unified Ukrainian state (this declaration 
was largely more symbolic than actual though).  The Western Republic was to become a 
province but retained a great amount of autonomy.  The new western province still had its own 
capital, administrative structures, laws, armies, and even maintained separate foreign ministers 
and diplomatic missions.
318
 
There was another group that worked to overthrow Skoropadsky and unify the Ukrainian 
territory as German soldiers were withdrawing from Ukraine, the Bolsheviks.  The German 
forces effectively removed most of the Bolshevik activities in Ukraine but the Bolsheviks were 
able to maintain propaganda activities in most major cities and even in Kyiv during the final 
months of Skoropadsky’s rule even though their numbers had dwindled to nearly 4300 
members.
319
  The Bolsheviks saw an opportunity to return to Ukraine as the Germans were 
leaving.  While the Directory was working to establish itself in the Ukrainian lands, Bolshevik 
military leaders pressed Lenin to agree to another invasion before the Directory consolidated its 
power.
320
  Lenin consented to the operation to support a provisional Soviet Ukrainian 
government and allowed Antonov-Ovseenko to command the Red Army.  The Red Army 
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progressed from Kursk in mid-December and quickly reestablished Soviet authority in Ukraine.  
On January 3, 1919 the Red Army conquered Kharkiv and reestablished a Ukrainian Soviet 
government there.  The Red Army caused the Directory to flee to Vynnytsia by February 2 and 
retook Kyiv on February 5. 
This Red Army occupation of Kyiv lasted longer than the first occupation in 1918 and 
forced the Directory into becoming a mobile government.  For about seven months, the Directory 
was operating from various cities and from constantly moving railcars in Western Ukraine in 
order to avoid Red Army or Polish capture.
321
  The Directory cabinet blamed Vynnychenko for 
failing to make peace with the Bolsheviks, his policies attempting to “out Bolshevik” the 
Bolsheviks, and for the loss of Kyiv.  He resigned from the presidency on February 10 and 
Petliura became president.
322
  The frequent movement of the governing officials to avoid capture 
created an emergency atmosphere that limited Petliura’s state-building attempts.  Without a 
stable government and governing location for the Directory, the generals gained greater authority 
to act on their own accord without much concern of Directory oversight or repercussions.  The 
generals received Directory funding to supply and inculcate Ukrainian nationalism in their 
soldiers but since the Directory lacked effective oversight, those funds frequently were wasted or 
were stolen by the generals for their own private aggrandizement.
323
  During 1919 the generals 
alternated their allegiance to the Directory, the Bolsheviks, or the White Russian forces as 
another way to expand personal gains and became virtual warlords.
324
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The generals nominally under the Directory and Petliura’s control saw and took full 
advantage of opportunities in the chaos of multiple invading armies.  The Bolsheviks were not 
the only foreign force that entered Ukrainian territory during the withdrawal of German forces in 
December 1918.  The French led a 60,000 strong Entente force to occupy Odesa in order to 
support anti-Bolshevik Russians who wanted to flee west.  As well the anti-Bolshevik White 
Russian forces under Anton Denikin entered the eastern Ukrainian lands to fight the Bolsheviks 
in the area around the Donets River.  There was still popular simmering resentment among the 
peasants over the previous German and Bolshevik invasions that allowed two generals to lead 
peasant uprisings effectively against the French, then the Directory, then the Bolsheviks, then the 
White Russians, and finally against the Bolsheviks again.  Generals Matvii Hryhoriiv (Grigoriev) 
and Nestor Makhno led strong peasant rebellions 40,000 strong against all invaders while their 
allegiances altered quickly. 
In this extremely chaotic environment, the generals nominally under the Directory and 
Petliura’s control as well as under Bolshevik and White control further alienated the populace 
from supporting any government with their actions.  Through much of the Ukrainian lands, rule 
existed only by bayonet.  Many of the general-warlords began raiding and terrorizing villages in 
their regions and plundering anything they desired.  The general-warlords looted money, jewelry, 
and even the women of villages and cities.
325
  The general-warlords tapped into much of the 
popular peasant resentment and directed their attacks primarily against the Jewish populations.  
A few reasons why the general-warlords targeted Jewish populations was due to the history of 
Jewish exploitation as stewards of noble lands and taverns, the general Jewish pro-Russian or 
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Bolshevik leanings, and widespread belief that Jews used Christian blood in matzoth.
326
  While 
these excuses may have remained in the zeitgeist, there is also a more contemporary explanation.  
During the German occupation, many peasants believed that the Jewish populations profited 
inordinately from their products forcibly removed to feed Germany.
327
  So similar to the peasant 
anti-Jewish activities during the Khmelnytskyi uprising, the peasants transferred their animosity 
from the group that was truly exploiting them to a group that was closer and perceived to be 
exploiting them.  In this environment of anti-Semitism, the Jewish population faced around 927 
pogroms and “excesses” between February and September 1919 that claimed between 30,000 
and 60,000 people and was the largest modern attack on the Jews before Hitler.
328
   
Whether pogroms or “excess” attacks came from the White Russians, Bolsheviks, the 
general-warlords, or the Directory forces, a number of writings have laid most of the blame on 
Symon Petliura, the UNR, and armies under their control.  These authors implicate the Directory 
of being culpable for a plurality of around 40% of the total pogroms in the Ukrainian lands.
329
  
Those authors do not deny that other forces operating in Ukraine also committed pogroms but 
have found them less culpable.  A former UNR minister under Petliura, Arnold Margolin, 
disputed the claim that other forces were less culpable.  Margolin claimed that open pogroms 
existed in Kyiv during Denikin’s army occupation yet the Jewish population still largely 
supported him more than the Directory.  Margolin also claimed that Denikin had “more 
                                                          
326
 Reshetar, 252-3.  Yekelchyk, 80-1.  While the Christian blood-matzoth myth has existed since 
the Medieval Ages, it gained new traction near the end of the Tsarist regime when The Elders of 
the Protocol of Zion was published.  The work spread west with fleeing White Russians and 
became a tool describing Bolshevism as a new Jewish plot. 
327
 Elias Heifetz. The Slaughter of the Jews in the Ukraine 1919. (New York: T. Seltzer, 1921), 
7-8. 
328
 Magocsi, 537.  Yekelchyk, 81.  Subtelny, 363.  An “excess” was a less violent attack where 
no life was loss. 
329
 Yekelchyk, 81.   
99 
 
numerous and terrible” pogroms than the Directory but due to Russian propaganda Petliura’s 
were better known in the West.
330
  The authors that defend Petliura generally insist that it was a 
lack of control over the forces rather than a coordinated, ordered attack.
331
  Reports leaked from 
Margolin and others around Petliura that Petliura was “depressed by the pogroms and implored 
his men not to commit them with tears in his eyes but found it difficult to persuade his 
Haidamaky to moderation.”332  Petliura even wrote articles to his army leaders reminding them 
that “the Jewish population has helped the UNR during the war [and that ] Bolsheviks have not 
executed only Ukrainians but also Jews during the struggle.”333  The largest anti-Jewish attacks 
arose only after the Directory lost Kyiv, which led some scholars to argue that the soldiers were 
demoralized and that the attacks occurred only after the soldiers were drunk and often against 
superiors’ orders.334   
The Directory attempted to respond to the pogroms and convince the Jewish population 
that they should continue to trust and work with the UNR against the Bolsheviks.  In April 1919 
the Directory issued a declaration stating: 
The Ukrainian Government will fight with all its power against violations of public order, 
will strike the brigands and pogrom instigators with the severest punishment and expose 
them publicly. Above all the Government will not tolerate any pogroms against the 
Jewish population in the Ukraine, and will employ every available means for the purpose 
of combating these abject criminals.
335
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The Directory court-martialed and ultimately executed General Semesenko for the pogrom he 
instituted in Proskuriv.
336
  Likewise junior officers and Cossack found guilty of pogrom activities 
were also executed.
337
  The declaration and threat of punishment did little to discourage further 
pogroms though since Directory forces usually were too preoccupied fighting the Bolsheviks to 
enforce declarations.  In August Petliura renewed his call for soldiers to respect Jewish property 
and lives as they had suffered against the Bolsheviks as well.
338
  Along with the declarations to 
punish offenders and respect Jewish lives, the Directory appropriated over 11 million Hryven for 
pogrom victims in July and doubled the amount in October.
339
  Petliura also called on Jewish 
settlements to organize their own self-defense units that would be included as part of the 
armies.
340
  Through these measures, Petliura was able to attract prominent Jewish citizens and 
founded a Ministry of Jewish Affairs.
341
  Jewish settlements in western Ukraine began to rally to 
the Ukrainian cause.  It is ironic that only after Jewish leaders began to trust Petliura and the 
UNR that the West began to receive reports of his pogroms and anti-Semitic activity.  
Symon Petliura realized quickly that Ukraine needed foreign support for any hope of 
maintaining an independent state.  While Vynnychenko was still president, Petliura believed the 
best hope of support came from the Entente and the French occupying Odesa.  The Entente was 
strongly anti-Bolshevik and Petliura believed that this shared ideology would garner Entente 
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support for Ukraine.
342
  From the beginning though, the French had a strained relationship with 
the Directory because they thought Vynnychenko and the UNR’s socialist leadership were as 
radical as the Bolsheviks, especially after the UNR sanctioned the peasant land seizures.  After 
Vynnychenko resigned, Petliura had renewed hopes that a new non-socialist cabinet and 
president would encourage Entente to support an independent Ukraine.  During the peace talks in 
Versailles, Ukrainian diplomats continued petitioning for recognition of independence and aid 
from the West.  The Entente though continued to place demands on the Directory in order to 
receive support, including the resignation of Petliura and subordinating the Directory’s forces to 
General Denikin.
343
   
The issue of subordinating the Ukrainian forces to Denikin was one of the initial cracks 
in the relationship between the Western Ukrainian Republic and the Ukrainian National 
Republic.  The leaders of the Western Republic believed that support for Denikin would 
encourage the Entente to send aid to Ukraine similar to the aid that the Entente was already 
providing Poland.  The Western Republic believed that Entente aid along with Denikin’s support 
would be enough to expel Poland from Galicia (which the Ukrainian and Galician forces lost in 
July 1919).  The UNR was more hesitant to support since Denikin’s stated goals were to restore 
the Russian Empire.  In the Ukrainian locales where Denikin’s army operated, he was hostile to 
the Ukrainian national aspirations; he closed Ukrainian schools, forbade the use of the Ukrainian 
language, and would not recognize the Directory government.  Denikin influenced Western 
thoughts about Ukraine by calling the Directory a “separatist movement worse than the 
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Bolshevik threat” that was a “result of Austrian and German propaganda to disrupt Russia.”344  
Because of the White Russian influence, the Entente was not ready to “Balkanize” the former 
Russian Empire, especially for a “bandit” leading a German created state.345   
On August 30 1919, the Galician Ukrainian forces liberated Kyiv from the Bolsheviks 
but were forced to surrender the city shortly after to Denikin’s forces.  The Directory attempted 
to work with Denikin but to no avail.  After months of negotiations, the Directory leadership 
realized that the Entente did not wish to support an independent Ukraine even if their forces were 
subordinate to Denikin.  The Directory finally declared war on the White Russians on September 
24, 1919 and believed that they could mobilize the peasantry against him to regain Kyiv.
346
  The 
attempt did not mobilize the peasants and only created another front in the conflict.  The armies 
were exhausted because of the continuous fighting, the lack of food and supplies and a typhoid 
epidemic broke out which nearly eliminated them.  This exhausted environment did nothing to 
foster continued cooperation between the Western Republic and the UNR.  The relationship 
crack became more pronounced between the UNR and Western Republic when the Galician 
army unilaterally negotiated a separate alliance with Denikin on November 15, 1919 because 
they believed they could win Entente support or at least leash the Polish armies if they supported 
the Entente backed general.
347
  The Directory considered this negotiation as a “stab in the back” 
for the republic.  An even larger crisis arose though when peasants attacked the Directory’s 
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railcars and stole the state treasury.
348
  Facing these crises Petliura fled to Warsaw and began 
negotiations with Poland. 
The Directory negotiations with Poland corresponded with a renewed resurgence of 
Bolshevik forces attacking Ukraine.  Through November and December 1919, the Bolsheviks 
virtually eliminated Denikin’s forces and pushed him back to southern Russia.  The Bolsheviks 
had learned from their prior failures though, and returned to Ukraine insisting on the right of 
national minorities to govern themselves and instituted new policies to assuage the nationalistic 
fervor and the peasant demands for land.  Lenin and the Bolshevik Party realized that a formal 
independent Ukraine entering a Soviet federation would diminish the friction.  Military 
Commissar Trotsky demonstrated this policy when he explicitly told the Red Army “your task is 
not to conquer the Ukraine but to liberate it.”349  The Ukrainian Soviet Republic allowed official 
education in the Ukrainian language and attempted to build up Ukrainian culture.  Rather than 
reinstitute the state farms and communes that angered so many, there was a massive distribution 
of land to the peasantry finally fulfilling that wish.
350
   
The Red Army was also successful against the Directory and pushed most of Petliura’s 
forces into Poland.  In December 1919 the Bolsheviks took Kyiv for the third time in less than 
two years.  While in Poland, Petliura came to an agreement in April 1920 with Marshal Josef 
Pilsudski where the UNR recognized Polish control over Galicia in return for Polish recognition 
of the UNR and aid against the Bolsheviks.  The Western Republic leaders, who had already fled 
to Vienna and had formed a government in exile there, denounced Petliura’s alliance with the 
oppressive Poles as a betrayal, and the “unity” that existed between the UNR and the Western 
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Republic ended with this agreement.  Not only the Galician Ukrainians accused him of selling 
out his people; Mykhailo Hrushevsky and Volodymyr Vynnychenko added their voices in protest 
to the treaty.
351
 
In exchange for Petliura’s recognition of Polish control in Galicia, which had been a fact 
for months, the Polish leadership agreed to enter the war against the Bolsheviks and that they 
would not conclude any agreements that were opposed to Ukrainian interests.  In April 1920 the 
Polish forces successfully drove the Bolsheviks from the western Ukrainian lands.  The Poles 
liberated Kyiv on May 7, 1920 with limited aid from the Directory’s forces and issued 
declarations that the Polish forces would remain only until the regular government assumed 
authority.
352
  Petliura believed that the peasantry would rally to the Directory’s defense but was 
unaware how exhausted the people were of war and that they still retained ill will against the 
Poles.  The peasantry largely did not rally to the Directory’s defense.  The political parties also 
largely did not rally to the Directory’s cause.  Petliura organized a cabinet in Kyiv on May 25 
and could only get support from two parties.  The cabinet did not meet long in Kyiv though; with 
word that the Bolsheviks launched a counterattack, the cabinet fled on June 8 and Kyiv fell once 
again to the Bolshevik armies on June 11.
353
 
The Bolsheviks did not halt at the Polish border during their successful repulsion of the 
Polish and Ukrainian forces.  Within two months the Red Army was on the outskirts of Warsaw.  
Galician Sich Sharpshooters suggested to Petliura that the forces could withdraw from fighting 
and attempt to hide in the Carpathian Mountains until the Bolsheviks were threatening Western 
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Europe, then when the anti-Bolshevik campaign began the Ukrainians could support the Western 
Powers and gain recognition.
354
  Petliura dismissed the idea because he did not wish to betray his 
ally Pilsudski.  Ultimately though Pilsudski betrayed the alliance.  After Pilsudski was able to 
counter the Red Army’s advance on Warsaw and push the Bolsheviks back to Minsk, they 
opened negotiations for an armistice in September and finalized it in October.  The armistice 
eventually became the Treaty of Riga in March 1921, and it formalized the division of the 
Ukrainian lands between Poland and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.
355
  The Treaty of Riga 
essentially accepted the status quo for borders between Poland and the “independent” Soviet 
Republics of Ukraine and Belarus, which would remain fixed until 1939.  It recognized Polish 
control over Galicia and Volynia without Ukrainian consent.  The treaty effectively symbolized 
Polish abandonment of support for Petliura. 
When Poland signed a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, it essentially nullified 
Petliura’s hope of liberating Ukraine.  Petliura continued to fight as the treaty was being 
negotiated but was forced to retreat in the face of the larger Red Army.  Limited Ukrainian forces 
continued to launch guerilla attacks against Bolshevik forces but that mostly amounted to a 
minor nuisance.  The Soviets finally eliminated the guerilla forces in 1924.  Petliura lived in 
exile in Tarnow, Poland for a short time and maintained contacts with Pilsudski.  Under 
Petliura’s orders Directory officers set up a Ukrainian National Republic archive in a Tarnow 
hotel using government documents they were able to escape with.  Petliura faced threats to his 
life from the Bolsheviks, and began to feel pressure from laws limiting Ukrainian activities while 
living in Poland, so he ultimately left to live in Paris, France in 1924.  There he continued to 
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petition Western governments for support.  It was in Paris that Sholem Schwarzbard assassinated 
Symon Petliura in the middle of the street in broad daylight on May 25, 1926, and claimed that it 
was retaliation for the pogroms.  Schwarzbard’s attorney claimed that Schwarzbard was seeking 
vengeance for 14 family members killed during the pogroms for which he held Petliura 
responsible.  There are still debates over Schwarzbard’s motives as Schwarzbard had ties to the 
Red Brigades in Odesa during the revolution and had links to a Soviet secret agent. This 
information though did not come out during his trial since the lawyer was able to make it a trial 
of Petliura during his time as president of the UNR.
356
  Another argument that it may have been a 
Soviet inspired assassination is since also in May 1926, Marshal Pilsudski launched a coup d’état 
and became dictator in Poland and there were concerns that there may be a renewed Polish-
Ukrainian fight against Soviet Ukraine.
357
  The trial acquitted Schwarzbard of any wrongdoing 
and further damaged Petliura’s name in Western eyes equating him with the pogroms but 
elevated him a martyr for many Ukrainian nationalists.   
 Ukrainian nationalists set up another Petliura Library in Paris with UNR government 
documents in an attempt to galvanize nationalistic sentiment.  The library had a tangled history 
though as ultimately both National Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union attempted to seize 
the materials from the library and use it for their own ideological purposes.  The National 
Socialists declared the library “under their protection” shortly after the invasion of France in 
1940 and confiscated over 100,000 books.
358
  There were claims that Adolf Hitler was a “student 
                                                          
356
 Patricia Kennedy Grimsted. “The Odyssey of the Petliura Library and the Records of the 
Ukrainian National Republic during World War II” in Cultures and Nations of Central and 
Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk. Eds. Zvi Gitelman, Lubomyr Hajda, John-
Paul Himka, Roman Solchanyk. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 183-4. 
357
 Grimsted, 184. 
358
 Grimsted, 186. 
107 
 
of the first great nationalist, Petliura” and that the symbol of Petliura would be used to lure 
Ukrainian nationalists into anti-Semitic activities for the possibility of Ukrainian 
independence.
359
  The National Socialists also used Petliura’s name during anti-Jewish atrocities 
during the occupation in Lviv.
360
  The Soviets also attempted to control the sensitive documents 
during the UNR’s brief rule of Ukraine.  Many of the earlier documents had already ended up in 
Soviet archives and were closely watched.  After World War II documents the National 
Socialists were not able to evacuate also ended up in various Soviet archives.
361
  The Soviets 
seized these documents to find Nazi collaborators, anti-Soviet or “bourgeois-nationalist” 
elements, and other enemies of the USSR
362
 as well as cover up the struggle for Ukrainian 
independence in order to maintain the fraternal union of republics.   
 
Interpretations and Problems with Petliura 
Ultimately there are three critiques that need to be overcome in order to accept Symon 
Petliura as a Ukrainian hero.  The first and most damning critique against him is the Directory’s 
actions during the pogroms in 1919.  Since he was Head Otaman of the Ukrainian forces and 
President during most of the anti-Jewish activities, several authors have blamed him almost 
exclusively for the actions.  Even his former partner in the Directory, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, 
accused Petliura of being an anti-Semite and that he encouraged the pogroms.  The National 
Socialist use of his name to encourage Ukrainian nationalists to commit anti-Jewish activities 
also does not do credence to his name.  If Petliura was an anti-Semite, why did he take such 
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pains to encourage Jewish participation in the UNR and to punish pogrom perpetrators?  In the 
multiple cities the Directory fled to, there were no pogroms, but instead there were outreaches to 
the Jewish populations, the establishment of Jewish protection units, and large capital outlays to 
pogrom victims.  Petliura attempted to do all he could to protect Jewish populations during the 
chaos of 1919 but with his limited resources overstretched and each general a virtual dictator 
unto himself law and order could not be reestablished in time.  One can see the UNR’s 
executions as an extreme attempt to restore law and order on a chaotic land. 
The second critique that needs to be overcome is his “apparent lack of patriotism” 
acknowledging Polish control over Galicia in late 1919 and early 1920.  Western Ukrainian 
nationalists and Hetman supporters have accused Petliura of being a traitor to Ukraine because of 
those negotiations relinquishing Galicia.  From the beginning until his death, Petliura believed 
that nationalists needed to focus on the possible and that central Ukraine needed to serve as the 
basis of statehood.  In August 1919, Petliura believed that Kyiv was more important to the 
nationalist movement than liberating Odesa (Kyiv’s symbolic status is one of the reasons why it 
traded hands so many times during the war).  Petliura could have realized that the war against the 
Bolsheviks was effectively over in late 1919 when the Bolsheviks reconquered Ukraine but he 
believed that with possibly one local ally (even if it meant trading Ukrainian territory) he could 
gain Entente recognition, support, and win an independent Ukraine.  If Petliura would have 
received Entente support like Poland did, it is possible that the UNR would have retained control 
of Ukraine and effectively nationalized the population as a buffer for Bolshevism.  That he did 
not receive support led him into the treaty with Poland for a last attempt. 
The third critique authors have leveled at him was his “lack of leadership” in organizing a 
Ukrainian state.  The population of Ukraine at this time was not prepared for nationalistic or 
109 
 
socialist activities.  Petliura had a more capable cabinet with a clearer goal of independence than 
Hrushevsky did but also faced greater challenges from external invasions and uncontrolled 
armies internally.  The popular cry was to own more land rather than socializing it, and 
assuaging the peasantry’s concerns proved difficult for all the groups that operated in Ukraine.  
The peasants would organize in their regions to fight invading armies but saw no reason to fight 
armies distant from their villages since the peasants did not recognize the other villages as part of 
their larger community.  Only the overwhelming size of the Red Army finally controlled the 
chaos in Ukraine.  While Doroshenko cites a lack of “ruthlessness” in his leadership that is 
necessary during a “revolutionary situation,”363 Petliura remained committed to a democratic and 
independent Ukraine and did almost everything in his power to fight for it even though the odds 
were greatly stacked against him and support was elusive.  
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STEPAN BANDERA AND THE OUN 
By the end of 1923, Poland had completed its control over the western regions of Ukraine 
in Galicia and Volhynia.  In order to influence popular foreign opinion and appease the League 
of Nations, Poland made claims of respecting Ukrainian national rights and even claimed to 
proffer autonomy in eastern Galicia.  Through these claims along with fatigue over the “Galicia 
problem,” the League of Nations recognized Poland’s governance of the region rather than just 
military occupation.  With control established over the region they called Eastern Little Poland 
(Galicia), Polish politicians like Stanislaw and Wladyslaw Grabski passed laws attempting to 
assimilate the 5-7 million Ukrainian population into Polish nationals within the next generation.  
The Lex Grabski of 1924 transformed Ukrainian language schools into functionally Polish 
language ones in Galicia.
364
  Along with Polish being the de facto language of primary school, 
the Lex Grabski also excluded Ukrainians from Lviv University on the premise that a separate 
but equal Ukrainian institution would be founded in the future but which never was.
365
  The 
Polish views on the Ukrainian provinces influenced their assimilation policies.  Poland believed 
Galicia was a hotbed of Ukrainian nationalistic agitation while they viewed Volhynia as loyal 
since it had no previous episodes of Ukrainian national movements.
366
  Polish settlers began to 
colonize regions of Volhynia attempting to civilize the under-populated region while keeping the 
Ukrainians there pacified and isolated from the Galician agitators.  The Polish assimilation 
policy underwent some modifications once Josef Pilsudski overthrew the state and became leader 
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in 1926.  Rather than national assimilation, Pilsudski instituted state assimilation where loyalty 
to the state instead of nationality of the individual became the focus. 
There were essentially three ways that Ukrainians reacted to the Polish assimilation 
policies.  Some groups acquiesced to Polish rule since they believed that they could continue 
culturally and economically as a minority group in Poland.  Other Ukrainians advocated for 
expanded political and social action within the Polish state in order to receive schools, churches, 
halt Polish settlements and eventually gain autonomy.  The Ukrainian National Democratic 
Alliance (Ukrainske Natsionalne Demokratychne Obiednannia) or UNDO was the most 
organized party working in the Polish state.  They opposed Polish settlements in Volhynia, 
attempted to found private Ukrainian schools to counter assimilation, promoted the use of 
Ukrainian for state purposes, and defended the rights of Uniate and Orthodox churches.
367
  The 
third way that Ukrainians reacted was based on the belief that Polish rule was illegitimate and the 
only way to counter it was through armed paramilitary insurrection to destabilize the state and 
establish an independent Ukrainian state.   Many of these paramilitary groups, like the Ukrainian 
Military Organization, originated from disbanded military units that served during the Ukrainian-
Polish war.  They became disgruntled that Ukrainians, like the UNDO members, joined the 
politics of the state since that lent legitimacy to the Polish rule and compromised Ukrainian 
demands for statehood.   
Due to the political and military failings of successive weak Ukrainian governments and 
continued feelings of persecution and assimilation in the 1920s, many Ukrainian nationalists had 
a rightward quasi-fascist bend in their political beliefs.  The interaction and reaction between 
Ukrainian nationalists and the Polish officials produced a “spiral of radicalization” in the state 
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over perceptions of betrayal and persecution.
368
  These beliefs sprang from not only former 
military personnel but also from disgruntled educated Ukrainians.  Groups of students from 
underground Ukrainian universities organized in the Union of Ukrainian Nationalistic Youth 
against Polish “occupiers” and communists.369  The Polish discrimination policies promoted 
radical anti-Polish attitudes in these groups.
370
  Even such leaders as former Hetman Pavlo 
Skoropadsky and Ukrainian nationalist fighter Vasyl Vyshyvanyi
371
 began to endorse more 
integral nationalist ideals.  These groups blamed democracy and socialist leanings for the 
weakness and failings of the Ukrainian states, especially after the Ukrainian National Republic 
traded the Western Ukrainian National Republic to Poland for military aid and ultimately fell to 
Bolshevik Russia.  Author and journalist, Dmytro Dontsov, provided them with a foundation of 
their ideology with his call for a “will to nation” through constant nationalist struggle.372  The 
success of western fascist ideologies inspired Dontsov and these groups into believing that a 
similar integral nationalist ideology could be useful in Eastern Europe. 
Integral nationalism was already starting to spread into Eastern Europe in the extreme 
nationalist parties of Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia in the 1920s.  While the other 
nations may have influenced Ukraine, much of the ideology seems much more homegrown due 
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to the disillusionment with failures of their own governments, the failures of Western support, 
along with belief that only radical actions could change the status quo.  Historian John 
Armstrong describes a number of characteristics that define what integral nationalism is, 
especially as it pertains to Ukraine:  
1) a belief in the nation as the supreme value 2) mystical ideas of solidarity of all 
individuals making up a nation [e.g.] biological characteristics or irreversible common 
historical development 3) subordination of rational thought to “intuitively correct” 
emotions 4) expression of the “national will” through a charismatic leader and an elite of 
nationalist enthusiasts organized in a single party 5) glorification of action, war, and 
violence as an expression of the superior biological vitality of the nation.
373
   
The Ukrainian Military Organization provided military and nationalist political ideology training 
for young Ukrainians.
374
  The training encouraged nationalists to undertake several terrorist-like 
actions against Polish officials including an attempted assassination of Josef Pilsudski in 1921 
and a sabotage campaign through 1922.  When the Allies recognized Polish control over Galicia 
in 1923, many Ukrainians doubted the efficacy of continuing armed resistance causing many 
veteran members to leave the organization.
375
  The Ukrainian Military Organization continued its 
tactics unmodified, though and ended up alienating many.  Ultimately, it was forced to flee 
abroad from a Polish police crackdown.   
There was a change in popular opinion of the extreme nationalist actions, though, after 
the 1926 assassination of Symon Petliura and acquittal of his assassin.  It galvanized even greater 
ideological support for paramilitary Ukrainian nationalists.  While in Vienna, Austria, the 
Ukrainian Military Organization, the Union of Ukrainian Nationalistic Youth and other student 
groups joined in a council to strategize and unite their tactics.  The council eventually coalesced 
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into one organization the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in 1929 with Yevhen 
Konovalets as its head.   Konovalets rose as a colonel in the Ukrainian National Army Sich 
Sharpshooters and distinguished himself as the leader of the brigade that entered Kyiv first and 
liberated it from the Bolsheviks.  He became the head of the Ukrainian Military Organization 
after the Sharpshooters disbanded and began synchronizing paramilitary attacks against Poland 
including the attempt on Marshal Pilsudski’s life.  Through most of the 1920s and into the 1930s, 
Konovalets was able to find support and receive money from a fund in Weimar Germany for 
stateless nations sponsored by other nationalists.
376
 He became the glorified leader for the 
struggle of Ukrainian independence and was an important rallying figure for nationalists largely 
because of his distinguished past and his organizational abilities founding the OUN.   
Along with glorifying their leader, Ukrainian nationalists made the concept of nation a 
central object of their ideology and believed that glorifying it came at all costs even.  During the 
formation of the OUN in Vienna in 1929, the group created a “Ten Commandments” or 
Decalogue for their cause.  True nationalists were expected to memorize and act according to all 
ten of the Commandments.
377
  One can see after reading the Commandments that individuals are 
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a means to an end for the national cause and that struggle is manifestly valued.  While Dontsov 
was the inspiration for the OUN’s ideology, he did not fully condone the actions of the group and 
never officially joined the group.  With the formation of the OUN, it is apparent that nationalistic 
zeal began to spread from primarily intellectuals as it was during the UNR, the Hetmanate, and 
the Directory to a wider and less educated group due to feelings of oppression. 
Through the 1930s the OUN continued their wave of violence in an attempt to destabilize 
the Polish government.  The OUN successfully assassinated a Soviet diplomatic consul in Lviv 
to protest the famine in Soviet Ukraine in 1932-33.
378
  In 1934 a Lviv University student 
continued the history of student violence.  Following the “tradition” inaugurated in 1907 when a 
Ukrainian nationalist student murdered a Polish professor, Stepan Bandera and a group of 
students in the OUN organized a plot to assassinate a Polish minister.  The student OUN group 
assassinated the Polish Minister of the Interior, Bronislaw Pieracki and was the highest official 
successfully targeted.  After the assassination, Bandera and his group of students attempted to go 
into hiding but were arrested, convicted, and jailed in 1935.  The court initially sentenced 
Bandera to death but revised the sentence to life in prison.
379
  While number of prominent 
Ukrainians and the UNDO denounced the OUN’s tactics, the OUN began to gain some support 
when Polish soldiers began arbitrary beatings and arrests in villages of suspected nationalists.
380
  
The support spread wide enough that the Polish government established a detention center, 
Bereza Kartuzka, to contain the nationalists.  The excessive Polish responses further encouraged 
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peasants to support extreme groups on the right and left, the OUN or communist elements, and 
provoked greater violent outbreaks.  Bandera would remain in a Polish prison until his 1939 
release during the Soviet Red Army invasion. 
Many Ukrainian nationalist groups fled to Germany during the Polish persecutions and 
Germany was frequently the choice for Ukrainian nationalists through the 1920s and 1930s as a 
safe haven.  Skoropadsky and the Hetmanate supporters along with leaders of the UNR in exile 
and OUN maintained close contact with the German government.  The aggrieved settlement 
terms of World War I found both Germans and Ukrainians sympathetic partners to the other’s 
plight.
381
  Although neither the UNR officials nor the Hetmanate were in any position to further 
National Socialist goals, they believed the German government was dedicated to restoring an 
independent Ukraine.
382
  The German intelligence service, the Abwehr, and its leader, Admiral 
Canaris, also maintained these contacts with the governments in exile as well as with the OUN.   
In the 1930s German policy changed towards Poland and the OUN contacts became an “ace in 
the hole.”   The Abwehr provided the OUN with training and arms that the OUN used to further 
their terrorist activities against Poland.  The Abwehr used the Ukrainian nationalists to 
destabilize Poland in the late 1930s and maintained these contacts with a motive to possibility 
undermine Soviet forces and influence popular sentiment in a future conflict with the Soviet 
Union.
383
   
The OUN attempted to capitalize on its relationship with Germany shortly after the 
German seizure of the Sudetenland and breakup of Czechoslovakia in late 1938 and early 1939 
respectively.  Czechoslovakia received the predominately Ukrainian population of Sub-
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Carpathian Ruthenia as part the peace settlements of 1919.  In March 1939, once Slovakia 
proclaimed its independence from Czechoslovakia under German influence, the Ruthenian 
autonomous region was cut off from Prague.  The OUN had been active in the region and 
advocated independence believing that the German government would recognize them as they 
recognized Slovakia.  The Carpathian Sich Sharpshooters along with the OUN and the Regional 
Council declared an independent Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine in Khust on March 15, 1939.
384
  
Germany publically supported Ukrainian nationalism in Carpatho-Ukraine and that inspired the 
Council leaders and OUN to believe that this small state could be the nucleus for a greater 
Ukrainian state.
385
  The next day though, Hungary declared war on the new state (with Hitler’s 
consent) and quickly succeeded in capturing and arresting many officials while invading.  The 
Sich Sharpshooters continued to fight in the mountains with OUN support but suffered major 
losses.
386
  This republic was perhaps one of the shortest-lived governments in world history as 
Hungary crushed the state by March 17.  Ultimately, the nationalists active in the brief 
government fled to Germany and began to concentrate their activities on liberating Galicia.  
While the nationalists lost German support for Carpatho-Ukraine, they still maintained hope that 
Germany would upend the balance of post-Versailles Europe that would allow for the creation of 
an independent Ukraine. 
The next hope for establishing an independent state came during World War II.  
Ukrainian nationalists saw Poland fall in 1939 though not from their terrorist activities but in the 
beginning of a new world war.  In September 1939 the Soviet Union joined with Nazi Germany 
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in partitioning Poland.  Shortly after the Soviet invasion of eastern Poland, the head of Soviet 
security, Lavrenti Beria, issued orders to all NKVD agents to control national archives, close 
down all radio transmitters and receivers, telegraph and telephone lines, post offices, and any 
other ways that people could organize a counter-revolution.
387
  Along with these orders Beria 
listed several nationalist political parties and groups to find and arrest with all due haste 
including the OUN.  The OUN though still found ways to organize in several villages early 
during the Soviet invasion.  Soviet authorities received warnings of OUN organized public 
demonstrations where people flew UNR flags, and sang national songs.
388
  In an attempt to 
counter the nationalistic feelings, the Soviet authorities placed a Ukrainian in charge of the Red 
Army, Marshal Tymoshenko, and portrayed themselves as liberators rather than conquerors.  
Under the guidance of the head of Soviet Ukraine, Nikita Khrushchev, Western Ukraine 
convened a People’s Convention which voted to join Soviet Ukraine.  With great pomp on 
November 1, 1939, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic accepted Western Ukraine into the republic 
“in order to unite Ukrainian people into one state and thus end the centuries-old division of the 
Ukrainian people.”389 
Initially Soviet governance seemed very beneficial to Western Ukrainian aspirations.  
There was a policy of “Ukrainianization,” which encouraged the development of the Ukrainian 
language and brought artists, writers, and singers from Eastern Ukraine to encourage the arts in 
the west.  Polish cultural institutions became targets.  Formerly Polish bilingual schools and 
gymnasia became fully Ukrainian schools.
390
 This trend continued even into higher education as 
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the Soviets finally gave the Galicians a Ukrainian university in Lviv and named it after Ivan 
Franko.
391
  The Soviet leaders believed that “Ukrainianization” would help combat the 
“bourgeois-feudal Polish rule” and influence the population to support the Soviet government.  
However, along with these conspicuous policies, the Soviet security forces, the NKVD, began 
discreetly removing political and national leaders.  Simmering resentment and animosity over 
prior Polish actions along with the new Soviet Ukrainianization policies helped win over many 
villagers and inspired them to collaborate with the Soviet authorities denouncing social elites and 
anyone suspected of harboring anti-Soviet attitudes.  Starting in late 1939 the first wave of 
arrests of professors, journalists, clergy, intellectual and popular leaders began and was followed 
by two more waves arresting other anti-Soviets in April 1940 and June 1941.
392
  The Soviets 
deported approximately half a million Ukrainians and another half a million Poles from Galicia 
and Volhynia to Siberian and Kazakhstani labor camps.
393
 
Even though the OUN was able to organize small-scale symbols of resistance to the 
Soviets, the organization remained divided with internal squabbling after the assassination of 
Konovalets.  In 1938 an NKVD agent, Pavel Sudoplatov, assassinated Konovalets with a 
package bomb in Rotterdam, Holland.
394
  There was not a clear line of succession but former 
Galician Sharpshooter Captain Andrii Melnyk assumed the leadership role.  Members of the 
OUN generally supported his leadership in the beginning and supported him during the Rome 
Conference in 1939, but there was a division forming in the OUN.  The division began largely 
over age differences in the group as younger members tended to advocate for more violent and 
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revolutionary actions while the older members sought to moderate the group enough to 
encourage more Galician Ukrainians to join the OUN.  While Konovalets was alive, he was able 
to reconcile the generation gap in the OUN, after his death though, the reconciliation fell to 
Melnyk and, generally, the youth were the largest group disenchanted with Melnyk’s 
leadership.
395
  The younger members felt alienated from group decisions since the older 
members had earned ranks and respect during the Polish-Ukrainian War (which they could not 
receive), and due to his ties to the Greek Catholic Church since they believed that Melnyk held 
his religion as more important than a Ukrainian state.
396
   
In an attempt to ameliorate the forming division, Melnyk made an effort to create a more 
revolutionary action branch of the OUN, so the youth could have a voice and participate.  
Melnyk asked Stepan Bandera, after his release from prison, to work together according to 
Bandera’s talents in a revolutionary branch of the OUN.397  Melnyk did not know that before he 
asked Bandera, Bandera was already organizing a revolutionary group comprised of former 
nationalist inmates like himself that had been locked up in the Polish detention camp Bereza 
Kartuzka.
398
  Bandera declined Melnyk’s offer, instead his actions show that he wanted the 
leadership of the whole OUN.
399
  The challenge to Andrii Melnyk’s leadership finally came to a 
head in 1940.  Bandera’s organization began to spread out from the 16 former prison friends to 
the youth to a larger following of OUN members and undermined Melnyk’s powerbase.  In 
August 1940 the OUN divided into two separate groups that rarely even talked to each other.  
Andrii Melnyk led one group (OUN-M), while Stepan Bandera led the other (OUN-B).  During 
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an OUN conference in Cracow in March 1941, the younger members ratified Bandera as the sole 
leader and solidified the division in the OUN.
400
  Rather than a division of ideology, largely the 
split was due to tactics since many members believed Bandera was a more dynamic and 
revolutionary leader than Melnyk. 
Both sections of the OUN had groups that remained in the Soviet controlled areas and 
maintained underground resistance while continuing to negotiate with the German intelligence 
service, the Abwehr.  German leadership was hesitant though to support either faction of the 
OUN for their nationalistic activities in Galicia due to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
401
  
Internally, the Germans fostered Ukrainian collaboration similar to the Soviet method by 
exploiting animosities in order to disrupt any potential Polish resistance movements in the 
General Government lands.  Unlike in the Soviet Union though, most of the Ukrainians 
collaborating with the Nazis were members of the OUN.  Frequently the Abwehr believed that 
they could gain greater support from the Melnyk faction since they were more ardently German 
supporting and believed to be less revolutionary.  However, Melnyk fell out of favor with the 
Nazi leadership, so the Bandera faction began to receive greater support.  When Germany was 
beginning to prepare for their confrontation with the Soviet Union, the Abwehr started training 
and arming 600 members of the OUN-B to comprise two support units for the German army.
402
  
Named Roland and Nachtigall these Ukrainian support units were to be both a force for rallying 
the oppressed Ukrainian populace to and guides for the Germans.   
The Bandera faction though started to view Roland and Nachtigall as a nascent Ukrainian 
army for the future nation they would form with German support.  Through 1941 the Bandera 
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faction attempted to motivate the public with propaganda pieces.  They tied their fight with the 
historical “struggles of Taras Shevchenko, the revolutionary course of Konovalets, the course of 
Khmelnytskyi and Petliura, for the glory and greatness of the Golden Trident.”403  When the 
Germans launched Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941, Ukrainian nationalist believed that 
their time for liberation and state building had begun.  Many Ukrainians welcomed the German 
forces as liberators from the Soviet Union especially in Galicia.
404
  Only a few days after the war 
began, on June 30, 1941, Yaroslav Stetsko (a lieutenant representing Stepan Bandera since 
Bandera remained in German territory) declared an independent Ukrainian state in Lviv.  The 
leaders in the Bandera faction believed that Germany would have no other option than to 
recognize the fait accompli state or they would lose the support of the Ukrainian populace.
405
  
Shortly after this declaration though, Nazi officials ordered a rescission of the declaration and 
when the Banderites would not rescind it, the Germans arrested the leadership.  Stepan Bandera 
and his lieutenant Yaroslav Stetsko spent most of World War II in a concentration camp near 
Berlin. 
While the German leadership would not recognize an independent Ukrainian state, they 
continued to encourage Ukrainian collaboration.  In fact, the Germans named one of their initial 
pogroms in Lviv “Operation Petliura” to rouse Ukrainian nationalist anger over the acquittal of 
his Jewish assailant and encourage their participation.
406
  The Germans also granted Ukrainians 
nominal authority in Galicia through a Central Committee while they also continued to 
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encourage Polish collaboration with administrations in Volhynia.
407
  The German attempt to play 
faction off faction also shows with their policies with the OUN.  After drawing the German ire 
over declaring an independent state, the Bandera faction fell from German favor and the Melnyk 
faction rose once more.  So that the Roland and Nachtigall support units (full of Bandera faction 
nationalists) could not undertake similar actions, the Germans sent one unit to secure the 
Romanian border, and sent the other to fight Soviet partisans and maintain order in Belarus.  
Within a year, the Germans would disband both units, arrest most of the officers and send them 
to concentration camps along with many other OUN-B members.  The Melnyk faction 
appreciated the newfound German support, especially as remaining members of the Bandera 
faction began targeting Melnykites with terrorism and assassination.  The Germans helped 
virtually wipe out most of the Bandera faction in order to support the Melnyk faction.
408
  The 
Germans though did not realize that the Melnyk faction was planning a similar tactic of declaring 
an independent state once their expedition group reached Kyiv.  As OUN-M groups moved east 
independent of the German armies, they began to organize local political governments and 
attempted to gain local support.  Both groups of the OUN were surprised though at the “lack of 
national feeling” and disappointed when the populations largely did not rally to the OUN 
cause.
409
  The greatest sources of support for both OUN factions in Eastern Ukraine were 
generally Soviet educated rural and urban intelligentsia who frequently had positions in local 
government.
410
  OUN-M members organized a city council in Kyiv and believed that it could 
become the beginning of an independent state.  However, even the Kyiv city council was too 
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much for the Germans, because the German officials began to arrest and execute hundreds of 
OUN-M leaders and members, when they learned of the OUN-M’s ultimate motives with the 
city council. 
Ukrainian support for the Nazi “liberators” began to change as Ukrainians learned of the 
German racial policies.  Ukrainian nationalists held out hope longer than the general public and 
cooperated and collaborated with the Nazi regime’s persecution of Jews to gain Nazi support 
against the Poles until they discovered the Nazi views on Slavs were virtually identical.  The 
Germans not only viewed Jews as subhuman but also considered Slavs as Untermenschen that 
would become slaves for the German master race.  Under the governance of Erich Koch, the 
Germans began to exploit Ukraine as a colony.  They diminished food shipments to the cities to 
drive people into the countryside, lowered peasant income, forced workers to work from dawn to 
dusk, and met any resistance to their rule with corporal punishment and brutal reprisals.
411
  
Largely though, two Nazi policies were the main cause of Ukrainian resistance.  The Nazis 
retained the much-despised Soviet collective farms to ensure Ukrainian agricultural production 
and cheap labor.  Since the peasants were unable to attain land, many began to view the Nazi 
regime as a continuation of the Soviet.  The second policy that influenced resistance was when 
Nazis also began to deport Ukrainians West in order to deal with worker shortages.  The 
Ostarbeiter (eastern worker) program deported 2.3 million Ukrainians to deplorable farming and 
factory conditions in the West to support the war.
412
   
By 1942 the anti-Nazi sentiment fomented to such an extent that a nationalist veteran of 
Petliura’s UNR government-in-exile, Taras “Bulba” Borovets, formed the Polissian Sich.  
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Initially it was formed to fight alongside the Nazis against the Soviet partisans near Volhynia, 
but it soon began fighting against the Nazis as well.  When the objectives changed to removing 
all foreign influence, Borovets renamed the unit the Ukrainska Povstanska Armiya (Ukrainian 
Insurgent Army) or UPA in spring 1942.
413
  Several veterans of the Roland and Nachtigal units 
joined with the discouraged populace in the insurrectionary force to disrupt the Nazis.  The UPA 
began attacking both Nazi forces and Soviet partisan groups in the marshy northwestern region 
of Volhynia, which was more conducive to guerilla actions.  Both factions of the OUN saw the 
popular support for the insurgent actions and formed their own groups of UPA. Ultimately the 
Bandera faction eventually co-opted Borovets’ UPA and overwhelmed it with members from the 
inside while intimidating other nationalists in 1943.  The OUN-B formed a security and 
intelligence bureau based on both the Nazi Gestapo and the Soviet NKVD to weed out internal 
threats like informants, traitors, and political opponents.  The intelligence bureau forced 
opponents of Bandera out of the UPA with a policy of “join or die” and was instrumental in the 
Banderite takeover of the UPA.
414
   
As the Banderites were taking over the UPA, the Melnyk faction again tried to encourage 
closer cooperation with Germany.  After the Nazi defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad, Melnykites 
saw increased German support as a way to stave off Soviet invasion and show the Germans that 
Ukraine deserved to be a state.  The Germans finally acquiesced and began to arm Ukrainians in 
a new Waffen SS division, Galizien (the German for Galicia since Reichsführer SS Heinrich 
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Himmler feared naming it Ukraine would encourage Ukrainian nationalism).
415
  Melnykites 
maintained nationalistic beliefs about the new division of 11,000 Ukrainians and viewed 
Galizien as the nucleus of a future Ukrainian national army.
416
  Initially the Germans did not 
fully trust the unit and utilized it primarily to counter Soviet and Polish nationalist partisans.  
Through the winter and spring of 1944, the unit burned and destroyed several Polish villages and 
killed many villagers.  The unit saw its first major action in July 1944 when it attempted to 
protect Galicia from Soviet invasion, confronted the Red Army at Brody, and was virtually 
annihilated.
417
  The Germans attempted to reconstitute the unit in order to use it to against 
Slovakia and Hungary, but many of the 3,000 survivors either fled to join the UPA or fled to 
Allied control territories.
418
  Andrii Melnyk continued to seek German support even as 
collaboration with Germany began to lose credibility until he was arrested by the Gestapo. 
After facing nearly total annihilation, the Banderite faction became more extremist 
towards Germans, Poles, and even other Ukrainians as part of their goals to national liberation.  
It was a gradual change towards the Germans since following the Nazi crackdown in 1941 and 
1942, the Banderites still did not fight back against the Nazis because they saw that “any actions 
against the Nazis would mean help to Stalin.”419  Only in 1943, the OUN-B along with its arm of 
UPA began to see Nazi weakness, especially after the German defeat at Stalingrad.  The Bandera 
faction’s ideology changed from a belief that the Nazis would win against the Soviet Union but 
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would be too weak to enforce any administration in Ukraine thus an independent Ukraine may be 
possible to the Soviets would win and be too weak.
420
  With this changed ideology, the OUN-B 
believed that it was the right time to strike the Nazis and succeeded in removing most of the 
German presence in Volhynia.  Bands of OUN and UPA frequently attacked and killed German 
settlers in Ukraine to force them from the land.  The tactics drove 43,000 German settlers to seek 
German SS protection in safe zones and provoked renewed retaliations on the Ukrainian 
people.
421
  The German reprisals frequently destroyed entire villages but worked against the 
Germans by adding more displaced people to partisan movements against them.   
After they largely isolated and removed the German threat, leaders of the OUN-B and 
UPA turned their attention to a possible future Polish threat.  A number of Ukrainian nationalists 
believed that there would be a repeat of the aftermath of World War I, where both Germany and 
Russia were exhausted and a resurgent Poland would emerge and establish control over 
Ukrainian lands.
422
  To prevent the Polish claims to Ukrainian lands, especially the lands in 
Volhynia where Poland focused its settlement in the 1920s and 30s, nationalists engaged in 
ethnic cleansing.  The Nazis and Soviets reinforced Ukrainian beliefs that the Poles could not be 
trusted when both effectively exploited those animosities in order to rule the region. With fear of 
a resurgent Poland and the great distrust in place, the UPA began to apply genocidal methods 
they had learned from the Nazis.
423
  The UPA also began targeting Ukrainians who hesitated to 
join the OUN, or who had ties to Melnyk or Borovets.  Through these tactics the UPA may have 
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killed as many Ukrainians as Poles in 1943.
424
  The success of the driving the German 
populations out of Ukraine with extreme tactics against only reinforced the use of these same 
tactics against the Polish population and with Soviets “collaborators”.425 
As a response to World War II and the realization that Germany would not support an 
independent Ukraine, the OUN’s ideology began to shift.  After the German invasion, both 
factions of the OUN sent expeditionary groups throughout 1941 and 1942 to organize 
movements in the East.  When the groups arrived in the East, they found Ukrainians that did not 
understand the OUN’s hatred and extremism towards Poles, the Soviets, and Jews.  The Eastern 
Ukrainians generally favored a more egalitarian society with economic and political 
opportunities due to Soviet education.
426
  Both factions began to alter their messages in order to 
gain wider support beyond Galicia.  The ideology shifted so much that Jewish doctors frequently 
were found travelling with UPA units.
427
  By August 1943 the Eastern influences became more 
apparent and moved the OUN away from solely the concepts of Dontsov’s integral nationalist 
ideology of force and terrorism to essentially a political party with a military force.  Ultimately 
these changes influenced the OUN to ignore most of Dontsov’s political guidelines by declaring 
the OUN’s opposition to the imperial regimes of Germany and the Soviet Union while 
advocating a free society with protection of minority and religious rights in the Extraordinary 
Grand Assembly in August 1943.
428
  The OUN found away to fuse the disparate concepts of 
Dontsov’s exultation of heroism and leadership with more socially egalitarian ideology. 
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With the Gestapo arrest of Melnyk and the removal of Borovets from the UPA, 
Bandera’s faction consolidated its position and became the primary center of the nationalist 
struggle.  After their Grand Assembly though the Bandera faction began to reach out to other 
nationalist groups in order to unite and focus the struggle against both the Nazis and the Soviets 
and liberate Ukraine rather than divide the nationalist front.  The OUN-B and UPA reached out 
to members of the Ukrainian National Republic abroad, the Hetmanate supporters, and other 
groups to form the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council and place the UPA under the council.  
Melnykites and nationalists allied with Borovets did not join the council because they distrusted 
the Banderites and felt that the Banderites would monopolize power in the group while 
nominally arguing that it was democratic.  Those arguments were ultimately correct since the 
OUN-B was the most important and dominant group in the council and did dictate most of the 
decisions of the council and the actions of the UPA.  While the OUN-B was the leading group of 
the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, Stepan Bandera had little involvement in it due to his 
incarceration and primarily local Banderite members made the decisions.   
The UPA became the one of the most important parts of the Ukrainian nationalist 
struggle.  After the Allied landings in France in June 1944 and with the continued pressure from 
the Soviet Red Army, the Nazi government changed its policy towards Ukraine in order to gain 
support against the Soviet Union.  They supplied the UPA with weapons and even released 
Bandera, Melnyk, and other nationalists from political prisons in order to secure a withdrawal of 
German troops.
429
  Even though the Germans released Bandera and Stetsko in September 1944, 
neither Bandera nor Stetsko returned to Soviet occupied Ukraine, nor were they in active 
                                                          
429
 Doroshenko, 757. 
130 
 
communication with the OUN-B local leadership nor UPA forces.
430
  Bandera had become more 
of a nominal leader or figurehead for the nationalist movement.  
As the Red Army and the Eastern Front of World War II passed through Ukraine towards 
Germany, the Soviets found Western Ukraine and Eastern Poland in complete disarray.  Not only 
had the Ukrainian-Polish ethnic strife stirred up during the war continued unabated, but also the 
Ukrainian Insurgent Army was prepared to fight the Red Army for every inch of Ukrainian 
territory.  Conservative estimates suggest around 40,000-50,000 Polish civilians were killed in 
Volhynia with another 20,000-30,000 in Galicia.
431
  In an effort to counter the UPA attacks and 
threat to Polish people, Polish nationalists created defensive units under the control of the Armia 
Krajowa (AK) (Polish Home Army) in January 1944.  The AK carried out reprisals against 
Ukrainians but to a much more limited death toll of around 20,000 since their goal was not 
extermination.
432
  The AK’s focus was more divided than the UPA’s since they were 
simultaneously defending Polish citizens from the UPA, fighting the Nazis to liberate Poland, 
and contending with the politics of working with the Soviet Union.  The UPA on the other hand 
was able to focus solely on the advancing Red Army and fought numerous battles.  UPA 
commanders organized sizable battalions to fight the Red Army head on through early 1944.  
These UPA units believed that their dedication could repulse the Soviets and even attempted to 
capture Kyiv to block the Red Army’s advance across the Dnipro.433  The UPA’s dedication did 
not stop casualties though, as Soviet forces reported killing over 91,000 nationalist guerillas and 
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detaining more than another 96,000 during 1944 and 1945.
434
  The Red Army was forced to 
contend with both insurgent groups while continuing their advance against Germany. 
To counter this bloody civil war, the Soviets offered nationalists amnesty in three large 
waves from 1944 through 1946 if they would come forward and stop fighting each other and the 
Soviet forces.  Initially the Ukrainian nationalists ignored the amnesty offer, continued to 
confront the Red Army head on in conventional combat through 1944, and sustained heavy 
losses.
435
  Ukrainians did start to seek the amnesty but many nationalists used the prospect of 
amnesty to blend into the population largely and continue actions against Poles, the Soviets, and 
any Soviet collaborators as an underground organization.
436
  UPA strategists realized that 
guerilla forces could be more effective than conventional confrontation and began to divide into 
smaller groups that merged and blended into village life.  These smaller village level UPA forces 
continued to fight the Soviets for nearly a decade after the World War II ended.   
Along with the attempts to mollify members of the OUN and UPA with amnesty so they 
would no longer be a hassle, Soviet forces also attempted to discredit the Ukrainian nationalists 
in order to alienate them from the populace.  The head of Soviet Ukraine, Nikita Khrushchev, 
began the attempts to discredit the OUN and UPA in February 1944, even before the Red Army 
had entered Ukrainian territory.  Khrushchev defamed the OUN and UPA as “Ukraino-German 
nationalists,” “Quislings begging Hitler for statehood,” and “dunces among the populace who did 
not realize what the Soviets had done for the Ukrainians.”437  The Red Army finally pushed the 
Germans out of Ukraine, and the NKVD returned with the intention to pacify the formerly 
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occupied areas and eliminate the nationalist movements.  When the slanderous propaganda did 
not work to stop the influx of nationalists to the movement, the NKVD promoted further ethnic 
strife between Ukrainian and Polish nationalists and even went so far as to create falsified UPA 
units to attack and ethnically clean areas of Poles to further the fighting in order to divide and 
conquer the region.
438
  The NKVD also openly enlisted local Ukrainians into its spy network in 
order to both spy on the UPA and provoke them into unpopular actions.  When members of the 
OUN-UPA could not discover which of the locals were active or inactive spies, frequently they 
would retaliate and execute innocent individuals.
439
    
The ethnic conflict between the Ukrainians and Polish continued for at least two years 
after World War II because neither the UPA nor the Polish defense forces would stand down.  
Soviet authorities realized the danger of having mixed nationalities with such animosities on the 
Polish-Soviet border so Stalin devised a solution.  Stalin believed “net naroda, net problem” (no 
nation, no problems) where the Ukrainian nationalists could be appeased with the acquisition and 
incorporation of Galicia, the Poles appeased with a nation-state of their own, and both 
nationalities would be beholden to Stalin.
440
  The policy that arose from this belief was the 
“repatriation” of all Poles in the newly established Ukrainian borders to Poland while Polish 
communists launched a similar policy “repatriating” Ukrainians in Poland to Ukraine.  The 
Soviets expelled 782,582 Poles from Soviet Ukraine to be resettled in Poland while the Polish 
government responded with expelling 482,000 Ukrainians to Soviet Ukraine by 1947.
441
  Unlike 
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the Soviet Union’s expulsion of the Poles though, the Polish government was unable to expel all 
the Ukrainians from its territory before the Soviet Union closed its border.  This left around 
200,000 Ukrainians in Polish territory.  Many of those Ukrainians were active UPA members.  
The Polish government launched “Operation Vistula” to break up Ukrainian nationalists, 
internally displace the Ukrainian populations, and forcibly assimilate them into Polish life.
442
 
The UPA continued fighting using guerilla tactics and terrorist actions like assassinating 
Soviet officials in Ukraine into the beginning of the 1950s.  Even though the UPA was still 
trying to motivate the populace to not accept Soviet government and resist the Soviet occupation, 
the public started to cooperate with the government.  The message of struggle with the Soviet 
Union also lost much of its importance after the death of the last UPA commander Roman 
Shukhevych in 1950.  People realized that the UPA guerilla tactics could not bring independence 
but instead only bring punishment since the West was unwilling to aid or fight for Ukrainian 
independence.
443
  The Soviet policies were effectively incorporating Western Ukraine into the 
Ukrainian Soviet Republic.  To discourage Galician nationalists, the Soviet government 
outlawed the Ukrainian national flag, proscribed national heroes, and prohibited use of the 
national anthem and Galician self-identity.
444
  The people who violated these laws were branded 
“bourgeois national” criminals.  First-Secretary of Soviet Ukraine, Nikita Khrushchev, in the 
post-war years, initiated mass arrests and deportations against Ukrainian nationalists in such 
numbers that exceeded the nationalists’ figures, indicating many common citizens also were 
punished.
445
  Between the years 1944 and 1946 alone, 182,543 Ukrainians were sent to the 
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Gulags.
446
  Russian writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in The Gulag Archipelago briefly discussed 
the large numbers of Ukrainians in the Siberian camps and he, much like, the Soviet authorities 
lumped all Ukrainian nationalists as “Banderists” while explaining that they were “the most 
dangerous rebels in the camp.”447  Soviet leadership purged many Ukrainians in civil and party 
administrations throughout the Soviet Republic and monitored intellectuals for any signs of 
nationalistic sentiment.
448
   
By the late 1950s the OUN and UPA had lost most of their influence among Ukrainians 
except for some in the diaspora which had limited influence internationally.  The “repatriation” 
of Poles to Poland and Ukrainians to Ukraine greatly diminished the OUN’s ideology of struggle 
with Poland and the new struggle with the Soviets was not gaining support.  The OUN continued 
to petition for foreign support but the Western powers largely ignored them.  American and 
British intelligence services encouraged the UPA’s actions against the Soviets to destabilize the 
regime and utilized Soviet information the UPA gave.
449
  This continued contact encouraged 
Ukrainian nationalists to believe that the West could be influenced to support the plea and 
struggle for independence.
450
  The Americans and British though did not extend their interest 
much beyond intelligence gathering actions.  There was one power though that did not ignore the 
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OUN, the Soviet Union.  Under both Stalin and Khrushchev, the Soviet leaders took the threat of 
the OUN and UPA seriously.  Soviet NKVD and KGB agents attempted to infiltrate the 
organizations to undermine them and target nationalist leadership.   
Stepan Bandera continued to advocate to the Ukrainian diaspora from Munich, Germany 
to motivate the Western Powers against the “communist imperialism” and support an 
independent Ukrainian bulwark against the communists.
451
  However, similar to Symon Petliura, 
and Yevhen Konovalets the Soviets began to target Bandera.  A Soviet agent shot Stepan 
Bandera in Munich while he was returning home for lunch on October 15, 1959.  His wife found 
his crumpled and bleeding body in the stairwell of their apartment building and quickly called 
for medical help.
452
  German doctors, however, could not save him and he died the same day.  
His lieutenant Yaroslav Stetsko took over the leadership of the group and continued to advocate 
for an independent Ukraine until his own death in 1988. 
 
Interpretations and Problems with Bandera 
Shortly after independence, Ukrainian historians began to reinterpret the activities of the 
OUN and the UPA but lost funding in 1993.  The Canadian Diaspora views of the OUN and 
UPA are still the leading challengers to the former Soviet interpretations of the organizations.  
Both Soviet and Diaspora interpretations are not without their biases though.  The post-war 
Ukrainian émigrés frequently were former OUN, UPA, and other nationalists, or relatives 
persecuted for their beliefs and this of course colors their interpretation that the OUN and UPA 
were freedom fighters from two of the most malevolent dictators of the 20
th
 century.  They 
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“sanitize” the history of their organizations glossing over the initial anti-Semitism in order to 
gain Nazi German aid and support.  The Soviet interpretation took the other extreme and accused 
all nationalists of being fascists while glossing over their own extreme policies.  With such 
extremes to contend with, it becomes understandable that there is little to no room in the center 
for compromise or dispassionate discussion.   
In 1997 then President, Leonid Kuchma, appropriated funds for twenty leading historians 
to continue the work started after independence.  After seven years of archival research, in 2004, 
the historians released a nuanced fourteen point historical conclusion that attempted to 
contextualize and explain the OUN and UPA actions without idealizing, whitewashing, or 
blackening anyone to counter both preconceived diaspora and Soviet interpretations.  They 
stressed the need for greater examination into the era and the escape from the myopic one-
dimensional narratives.
453
  The era requires a great amount of nuance and finesse to recognize 
and address the ambiguity and controversy for all sides of the issues.  That ambiguity is what 
makes black and white beliefs so controversial.  Further research and its dissemination are 
necessary for reconciliation.  As a further attempt at reconciliation a year later in 2005, President 
Viktor Yushchenko invited UPA veterans to celebrate the 60
th
 Anniversary of the end of World 
War II with former Red Army soldiers.  Many individuals did make their peace with each other 
but only a few months later in October 2005 groups of UPA and Red Army soldiers protested the 
other group’s receipt of veteran’s benefits.454  In 2009, fifty years after his assassination, and one 
hundred years after his birth, Western Ukraine celebrated the efforts of Bandera’s faction of the 
OUN and the UPA.  The preparations for the anniversaries and celebrations inspired new 
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research and documentaries about Bandera that amounted to more than 20% of all research 
conducted into Bandera.    
One may question why independent Ukrainian leadership has focused so much research 
on redeeming a quasi-terrorist organization like the OUN.  There are a few reasons why Ukraine 
has tried to “rehabilitate” the OUN and its leadership through three different presidencies.  The 
myth that Ukraine has been in a continual struggle for independence makes the OUN and UPA a 
necessary component for that myth.  That the OUN and UPA were able to fight, even briefly, 
against both the Nazis and the Soviet Union independent of outside help plays an important 
psychological stimulus for nationalist feeling and a justification for independence.  The OUN 
and UPA can be considered one of the first national armies of Ukraine that espoused the concept 
of an independent state and fought for it while there was no state.  Their entire reason for being 
and fighting was an independent Ukraine, free from outside influence.  The OUN also presented 
the argument that due to Ukraine’s oppression and victimization under Russia and communism 
they deserved a state of their own.  Although the OUN and UPA ultimately failed concerning 
their ideological goals of an independent Ukrainian state, they succeeded in politicizing the 
diaspora abroad, which in turn helped politicize Ukrainians in Ukraine during Glasnost.  The 
OUN and UPA provided a justification for independence and helped foment a stronger 
nationalism than had existed previously among Ukrainians.   
This strong and determined focus on independence is what made the OUN problematic 
for the Soviets during World War II and in the immediate aftermath.  Nationalism in Ukraine 
following World War I was one of the strongest forces that could counter and potentially 
undermine communism and continued to be so after World War II.  Both movements depended 
on and attempted to motivate urban workers and intellectuals for their causes making the groups 
138 
 
naturally inimical to each other.  During World War II the OUN found its greatest support in 
Eastern Ukraine among Soviet educated apparatchiks and intellectuals rather than among rural 
peoples.  Without the intellectuals’ support the Soviet state would not be able to exist, so from 
the outset of the OUN-Soviet conflict, the Soviets derided the nationalists in their propaganda by 
calling them Mazepists, “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists,” and Banderites regardless of what 
organization they actually belonged to.
455
  The blanket name-calling also helped the Soviets to 
stifle any debates.  The Soviets focused on linking all nationalists to fascism and Nazism and 
continually claimed that the OUN was merely a puppet of fascist intentions in order to blacken 
the OUN, stigmatize any nationalist group, and confound any potentially nationalist debate.  
However, even discounting the Soviet denigrations in any evaluation of the OUN and 
Stepan Bandera, some major problems exist.  The largest problem with the OUN and especially 
the OUN-B is its extreme fanaticism.  While the stated goal of Bandera to liberate Ukraine may 
have been justified, the extreme and uncompromising methods the group used does not 
encourage one to overlook the numerous reports of extreme violence.  Apologists may argue that 
the numerous reports derive from Soviet NKVD invention or the fake squads the NKVD used to 
discredit them, but the history of the group necessitates investigation.  Through the 1920s and 
1930s even Ukrainians wrote about and disagreed with the OUN’s terror tactics, and it is 
unlikely that those tactics changed greatly from those decades into the chaos that swept through 
Ukraine in the 1940s.  The OUN methods of assassinating and terrorizing enemies and people 
deemed collaborators with those enemies does not lend to any definition of heroism.  The most 
impartial and dispassionate analyses of the OUN and UPA must include discussion of their 
brutality instituted against “outsiders” and their own people.  It is difficult though to find those 
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impartial and dispassionate discussions of Bandera.  Most of the sources favorable to the OUN 
remained conspicuously silent about the OUN and UPA’s actions during 1943 and if they 
mention anything, it is usually only organizational issues while numerous sources opposed to the 
OUN and UPA report the brutality to non-combatants.  Even with more research, it can most 
likely be concluded that the OUN was involved in excessive actions against the populace in 
western Ukraine, and even though the symbolism of the OUN continuing the Ukrainian struggle 
for statehood is important to independent Ukraine, it is because of those excesses of the OUN 
that Bandera should not be a hero.   
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CONCLUSION 
Facetiously, personalities as diverse as rocker Frank Zappa
456
 and comedian Eddie 
Izzard
457
 have discussed what the requirement threshold is for a state to exist.  Using those 
thresholds Ukraine qualifies as a state, since they have a beer, an airline, a football team, and a 
flag, and even though they conscientiously gave up the nuclear weapons stored in the country 
during the USSR.  More seriously though, Ukraine has laws, a constitution, police, military, 
education, and maintains the trappings of what is necessary for statehood.  The fact that Ukraine 
is a state is not what is in question, since it has been a state since the “independent” Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist Republic joined the USSR in 1922.  Ultimately it was the Soviet structural 
system that gave Ukrainians the essence of a state, named it, and why independent Ukraine broke 
away following the arbitrarily designed Soviet administrative district rather than determining 
new borders.  It is establishing the Ukrainian nation that is a more difficult problem.   
While the state became independent through referendum and essentially granted 
independence by an apathetic Russia, there is a sense that independence came only from the 
generosity or apathy of Russia.  Even though the “Orange Revolution” of 2004 was not a 
nationalist revolution, it was an attempt to integrate all Ukrainians in a democratic government 
under the rule of law and complete the “revolution” that began in 1991.  As one protester 
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reported “in 1991 we became independent, now we want to be free.”458  Many Ukrainians were 
seeking freedom from Russia’s continued influence in the country which remained strong 
following independence (in fact the influence was so great that Russian President Vladimir Putin 
openly campaigned for two months in 2004 for  pro-Russia candidate Viktor Yanukovych).
459
  
Yanukovych’s campaign became a campaign against not only Yushchenko but against Western 
Europe and America.  Yushchenko faced a Russian inspired smear campaign that attempted to 
present him as an American spy subjugating Ukraine to the will of America due to his American 
wife.  Yanukovych’s negative posters presented images of US President George W Bush 
revealed behind a torn picture of Yushchenko with a slogan of “Yes! For Bushchenko” (a 
combination of their names).
460
 This mixed image of Bushchenko also appeared as a cowboy in 
another poster riding across a map of Ukraine threatening the outbreak of a civil war like in 
“Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Iraq” and saying that “[Ukraine is] next.”461  When the 
smear campaign did not succeed, Yushchenko was poisoned with dioxin in September 2004.
462
  
Allegations spread quickly that the Russian FSB (successor to the KGB) was involved in the 
poisoning and Ukrainian nationalists linked the attempt on Yushchenko’s life with the previous 
successful Russian assassinations of Bandera, Konovalets, and Petliura. 
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Yushchenko survived the poisoning and came in first in the first round of elections in 
October 2004.  Although he came in first he did not have the 50% to avoid a second round of 
elections against Yanukovych.  During the second round, there were many voting irregularities 
and Yanukovych won even though exit polls showed stronger support for Yushchenko.
463
  Again 
Russian influence was suspected.  Ultimately with the help of millions of Ukrainians marching 
on Kyiv another election round was held, Yushchenko won, and received the presidency but he 
still could not escape Russian influence.  In 2006 and 2009 Russia doubled the cost of natural gas 
shipments to Ukraine
464
 (both times closely corresponding with upcoming elections) which 
harmed Yushchenko’s popularity and ultimately led to his 2009 defeat to Yanukovych.   
Due to Yushchenko’s ordeals involving Russia, one can understand why his 
administration promoted these five individuals as potential heroes in an attempt to legitimize and 
justify the nation being congruent with the state.  The Ukrainian nation is still seeking 
justification to govern that state through the attempts to delegitimize the Pereiaslav myth, which 
brought them under Russian influence, and by promoting these five individuals, it showed that 
the struggle to make a state congruent with the nation has been constant since Khmelnytskyi.  
While the definition of who the nation is has changed, the goal of an independent state has not.  
National heroes become symbols to legitimize a nation-state by showing that someone was 
fighting for independence and that is why there is such a struggle to establish these five people as 
heroes.  These five individuals are a few among all the figures and symbols representing that 
continual national struggle to be a state independent of Poland and Russia.  
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While Yanukovych has backed away from Yushchenko’s nation building efforts, he 
continues to face similar problems of how to unify the Ukrainian people.  In late November 
2013, his decision to back out of trade negotiations with the European Union unleashed the 
largest protests in Kyiv since the “Orange Revolution.”  Protesters viewed Russian influence as 
the reason why Yanukovych backed out of the nearly completed deal at the last minute.  The 
protesters have not only targeted Yanukovych with their invectives; they have also blamed 
Russia for interfering once again in Ukrainian affairs.  Many of the people gathered in Maidan 
Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) hold signs full of invective saying “if you’re not jumping, 
you’re a Moskal!”465 Some protesters have even torn down a 70-year-old statue of Lenin in Kyiv 
as a sign of their frustration over Russia’s meddling.466  Yanukovych is still attempting to 
assuage the protesters who call for his ouster from power. 
Independent Ukraine is a young state and still figuring out how to build and consolidate 
their nation.  While they define a citizen as someone who supports the Ukrainian state, they are 
still debating what a hero is.  Part of this debate over the establishment of heroes stems from 
groups wanting to delegitimize the former Soviet regime and arguing that it is due to Ukraine’s 
long suffering under oppressive regimes that they deserve a state of their own, while some 
segments of society continue to idealize and legitimize the prior Soviet government.  As the 
Ukrainian state is attempting to build the nation, they have been removing the symbols of former 
Soviet authority; many statues and portraits of Lenin, Stalin, and Marx have been coming down 
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and have been replaced with statues and portraits of Shevchenko and Hrushevsky in order to 
show the new values of a Ukrainian state.  However, one can still find many lingering statues of 
Lenin in southern and eastern Ukrainian towns.  Western Ukrainian towns have removed the 
Soviet symbols more quickly.  According to surveys conducted from 1994 through 1996 through 
Ukraine, Lviv in the west was the most nationalistically Ukrainian region while Donetsk in the 
east was the lowest.  Frequently these two places are treated as representatives of the extremes 
on a continuum of “Ukrainian-ness.” Residents of Lviv consistently identified themselves as 
Ukrainian for their primary identity (73.1%-78.5%) where as Donetsk residents’ identities 
ranged from Ukrainian (25.9%-39.3%), to Russian (22.9%-30%), to Soviet (40%-45.4%) as their 
primary.
467
  When there are still sizable segments identifying themselves as Soviet, it is difficult 
to completely remove the previous regime and legitimize the new.  That difference in self-
identification as “Ukrainian” can explain why western Ukraine has been more accepting of these 
five individuals as national heroes versus the east. 
Many academics have argued that these differences between Lviv and Donetsk and thus 
the legitimization problems in Ukraine in toto stem largely from the differences of language in 
the two cities and regions.  Lviv residents speak primarily Ukrainian while Donetsk residents 
speak primarily Russian.  However, concerning that “language issue,” it did not change their 
beliefs pertaining to patriotism since both residents in Lviv and Donetsk had a consensus that 
“the language people speak does not matter, as long as they supported Ukraine.”468 As well 
several residents of Donetsk responded that “they were ready to accept the establishment of 
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Ukrainian as the official public language so long as they were given time to prepare for the 
change and if Ukrainian will be the language of a ‘strong master’ who will bring the situation in 
Ukraine under control.”469  These responses do not reflect the traditional interpretations that the 
eastern regions of Ukraine are less nationalistic but merely that they desire a stronger state that is 
responsive and can guide its people. 
It seems rather than language being one of the largest problems hindering nation building 
it was historical education.  Again, the primary self-identifications are indicators of the disparate 
views on Ukrainian history and challenges Ukraine faces in its legitimization.  Both Lvivites and 
Donetskites view the Kyivian Rus’ era as important for Ukrainian history (72.7% and 77.2% 
respectively) but then have very different views of the rest of Ukraine’s history.  Lviv residents 
view Cossack history (74.1%), the Ukrainian National Republic (67.5%), and the Ukrainian 
Proclamation of Independence in 1991 as the most important events (90.4%)
470
 whereas Donetsk 
residents viewed the Treaty of Pereiaslav (77.7%) and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic 
(59.7%) as the most important events.
471
  That is why one of the ways that independent Ukraine 
has been attempting to legitimize itself is through the nationalization of history and showing that 
there has been a constant struggle for statehood.  Ukraine has attempted to “reclaim” Kyivian 
Rus’ history and the interpretation of Khmelnytskyi from Russian appropriation.  Ukraine has 
also attempted to establish an argument that the current state is a continuation of the Cossacks 
values.  The importance of the Cossacks in national thinking shows why even after Ukrainian 
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independence there were movements during both Kravchuk and Kuchma’s presidencies for the 
title of President to be renamed Hetman to reinforce the continuity with the Cossacks.
472
  The 
Ukrainian state is attempting to justify itself as a continuation of the Orthodoxy of the Kyivian 
Rus’ while also being a continuation of the freedom and democratic inclusiveness of the 
Cossacks. 
The state needs to be created before one can create nations and/or nationalists since it is 
the state that establishes the educational system.  When the Soviet Union incorporated the 
Ukrainian Soviet Republic in 1922, illiteracy was rampant and most of the Ukrainians were 
largely still agrarian.  The Soviet regime industrialized, and effectively urbanized the Ukrainians 
but in order to industrialize, the regime needed to educate the people.  With the Soviet education, 
literacy rates soared and Ukrainians came into greater contact with Russians in the urban 
environments.  This contact with Russians and the governmental policies that disadvantaged 
native Ukrainian speakers helped crystallize their identity.
473
  Ukraine start controlling its own 
educational system only in the last days of Glasnost and that is why reinterpretation and 
rehabilitation of these maligned figures began.  Ukraine is still contending with the lingering 
after effects of Soviet education while developing its national mythos and its identity since 
gaining independence.  Education is the key component to delegitimizing the prior regime, 
matriculating national sentiment, and coalescing various factions on national heroes.   
The Ukrainians are still justifying their role in the world and the debate over national 
heroes reflects the division of what role it will ultimately take.  While most of the world 
recognizes Ukraine as a legitimate and justified state, there are Russians who still deny that there 
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are Ukrainians
474
 as well there are some who claim that the creation of a Ukrainian state is like 
East and West Germany (an artificial division that will one day be reunited).
475
  While the pro-
Russian groups in Ukraine may not advocate reunification with Russia (since there has not been 
a large movement since 1991), they do weaken the process of legitimizing Ukrainian 
independence since they maintain positive views of the prior regime.  In the eastern and southern 
parts of Ukraine, Soviet nostalgia remains.  It is in many ways similar to feelings in eastern 
Germany (Ostalgia) that “things were better” under the prior regime.  The groups that still 
identify themselves as “Soviet” or “Russian” within Ukraine disagree with these figures as 
heroes and generally want closer relations with the Russian Federation.  In contrast, the groups 
who self-identify as “Ukrainian” are more accepting of these figures as heroes and generally 
favor closer relations with Western Europe and the USA.   
The Ukrainians find themselves in a quandary over proving their identity similar to how 
Austria found itself with the breakup of another 20
th
 century empire, the Habsburg Empire.  Both 
states have had a late start in building a nation-state while escaping the specter of more populous 
“big brothers” (Russia and Germany) that overshadowed and have attempted to incorporate 
them.  Austria reinterpreted its history to highlight its differences and distinctiveness, similar to 
what Mykhailo Hrushevsky did with his History of Ukraine-Rus’, but a “separate Austrian 
national identity only came decades after independence in the 1960s.”476  Hrushevsky’s influence 
has only returned since the early 1990s so there is still time for growing pains.  The Soviet self-
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identity will decline in time, but what will replace it?  Further research could focus on whether 
Soviet self-identification actually is declining and if there is a decline what is its impact on 
nation-building and the establishment of national heroes.  If there is not a decline in Soviet self-
identification, would that mean that protests would continue until the Ukrainian state  fractured 
into two separate states each responsive to the popular demands, a pro-Western state and a pro-
Russian state?  Whether other former Soviet republics have had, or are experiencing, similar 
struggles establishing national unity and what courses of actions those states have or have not 
taken.  Ultimately nationalism is what is necessary for a state to remain independent but it is only 
with education and time that Ukraine will build its nation, decide who its heroes are, and decide 
the role and orientation their state will have in the world. 
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